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ABSTRACT 
 
THE BALANCING OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: 
 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY AND THE UK 
 
by Ipek Demirsu 
Ph.D Dissertation, February 2015 
Supervisor: Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
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One of the most salient manifestations of the age-old tension in international politics 
between international norms versus security concerns is nowadays evidently conveyed in the 
tense relationship between human rights and counter-terrorism. While commitment to 
human rights became a benchmark of legitimate state conduct in contemporary politics, the 
fight against terrorism particularly in the post-9/11 era has given way to contentious 
practices that tend to undermine long established democratic values. At this juncture, this 
research investigates how state actors balance the often contradictory entailments of counter-
terrorism and human rights. Given that the relationship between discourse and policy of 
counter-terrorism is a mutually constitutive process, the study undertakes a multi-method 
qualitative research composed of a comparative policy coupled with a frame analysis of 
parliamentary debates in the context of Turkey and the UK. The study argues that in an 
attempt to by-pass human rights obligations state actors securitize areas of political life 
replacing them beyond the boundaries of normal politics by invoking a sense of 
exceptionalism. The institutionalization of the state of exception in the long-run brings grave 
ramifications for the status of human rights and the functioning of democracy.   
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ÖZET 
İNSAN HAKLARI VE TERÖRLE MÜCADELENİN DENGELENMESİ: TÜRKİYE VE 
İNGİLTERE VAKALARININ KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ 
Ipek Demirsu 
Siyaset Bilimi Doktora Tezi, Şubat 2015 
Danışman: Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
Anahtar Kelimeler: insan hakları, terörle mücadele, güvenlikleştirme, istisnailik. 
Uluslararası politikada, uluslararası normlar ile güvenlik kaygıları arasındaki gerilimin en 
dikkat çekici tezahürlerinden biri, günümüzde insan hakları ve terörle mücadele önlemleri 
arasındaki gergin ilişkide açıkça görülmektedir. İnsan haklarına bağlılık, çağdaş politikada 
meşru devlet idaresinin bir referans noktası haline gelmişken özellikle 11 Eylül sonrası 
dönemde terörle mücadele köklü demokratik değerleri zayıflatma eğilimindeki tartışmalı 
pratiklerin yolunu açmıştır. Terörle mücadele söylemi ve politikası arasındaki ilişkinin 
karşılıklı kurucu bir süreç olduğu göz önüne alınarak, karşılaştırmalı politika analizinin yanı 
sıra Türkiye ve İngiltere bağlamındaki meclis tartışmalarının çerçeve analizinden oluşan çok 
yöntemli bir nitel araştırma yürütülmüştür. Çalışma, devlet aktörlerinin insan hakları 
yükümlülüklerden feragat etmek amacıyla politik yaşam alanlarını güvenlikleştirdiklerini 
(securitization), bir istisnacılık (exceptionalism) anlayışına başvurarark normal politika 
sınırlarını aşan alanlar haline getirdiklerini tartışmaktadır. İstisna halinin uzun vadede 
kurumsallaşması insan haklarının konumu ve demokrasinin işleyişi için ciddi sonuçlara 
sebep olmaktadır. 
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Part I. National Security and International Norms: Sovereignty in the Nexus of 
Counter-terrorism and Human Rights
 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the end of the cold war, human rights has become the dominant moral vocabulary in foreign 
affairs. The question after September 11 is whether the era of human rights has come and gone. 
Michael Ignatieff, New York Times 5 February 2002
1
 
 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 events, with the decision to pass the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 the United Kingdom became the only European country to 
derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights by introducing the notorious 
provision of indefinite detention for non-nationals. The implementation of this provision 
ensued in HM Belmarsh Prison in London being referred to as ‘Britain’s Guantanamo Bay’ 
(Winterman, 2004) premised on a legal lacuna. In a different setting in Turkey, by the end of 
2012 the country has been characterized as the ‘world’s biggest prison for journalists’, most 
of whom are charged under counter-terrorism legislation, either allegedly being member of a 
terrorist organization or promoting such ideals. (Reporters Without Borders, 2012) In a 
revealing report the Associated Press has indicated that for arrests due to terror-related 
crimes, among 350,000 people convicted since 2001 world-wide, Turkey accounted for one 
thirds of such arrests (Mendoza, 2011). As the concept of ‘terrorism’ has come to be 
increasingly articulated by government officials, it has created new sites of ‘security’ and 
new grounds for bypassing core human rights principles.  
In world politics today, there is an evident conundrum arising from the clash of 
national security interests and international human rights obligations, particularly in the post-
9/11 era as the concept of terrorism has resuscitated realist concerns within and across 
                                                          
1
 http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/05/opinion/is-the-human-rights-era-ending.html 
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national borders. A growing number of states are becoming signatories to key international 
human rights treaties, while concomitantly pledging loyalty to the ‘War on Terror’ launched 
by the United States, which often entail contradictory policies. On the one hand, the 
normative power of human rights has become an indispensable dynamic in the political 
arena, conferring legitimacy to state conduct. On the other hand, the inflated environment of 
emergency triggered by the concept of terrorism has produced a perception of perpetual 
threat that necessitates extraordinary measures. As the state of exception becomes the norm 
in fighting terrorism, it seriously risks debilitating the status of fundamental rights and 
freedoms with long-term repercussions for the functioning of democracy.  
The concept of human rights has become ever more salient in the political arena 
since the end of World War II, as a result of and a response to the arbitrary use of power by 
governments. The concept has come to signify a limitation to the employment of state power 
vis-à-vis its citizenry, as ‘universal’ and ‘inalienable’ rights that every individual is entitled 
qua humans. There is a general acceptance of the moral status of human rights norms 
manifested in the fact that every state is part of at least one human rights instrument and no 
state dares to openly denounce such rights. (Ruggie, 1983: 98) Many scholars have come to 
celebrate what has been termed as ‘the global human rights regime’, with reference to the 
various international bodies and conventions that have ingrained these norms, in addition to 
the normative power they hold in world politics (Donnelly, 1999; Brown, 2002; Forsythe, 
2000). In this respect, international human rights constitute one of the most important 
normative apparatuses of our age, by promoting the acceptable scope of state-conduct 
towards its citizens. (Freeman, 2002: 94-97) Some have even argued that the principle of 
 3 
 
sovereignty has become conditioned upon the protection of fundamental rights in conferring 
political legitimacy. (Reus-Smith, 2001; Chowdhury, 2011) 
On the other hand, another salient concept that has come to the fore in international 
politics particularly since the end of Cold War has been ‘terrorism’; a concept that has 
invoked the notion of national security once again and resurfaced realist concerns over 
survival and national interest at the expense of moral considerations such as human rights. 
Notwithstanding different articulations of the term in different national settings, the 
accentuated perception of insecurity has culminated in controversial counter-terrorist 
measures that suspend established norms. In the last decade, the world has witnessed some 
of the most atrocious human rights violations under counter-terrorist measures, which are 
likely to have long-term reverberations in democratic societies. The concept of national 
security becomes rather elusive in the context of terrorism, since this notion is associated 
with non-state actors and a form of violence that is distinct from conventional warfare. 
Hence, the process of defining, circumscribing and addressing this concept is a process of 
constitution which bears significant policy outcomes. As put by Fierke,”[a]rticulating a 
threat or declaring a war are speech acts that bring a particular state of affairs into being.” 
(2010: 200) 
At this junction, this study undertakes an investigation of the trade-off between 
international human rights and national security concerns in the contexts of Turkey and the 
United Kingdom. It seeks to uncover different mechanisms involved in governments’ 
attempts to strike a balance between the entailments of human rights obligations and counter-
terrorism policies. As such, the study addresses the following questions:  
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1. How do state officials balance counter-terrorism and human rights norms? 
2. How are controversial counter-terrorism measures legitimized by state officials vis-à-
vis human rights obligations?  
3. What are some salient framing strategies employed by state officials? 
4. Why does United Kingdom as a long-established liberal democracy display similar 
tendencies found in a yet democratizing country like Turkey? 
This study argues that in an attempt to by-pass human rights obligations state actors 
securitize areas of political life replacing them beyond the boundaries of normal politics by 
invoking a sense of exceptionalism. In order to legitimize the suspension of basic rights and 
principles of due process, the purview of the security apparatus is broadened along with 
special powers granted to the executive and security forces. The institutionalization of the 
state of exception in the long-run yields serious ramifications for the status of human rights, 
where difference and dissent come to be identified as existential threats to national security 
that need to be silenced and eliminated. Hence, as governments pay lip service to human 
rights norms that are considered as ‘scripts of modernity’ (Krasner, 1999) signaling 
membership to ‘the civilized nations’, they endeavor to maneuver their obligations in the 
context of counter-terrorism through acts of securitization.  
Therefore, this study focuses on the interplay between language and policy, in an 
attempt to investigate how these two terrains shape the status of rights vis-à-vis security. The 
relationship between counter-terrorism policies and the security narrative is a mutually 
constitutive phenomenon: while the language on terrorism (and hence counter-terrorism) 
shapes perceptions of threats to national security and who is to be deemed ‘the enemy’, 
these perceptions are in turn translated into policy outcomes with real and often severe 
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consequences. In other words, the legitimization and institutionalization of security policies 
are two interconnected processes that reinforce one another. Conversely, the security 
narrative is challenged by the discourse of rights which confronts the stronghold of 
exceptionalism by invoking commitment to international norms and democratic values. 
These principles are endorsed as international obligations that state parties ought to follow, 
often signaling membership to the ‘civilized nations’. As a result, the conflicts, bargains, and 
negotiations among these two narratives, at times borrowing from each other’s symbolic 
repertoire, ultimately produce policies that shape the trade-off between human rights and 
security concerns.  
In order to shed light on the intertwined workings of policy development and 
political discourse, this study undertakes a dual investigation of the phenomenon at hand. 
Employing a multi-method qualitative research design, the study is comprised of a 
comparative analysis of policy development and a frame analysis of the legislative process 
to offer a comprehensive picture of different dynamics at work. Also known as triangulation, 
this methodology is conducive to linking discourse to policy output by building on the 
centrality of context in the analysis. Thus, the first part of the study seeks to trace and map 
out the historical development of human rights and counter-terrorism policies, in light of 
international and domestic trends, key events, and actors involved. Moving on from this 
background, the second part of the analysis aims to investigate the official representation of 
issues pertaining to national security and human rights through a frame analysis of 
parliamentary debates. This bipartite research design is formulated to address two cases, 
namely Turkey and United Kingdom, which convey significant similarities due to their 
common experiences with terrorism and their approaches to counter-terrorism measures. 
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Although the UK is a long-established liberal democracy while Turkey still strives in its 
quest for democratization, not only do both governments adopt similar security policies, but 
at critical junctures the UK is taken as a model for counter-terrorism legislation in Turkey. 
Interestingly, such parallels in the policy output are accompanied by similarities in the 
political discourse, as recurrent concepts, themes, and arguments travel across both settings. 
Hence, the contexts of Turkey and the UK offer valuable insights into the politics of law-
making and how this process is informed by language.  
 As a result, this plan of research is novel on several grounds. Firstly, it offers a 
rigorous analysis of how states balance human rights and counter-terrorism, by linking 
policy outputs to dominant political representations. There is an apparent lacuna in the IR 
literature when it comes to the tension between human rights and fight against terror, since 
it is either studied in solely legal terms or from a normative philosophical perspective. In 
this regard, the contextual and discursive aspect of the interplay between norms and security 
concerns remains largely understudied. While considerations of both power and morality 
inform one another in concrete processes of policy formation, cognitive frames prevalent in 
the cultural pool of meanings and values shape how issues are to be problematized and in 
turn handled with. Secondly, by bringing together the structural components of frame 
analysis and the analytical tools offered by the qualitative research programme ATLAS.ti, 
the study offers a systematic analysis of political language that is successfully applied in 
different settings. As a result, the research demonstrates how similar representational 
constructs and policy frames reverberate across both the Turkish and the British cases 
through visible discursive patterns. Moreover, the study contributes to the literature in 
demonstrating how counter-terrorism policies have come to culminate in unforeseen 
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protracted forms of injustice that jeopardize the functioning of democracy in a society. 
Although the literature focuses predominantly on notorious forms of rights violation such as 
torture or indefinite detention (Lazarus & Goold, 2007), a less palpable but more pervasive 
manifestation of such exceptional measures has been the spill-over effect of the security 
logic to everyday politics and the democratic process. Therefore, the study illustrates how 
acts of securitization yield serious ramifications for democratic forms of political opposition 
as they become more and more entrenched in the legal framework.   
 In what follows, the study is composed of three parts: the first part elaborates the 
theoretical and methodological structure, the second part offers a comparative policy 
analysis, and the third part provides a frame analysis of parliamentary debates. Chapter 1 
will delineate alternative accounts of studying security in international relations and how the 
notion of ‘securitization’ borrowed from the Copenhagen school is a useful analytical tool 
for examining the language of security. This chapter also provides an overview of the state 
of exception borrowing from Schmitt ([1922] 1985) and Agamben (2003), as well as the 
theoretical foundations of international human rights norms and the resuscitation of 
(in)securities triggered by terrorism. Chapter 2 elucidates the contours of the methodology, 
predicated on a multi-method qualitative research design analyzing policy development and 
policy frames as two interconnected processes in the cases of Turkey and the UK. Part I will 
finish off by adjoining the theoretical framework with the methodology. Chapter 3 depicts 
the historical development of both counter-terrorism and human rights policies in the UK 
context, whilst highlighting international trends and key events such as 9/11 as well as 2005 
London bombings. On the other hand, Chapter 4 highlights similar policy dynamics in 
Turkey, explicating the impact of the EU-accession process in Turkey, especially with 
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respect to the role of the military, and the onset of a reverse process of securitization that 
has hindered the momentum of political reforms. Part II concludes with a comparative 
analysis that traces similar trends in these two contexts. Lastly, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 
provide a structured frame analysis of parliamentary debates with the help of ATLAS.ti, 
pertaining to important counter-terrorism legislation in the House of Commons and the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly respectively. Once again, at the end of Part III a 
comparative account of discursive patterns and recurrent themes are presented alongside 
distinctive national narratives and representations. The study concludes by bringing together 
policy outcomes and framing patterns, with an aim to illustrate how the language and policy 
shape and influence each other in the balancing of human rights and counter-terrorism.  
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Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review: 
Sovereignty between Security and Human Rights Norms 
 
One of the most salient manifestations of the age-old tension in international politics 
between international norms versus security concerns is nowadays evidently conveyed in the 
tense relationship between human rights and counter-terrorism measures. Within this nexus, 
the field of national security as the sacrosanct terrain of the realist paradigm is juxtaposed 
vis-à-vis the normative power of human rights principles. While commitment to 
fundamental rights and freedoms is recognized as a benchmark of sovereignty in 
contemporary politics, the fight against terrorism and the resuscitation of security interests 
particularly in the post-9/11 era has given way to contentious practices that tend to 
undermine the former. At this juncture, the question is how do governments balance the 
often contradictory entailments of fighting terrorism and human rights obligations? In an 
endeavor to strike a balance between human rights commitments and national security, 
states often seek to legitimize the policies and measures they undertake to both domestic and 
international audiences. As a given issue area is rebranded as a matter of national security, 
policies that suspend basic rights and freedoms attains legitimate grounds for being enacted. 
In order to explore various entwined dynamics that are at play in the attempt to balance 
security and rights, this chapter provides a general overview of the state of the art.  
1.1 The Concept of ‘Security’ and its Study: 
The task of defining the concept of security and circumscribing its contours used to 
be the privileged realm of the realist paradigm, with its emphasis on the military dimension 
and the security dilemma. Realism has long designated a trivial role to any form of norms, 
ideas and values, rendering them as epiphenomena that are ultimately manifestations of 
power politics. Realist scholars view the nation state as the main actor in world politics 
 10 
 
upholding their exclusive right to sovereignty, and therefore, international politics (as 
implied in the wording) is a domain of state interaction underscored by competing national 
interests and power struggles. As famously put by Waltz, “…discussions of foreign policy 
have been carried on since 1945, in the language of political realism-that is, the language of 
power and interest rather than of ideals or norms.” (1979: 9). Congruently, Morgenthau 
indicates that ethics and politics belong to analytically distinct domains, where the former is 
evaluated by moral norms and the latter assessed by its political consequences. 
(Morgenthau, [1967] 1993: 13) In a realist world order marked by distrust, since there is no 
higher authority to resort, states ultimately pursue security via self-help at the risk of inciting 
insecurity on part of other states. Other states or institutions are not to be trusted, since the 
anarchic system fuels uncertainty and suspicion regarding others’ motives. (Waltz, 1979) 
While gains for one actor translates as losses for another, cooperation through international 
institutions or regimes is perceived as promoting the interests of powerful actors, thereby 
reflecting the extant power relations. (Mearsheimer, 1994) Hence, realism has usually 
depicted world politics as premised on an anarchic order where might and power capabilities 
are essential in determining each actor’s place.  
Although the realist school has historically been the dominant paradigm in 
International Relations literature owing to its theoretical depth and analytical rigor, 
particularly with respect to the terrain of security, it has nonetheless remained indifferent 
towards the growing influence of international norms and how they exert power through 
logic of appropriateness in world politics. As such, this approach fails to explain why a 
notion such as human rights that by and large challenges the principle of sovereignty and 
meddles with a state’s relationship with its citizens on normative grounds has become 
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widely recognized and institutionalized in international politics. This tendency is premised 
on the main tenets of realism that on the whole overlook other equally compelling yet less 
tangible dynamics in world politics such as beliefs, values, norms, and identities, in addition 
to those evident material factors that constitute national interests. Thus, since 1980s 
prominent figures from different camps of IR theorizing have undertaken the endeavor to 
redefine the concept of security and propose alternative conceptualizations of world politics 
to those presented by the realist paradigm. As an ‘essentially contested concept’ security has 
come to be defined in myriad different ways, particularly with respect to its referent object 
and perceptions of threat. Three such endeavors come to the fore, inter alia, those 
approaches that have challenged cardinal realist assumptions, namely the Constructivist 
Security Studies, Critical Security Studies, and the Copenhagen School. In what follows, 
this section will provide a theoretical overview of these three relatively novel approaches 
that have challenged the realist camp at its sacrosanct terrain, the politics of security.  
To begin with, the Constructivist research agenda rests on the assumption that 
security is a social construct that is constituted via intersubjective understandings, rather 
than an objective entity to be investigated. This position is employed by Adler and Barnett 
(1998), who take up social constructivism in a way to extrapolate how international 
communities can replace ‘power’ as the main source of security in world politics. Borrowing 
from the Deutschian concept of security communities, they argue that a common set of 
values and understanding of ‘proper behavior’ engender a process of redefining the concept 
of power to signify defending those common norms against an external threat. The main 
argument is that as states become drawn into established sets of social relations in a 
network, their expectations and behaviors also tend to converge, thereby creating fertile 
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grounds for peaceful change. (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 3-12) As such, Adler and Barnett 
introduce identities, norms and values as explanatory variables in security studies, contrary 
to the power-driven and conflict-laden realist account of world politics. Yet, the nation state 
is still taken as the main actor in the international arena and also the primary object of 
security.  
One of the mainstay arguments of constructivism is that shared identities, values and 
norms can culminate in institutional entities promoting a common culture of ‘proper’ state 
behavior. In this sense, Katzenstein’s constructivist account of security is illustrative of how 
the perception of and meanings attributed to central concepts such as security and power 
exerts an impact in world politics. Particularly vis-à-vis the liberal and realist strands of 
theorizing, Katzenstein evokes ‘culture’, ‘identity’, and ‘norms ’as explanatory concepts that 
can be applied to the traditional terrain of military security. (Katzenstein, 1996: 4-10) In so 
doing, together with Jepperson and Wendt, Katzenstein argues that: 1) cultural or 
institutional environments exert an impact on national security outlooks; 2) global and 
domestic settings (pertaining to culture and norms, rather than material elements) shape state 
identity; 3) a change in identity translates as a change in national security agenda; 4) state 
identities are intertwined in normative inter-state structures; and finally 5) state actions in 
turn have a bearing on such structures. (Jepperson et. al., 1996: 52-53) Through these central 
assumptions, the impact of inter-subjective understandings and normative considerations on 
the traditional military account of ‘security’ are developed.  
All in all, the Constructivist camp brings into play ideational and normative factors 
that have long been absent in the realist paradigm. They aim to point out the ways in which 
identities, norms and values come to shape national interests and security agenda of nation 
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states. Nonetheless, the constructivist account has been criticized for keeping intact the main 
realist premises, such as a positivist research agenda and a traditional conceptualization of 
national security. According to Smith (2005), the constructivist security studies rests on “a 
form of rationalism” shared with realism, in which ideational factors merely work to 
supplement the material explanations proposed by the latter. A similar point is also made by 
Waever (2002), who maintains that such a dichotomous conceptualization of idealism versus 
materialism fails to capture “…in a systematic way … why the same cultural and historical 
background can sustain highly contradictory foreign policies, or to explain change, 
especially discontinuous change.” (2002: 22) This shortcoming is important with regards to 
explaining changes in policy orientation and differences in various contexts with similar 
historical experiences. Secondly, this line of constructivism is preoccupied with the security 
of the nation state, thereby failing to employ a critical angle towards extant power relations 
this notion is premised on. Subsequently, by failing to criticize the conventional 
conceptualization of ‘national security’ constructivism tends to overlook security of the 
individual or the society, as pointed out by the Critical Security Studies approach.  
The starting point of Critical Security Studies (hereafter CSS) is a critique of the 
realist approach to security, which they deem as part of the problem of world politics today. 
Borrowing from Cox’s distinction of ‘problem solving theories’ versus ‘critical theories’, 
CSS considers realism to be “…a textbook exemplar of a problem masquerading as the 
problem-solver,” (Booth, 2005: 4) since it takes into account a single depiction of reality and 
endorses predefined questions that entail predefined answers. As an alternative, CSS 
engages with a wider array of issues that does not privilege extant power-holders as the main 
political units and undertakes what is termed as a post-naturalist research agenda that 
 14 
 
refuses to equate social sciences with natural sciences (the latter being an attribute of 
positivist epistemology). (Ibid.: 10-11) Thus, the definition of security as it takes place in the 
CSS approach is defined as the following:  
Security is conceived comprehensively, embracing theories and practices at 
multiple levels of society, from the individual to the whole human species. “Critical” 
implies a perspective that seeks to stand outside prevailing structures, processes, 
ideologies, and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations of security 
derive from particular political/theoretical positions; critical perspectives do not make a 
claim to objective truth but rather seek to provide deeper understanding of prevailing 
attitudes and behavior with a view to developing more promising ideas by which to 
overcome structural and contingent human wrongs.  
                     (Booth, 2005: 15-16) 
Since the political realm is not exempt from considerations of morality, CSS 
undertakes the task of discovering possible niches for social progress through the use of 
‘immanent critique’. In line with this stance, security within the contours of CSS theorizing 
is conceptualized as “an instrumental value” in world politics that does not consist of a 
military dimension, but rather includes other equally pressing issues such as poverty, 
environmental degradation, communal identities that are under threat…etc. (Ibid.: 23) It is 
claimed that the concept can be utilized to promote emancipatory politics if it is adopted to 
different issue areas that are not present in the realist agenda. As put by Booth, “[w]hile 
never neglecting the military dimension of security, students of CSS must seek above all to 
try to overcome the traditional prioritizing of the victims of politics (wars/tyranny) over the 
victims of economics (poverty/oppression).” (Ibid.: 110)  
In a similar vein, Buzan (1983) argues that the concept of security is a multifarious 
phenomenon that cannot be adequately grasped through a unidimensional vantage point. 
Instead, he offers an account of security that encompasses five interwoven sectors, namely 
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the military sector along with the political, the economic, the societal, and the environmental 
sectors. According to Buzan, the neorealist agenda posits that any formulation of security, 
be it national or international, is set against the background condition of anarchy, which in 
turn endorses three preconditions: states are the main referent object of security, national 
security is a relational and interdependent phenomenon, and hence security can only be 
relative not absolute. (1983: 22-23) Buzan disagrees with this stance, and instead contends 
that security has many referent objects on different levels of actors that cross-cut the 
abovementioned five sectors, from the subnational individual level to the international 
system as a whole. (Ibid.: 26) What is novel about this multifarious perspective is that by 
including the individual dimension into the analysis, Buzan illustrates the ways in which the 
state might be both a major source of and a major threat to the security of the individual. As 
such, it can be argued that inter alia two salient themes differentiate CSS from constructivist 
security studies, namely its focus on a variety of sectors in addition to the military sector and 
its critical stance towards the positivist research agenda. In so doing, CSS is able to 
overcome the aforementioned criticisms raised against the constructivist account in their 
plea to offer an alternative to the realist paradigm.  
One of the most important points raised by the CSS approach pertains to the 
dichotomous characterization of ideational factors versus material factors that is prevalent in 
constructivist studies, particularly with respect to the conceptualization of the state. Buzan 
(1983) offers an alternative account of the nation state that interconnects these two 
dimensions of this political entity. Whilst the physical base of the state is constituted by the 
population and the territory, the institutional base comes into being in order to govern the 
latter. On the other hand, the ‘idea’ of the state is significant in acquiring legitimacy which is 
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predicated on the ‘nation’ and its organizing ideology. As such, Buzan puts forth the issue of 
‘national identity’ as a critical element of the security problematique, despite the fact that the 
relationship between the state and the nation is not straightforward most of the time. 
Moreover, the official ideology of the state is also an inextricable component of the 
legitimacy of the state that is embedded in the institutional make-up, wherein the grounds 
for determining relations between the government and the society are set. (1983: 70)  
This conceptualization is quite conducive to an analysis of state legitimacy in the 
nexus of international norms versus national security concerns and operational for acquiring 
a better grasp of the ideational aspects of the state apparatus. Building on from this point, it 
is plausible to investigate how states acquire legitimacy via the official state ideology and 
the construction of a ‘national identity’ that supplements the latter.  Moreover, it allows the 
analyst to inquire in what ways such national interests are posited as being under threat in a 
security environment, thereby legitimizing exceptional measures. Such a framework is 
largely absent in the realist account that opts to focus on the material bases of the nation 
state and their positioning in the wider international context, with the exception of classical 
realism which indeed pays considerable attention to the power wielded by ideational factors 
such as state ideology and nationalism.2 (Carr, [1939] 1964; Morgenthau, [1967] 1993) 
Lastly, bringing to the fore the indispensable role played by language, the 
Copenhagen school defines security as a situation in which a given referent object faces an 
existential threat, hence security is a search of survival. In this respect, “[t]he invocation of 
                                                          
2
 E.H. Carr (1946)  in his canonical work explains in detail the political weight of both the moral basis of the 
nation state as well as the importance of the power of propaganda and rhetoric. Similarly, Morgenthau 
(1993) in his account of political power makes a lucid differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate state 
power by highlighting the indispensable role played by ideological elements in the international arena.  
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security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened 
the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers to handle existential threats.” 
(Buzan et. al., 1998: 21) Once an issue-area is deemed as a security issue per se, state 
officials are evoking a sense of emergency that bestows upon them the right to use 
extraordinary measures in overcoming such threats. Consequently, any issue can be placed 
in a spectrum that ranges from nonpoliticized, politicized and to securitized. The first 
denotes a situation where an issue is not deemed as susceptible to public debate or decision-
making, while the second is a condition in which a given issue is taken into consideration for 
governmental decision and policy implementation. On the other hand, a securitized issue is 
one which is ‘beyond politics’, requiring emergency measures that are exempt from the rules 
of ‘normal politics’. (Ibid.: 23) Thus, the framing of an issue bears tremendous significance 
when it comes to the juncture it is dealt with. This is an essential theme that runs throughout 
this study, in order to illustrate the ways in which the perception and subsequently the 
categorization of an issue determines the policy outcome, particularly depending on whether 
it is classified as a ‘security’ issue or not.  
As such, the study of security for the Copenhagen school is a study of ‘discourse’ 
and ‘political constellations’. The main question is therefore the following: “When does an 
argument with its particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to 
make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?” 
(Ibid.: 25) This problematique is interconnected to the central research questions of this 
study, which seek to investigate how the framing of counter-terrorism policies takes place, 
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and the extent to which such framing justifies the suspension of human rights obligations.
3
 
Congruently, the act of securitizing manifests itself on the rhetorical plane and displays a 
certain discursive logic (i.e. an existential threat and emergency action). As put by Buzan et. 
al., “[f]or the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to assess some objective threats that 
really engender some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the process 
of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively 
responded to as a threat.” (1998: 26) In other words, the concept of securitization is to be 
understood as a speech act. Still, certain conditions need to be met for the speech act to 
operate: firstly the internal condition of the grammar of security including the 
conceptualization of an existential threat and a scenario of handling it; secondly the external 
condition of the context and social actors which can involve political actors that articulate 
security concerns, and thirdly the citizens as the audience of the speech act. (Ibid.: 32-34) 
These components articulated by the Copenhagen school will form the backbone of our 
study, as the internal composition of the discourse, the actors involved, and the context are 
inseparable elements of the analysis.   
The Copenhagen School distinguishes itself from CSS which employ a similar 
theoretical perspective. What they have in common is a critical stance towards traditional 
accounts of security and a focus on the social construction of the concept. Yet, unlike the 
Copenhagen school, CSS is premised on the assumption that since key concepts are socially 
constructed, emancipation is possible. This is exemplified in its reconceptualization of 
                                                          
3
 A point that needs to be stressed is that the Copenhagen school states that framing a certain issue as a 
security issue entailing emergency measures does not in itself culminate in securitization, but merely 
constitutes a securitizing move. The act of securitization fulfills itself only when it finds a resonance through 
its audience, which accept the arguments that legitimizes the necessity of emergency measures, thereby 
granting the right to condone infringement of established rules. 
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security to connote ‘human security’, thereby attributing an instrumental value to the 
concept. Subsequently, CSS incorporates different aspects of the security problematique, 
such as unemployment, pollution, poverty…etc, and as such treats threats as ‘real’ and 
objective. Buzan et. al. (1998) instead opt to remain within the traditional purview of the 
notion of ‘security’ since they argue that once constituted, socially constructed phenomena 
often have a structure of their own and remain largely intact. Yet, by understanding the 
dynamics of such structures one can avoid the processes of ‘securitization’, which is the 
expansion of the security outlook upon other areas of social and political life. Thus, 
Copenhagen school sticks to the traditional domain of security and underscores its 
discursive and constructed disposition, while being critical of such expansion4 (Ibid.: 204)  
This point is also echoed by Waever in his criticism of over-stretching the 
boundaries of security to a point where it signifies every aspect of human life that is deemed 
desirable and loses its explanatory power. (Waever, 1995: 47) Waever is adamant in 
remaining in the traditional terrain of ‘national’ security, and insists that the subfield of 
security has “an established set of practices and…has a rather formalized referent,” contrary 
to a viewpoint of “security of whomever/whatever…” (Ibid.: 48) He is also critical of 
Buzan’s (1983) early tripartite model that includes the individual and international levels in 
addition to the state level as objects of security. Yet, Buzan asserts that this move was 
intended to demonstrate how state practices have significant ramifications on different 
levels. Hence, at the last instance both Buzan and Waever occupy a position that prioritizes 
the concept of national security in order to asses in what ways conventional security issues 
are extended onto non-military areas. It is indicated that while hard-core military 
                                                          
4
 In so doing, they regard their work as radical constructivism. 
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connotations have diminished in contemporary world politics, the understanding of ‘threats 
to sovereignty’ employ a prevalent position. In this regard, the logic of war imbued with 
motives such as challenge/resistance, offense/defense, victory/defeat, is expanded to 
different sectors. (Waever, 1995: 50-54)   
 The conceptualization of security as a speech act enables the analyst to observe 
situations where the state elites endeavor to gain control over an issue by rendering it a 
matter of ‘security’. Through the act of framing, the state and its officials retain a special 
position to determine national threats and declare control over it. As put by Waever, “[b]y 
uttering security, a state-representative moves in a particular development into a specific 
area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.” 
(Ibid.: 55) As such, Waever’s account of security differs from CSS in that security is not 
construed as something positive and desirable to be carried on other issue-areas, but quite to 
the contrary, it is depicted as a negative phenomenon that ought to be limited. (Ibid.: 56) 
Therefore, a more inclusive redefinition of the concept that is advocated by the critical 
approach is refuted in favor of the classical understanding, which enables the analyst to 
grasp articulations of security by elites.   
As illustrated above, these three camps of security studies convey distinctive 
similarities as well as clear points of departure (See Table 1).  All three approaches 
undertake a critical assessment of the mainstream paradigms as a starting point, primarily 
the conventional conceptualization of security prevalent in the realist school of IR 
theorizing. Both the constructivist camp and Copenhagen school opt to maintain the 
conventional terrain of ‘security’ in world politics. Nonetheless, while constructivism adopts 
this stance in order to verify the explanatory power of sociological concepts such as culture 
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and identity, Buzan and Waever are motivated to demonstrate how the logic of security 
permeates to nonconventional sectors as a result of securitizing discursive acts by state 
elites. In so doing, both approaches place the nation state in the center of their research 
agenda. On the other hand, CSS scholars prefer a more inclusive redefinition of security that 
can respond to new forms of threats such as poverty or environmental degradation. Their 
focus on individual security is both an empirical and a normative stance that aims to bring 
about emancipatory politics, a viewpoint that is not shared by the other two camps.  
This study shares with the Constructivist scholars an intersubjective understanding of 
security as a social construct that can exert its power through the logic of appropriateness as 
well as the logic of consequence. Yet, the epistemological and theoretical premises of 
Constructivism render this approach susceptible to the criticism of merely supplementing the 
voids left by the realist research agenda, in the absence of a critical conceptualization of the 
notion of ‘security’ itself. When it comes to the research agenda of Critical Security Studies, 
this study concurs with the point that most ‘positivist’ theories fail to acknowledge the 
workings of power and ideology in the acts of defining and redefining social phenomena 
that are taken as hard objective facts. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework of this study 
does not adopt an inclusive conceptualization of ‘security’ or an objective of emancipatory 
politics for the reasons congruent to those presented by the Copenhagen School. Instead, and 
in line with the latter approach, a limited and traditional operationalization of ‘security’ is 
applied as to shed light on acts of securitizing by state elites, as well as the wider 
ramifications of this act in policy making. Therefore, the framework provided by 
Copenhagen school is quite conducive to the study of the trade-off between counter-
terrorism and human rights. Particularly, Waever’s focus on securitization is fruitful for 
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analyzing how state actors endeavor to attain legitimacy by framing hitherto non-securitized 
issues as existential threats to the sovereignty and national interests, which in turn translate 
to policy outcomes. The next section will elucidate what is meant by the concepts of 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘legitimacy’ in greater detail.   
Table 1 Alternative Approaches to Security 
 
 
 
Alternative Schools 
of Security Studies  
Contribution  Shortcomings  
Constructivism  -social construction of security 
-intersubjective process 
-ideational factors  
-does not problematize the 
traditional notion of ‘security’ 
- fails to criticize extant power 
relations  
-dichotomous conceptualization 
of ideational and material 
factors 
Critical Security 
Studies  
-critical analysis of the 
conventional security apparatus 
-interconnects the ideational and 
the material foundations of the 
nation state 
-instrumental value of security 
-over-stretches the concept of 
security into all forms of human 
security (poverty, environmental 
degradation...etc.) 
-mars its analytical strength  
Copenhagen School 
(Securitization)  
-securitization as a speech act, not 
an objective condition 
-maintains the traditional 
conceptualization of security to 
illustrate how it expands onto 
other areas  
-most befitting for the topic of 
investigation, yet insufficient by 
itself 
-needs to be supplemented by 
other theories in order to better 
address the research questions  
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1.2. Sovereign Power and the ‘State of Exception’: 
Most theoretical accounts of ‘sovereignty’ adopt a Hobbesian understanding that is 
based on the capacity of the state apparatus to provide security to its citizenry. According to 
Burke, “…the modern idea of the political community- the Westphalian sovereign state 
based on the disappearance of individuals into the unity of the nation- is premised on a 
brutal and deeply relativistic claim about security.” (Burke, 2009: 65) While the nation state 
continues to retain the sole authority on security matters, the ‘sovereign’ is entitled not only 
to revoke the established legal order for the sake of security, but also to designate those 
elements that pose a threat to the well-being of the nation. This study opts to construe the 
concept of sovereignty along the lines of both as an authority to determine threats to national 
security and concomitantly as a form of power that ultimately relies on legitimacy. This 
section will firstly explicate the concept of sovereignty through the authority to declare a 
state of exception and designate those elements that pose an existential to the nation.  
By virtue of being the single entity to demarcate the state of exception, the sovereign 
stands as the ultimate authority to confirm and guarantee the validity of the law within the 
borders of a nation state. Schmitt defines the sovereign as the one  “…who decides in a 
situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or the interest of the state, public 
safety and order…and so on.” (Schmitt, [1922] 1985: 6) Yet, the exception cannot be 
encoded in law and thus takes place outside the legal order. Schmitt contends that the only 
clause that can be incorporated in the constitution would be designating authority to who can 
act on such situations. Moreover, holding the authority to decide on the state of exception 
along with the power to specify the enemy within, Schmitt ([1922] 1985) construes the act 
of eliminating radical political groups from domestic politics within the purview of 
sovereign power. The monopoly over declaring the state of exception also entails the power 
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to determine how this exception is to be handled with and when to shift back to the normal 
order of politics. (Ibid.) As such, the principle of sovereignty confers the state contours of 
legitimate authority and concomitantly the means of sidestepping it by invoking the notion 
of security.  
 Schmitt maintains that the sphere of politics is distinct from other spheres such as 
morality or economics, and as such, it is imbued with a concern over who is friend and who 
is deemed the enemy. This distinction is constructed by the state, who in turn can command 
its citizens to sacrifice their lives to fight the enemy in case of war. The recognition of the 
enemy does not stipulate its perception as evil or a potential competitor, but relies merely on 
the grounds that the enemy is the other or a stranger. Schmitt argues that the friend-enemy 
divide is different from other divides such as good-evil, aesthetic-ugly, or economically 
detrimental-beneficial. An existential difference assumed by an alien instigates a threat to 
one's way of life, and thereby justifies conflict. In other words, the ‘enemy’ does not 
necessarily have to be ‘evil’ or ‘detrimental’, the mere fact that s/he is existentially different 
is sufficient in itself. ([1927] 1996: 27) Thus, in this line of argument according to Schmitt 
"...war is the existential negation of the enemy." (Ibid.: 33) 
For the state to be able to ordain risking one’s life is what discerns this institution 
from other forms of organizations and places it above all others. Hence, Schmitt’s 
conceptualization of the state is in line with Hobbes’ Leviathan, whereby the primary task of 
the sovereign is to ensure order and safety within the given legal framework, and with the 
help of armed forces and bureaucracy. (Schmitt, [1927] 1996: 20-35) Since the principal aim 
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of the state is to preserve itself, the sovereign can suspend the extant legal order5 in 
circumstances deemed as posing an existential threat, thereby demonstrating its superiority 
over the law. (Schmitt, [1922] 1985: 12) Concurrently, the state is also the ultimate authority 
to classify the enemies ‘within’, those groups of individuals that jeopardize the existence of 
the political community.  
The theme of friend-enemy distinction is also taken up by Blaney and Inayatullah 
(2000) from the vantage point of ‘difference’, who revisit the concept of Westphalian 
sovereignty which they take as one of the most preponderant principles in international 
politics. Taking the issue of difference versus equality as a starting point, the authors 
elucidate the underlying concern of the Peace of Westphalia: the containment of difference 
(manifestly religious and cultural difference) within the borders and the purview of the state, 
while acknowledging equality amongst the latter. The contemporary repercussion of this 
phenomenon is the attribution of ‘difference’ to populations of distinct states, compared to 
the conceived 'sameness' within borders. Congruent to Schmitt’s account, these scholars 
indicate that the construction of ‘sameness’ versus ‘difference’ engenders a political 
environment wherein diversity is perceived as a threat, whether it is found within the borders 
of a nation state or pertaining to other cultures and societies. The function of demarcating 
difference and determining ‘otherness’ is crucial in the context of counter-terrorism, as those 
political elements or social groups within and beyond the borders of a society that are 
deemed as belonging to this category usually become suspect communities and thereby 
subject to ‘emergency measures’ executed by state agents.  
                                                          
5
Which does not equate to anarchy or chaos, but to yet a different order under the unlimited powers of the 
sovereign.  
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In a similar vein, Giorgio Agamben (2003) elaborates on the Schmittian formulation 
of the ‘sovereign’ as the one to decide on ‘the state of exception’, applying it particularly in 
the post-9/11 political context. Resting on the notion of ‘necessity’, the state of exception 
stands at the grey zone between law and politics. He claims that the modern state of 
exception is a product of democratic governments, not absolutist states, wherein “the 
physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who 
for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system [takes place].” (2003: 2) Thus, 
what took place in the aftermath of September 11 is a legal limbo in which the individual is 
stripped of any legal status and therefore fundamental rights. As a staggering practice, the 
authorization of ‘indefinite detention’ for noncitizens suspected of terrorist acts on 13 
November 2001 has ensued in a category of ‘detainee’ in the US, rendering such individuals 
to be susceptible to what Agamben defines as the “de facto rule” of the sovereign. 
Previously issued the same year on 26 October, the U.S.A Patriot Act bestowed the attorney 
general the power to take into custody aliens suspected of being involved in activities 
against national security, to be either released or charged by a criminal offense within seven 
days. Nevertheless, the introduction of ‘indefinite detention’ for non-nationals suspected of 
involvement with terrorist activities signifies their containment outside of the legal order, as 
they are not charged with a crime according to the American laws. (Ibid.: 3) An equivalent 
measure has been adopted in the UK on 19 November 2001 with the enactment of Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 that has introduced indefinite detention of non-
citizens, ensuing in the derogation from ECHR.  
In contemporary politics, there seems to be a proclivity among Western democracies 
to ingrain the declaration of state of exception within the purview of the security paradigm. 
 27 
 
Institutionally speaking, the state of exception entails the extension of executive powers to 
include ‘decrees having the force of law’. This phenomenon translates itself as the blurring 
of the lines that demarcate legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the state.  
(Agamben, 2003: 4-7) Thus, the principle that ‘necessity creates its own laws’ becomes 
enshrined in the institutional make-up of the state apparatus, notwithstanding the fact that 
necessity is a subjective notion that comes into life only when it is uttered. (Ibid.: 30) 
Consequently, in line with Schmitt’s account, the state of necessity according to Agamben is 
a “space devoid of law,” which does not equate with a state of nature, but rather connoting 
the suspension of law. (Ibid.: 50) Agamben’s account of sovereignty is imperative in 
shedding light to the processes framing ‘extraordinary measures’ and how this practice is 
imbued within the notion of sovereignty itself. Hence, the ‘sovereign’ is endowed with the 
capacity to sidestep the grounds of its own authority and revoke legal principles for the sake 
of security. This conceptualization has important bearings in the context of counter-
terrorism, as it succinctly illuminates how state actors are able to violate rights and freedoms 
whilst invoking legitimacy. A multitude of practices that overtly sidestep due process and 
basic rights, such as extremely long pre-trial detention periods, being deprived of a right to 
defense or a right to be informed on what charges the individual is suspected of, are cogent 
examples of this phenomenon where individuals are dealt outside of normal criminal 
procedures as existential threats to be contained.   
As can be seen, the concept of ‘sovereignty’ is a complex phenomenon that lends 
itself to different articulations. In the accounts provided above, the first characteristic that 
comes to the fore is the sovereign’s role as the provider and maintainer of security in a given 
territory. Schmitt in his famous account identifies the sovereign as the one who can stand 
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out of the law while concomitantly vindicating the legal order when circumstances require it 
so, particularly in times of pressing security concerns. By virtue of being the sole provider of 
security, the sovereign is depicted as the ultimate authority to decide on the friend-enemy 
divide both inside its borders and outside. Blaney and Inayatullah illustrate how this theme 
reverberates in contemporary politics through acts of ‘othering’ those ways of life that are 
deemed alien to ‘us’. Likewise, Agamben adopts Schmitt’s conceptualization to explain the 
ways in which democratic states have normalized and institutionalized the ‘state of 
exception’ as a practice of sovereignty in the post-9/11 era. These accounts are helpful in 
answering the question of how states can legitimately revoke established norms and 
principles in the context of national security.  
Nonetheless, in order to place the notion of sovereignty within the framework of 
logic of appropriateness, one must first elaborate what is meant by ‘legitimacy’. Defined as 
“a political space, but not an unbounded or normatively autonomous one,” the concept of 
legitimacy only makes sense in the context of an international society that is built upon a set 
of principles, norms and values. (Clark, 2005: 29) In contemporary politics, universally 
accepted principles and norms have come to constitute one of the primary benchmarks of 
sovereignty, and thus exert a limit on the execution of ‘sovereign power’. This conditioning 
has been taken up by David Held: “Sovereignty can no longer be understood in terms of the 
categories of untrammeled effective power. Rather a legitimate state must increasingly be 
understood through the language of democracy and human rights. Legitimate authority has 
become linked, in moral and legal terms, with the maintenance of human rights values and 
democratic standards.” (2004: 137) The next section will elaborate international norms in 
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general and human rights principles in particular that demarcate the standards of appropriate 
state behavior.  
1.3. International Norms and Human Rights: 
Scholars from different paradigms have come to acknowledge the fundamental role 
played by international norms in conferring legitimacy to state actors in the post-war world 
politics. Finnemore and Sikkink define a norm as a “standard of appropriate behavior for 
actors with a given identity.” (1998: 891) Pertaining to the symbolic order, international 
norms attribute ‘meaning’ to state conduct and endeavor to shape it in line with globally 
accepted principled beliefs. (Khagram et. al., 2002: 11-12) Due to their ideational 
disposition and power of invoking a sense of justice and legitimacy, international norms 
have been utilized, appealed to and promoted by different actors within world politics, such 
as international organizations, nation states, and civil society actors that operate within and 
across state borders. This is also the case for international human rights, as they are being 
ever more incorporated into the discourses of various political actors.  
Normative and ideational concerns have always underscored international politics, 
even within the realist paradigm in the form of legitimacy and ideology. (Carr, [1939] 1964; 
Morgenthau, [1967] 1993) During the behavioralist revolution of 1960s and 1970s the focus 
of research premised on 'observable' variables, while concern over norms and ideas have 
been sidelined only to resurface in 1908s under what has been known as the 'ideational turn'. 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 248-252) But how norms come to be accepted and endorsed 
by political actors in the first place? In order to grasp such change, Finnemore and Sikkink 
elaborate on the life cycle of norm, where norm entrepreneurs operating on a transnational 
platform strategically frame issues in order to evoke a sense of appropriateness. According 
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to Finnemore and Sikkink, increasing number of states start recognizing the newly emergent 
norms due to a concern over legitimacy as well as international and domestic reputation. 
(Ibid.: 255-258) As a product of a process of socialization, it is argued that these norms 
become internalized and institutionalized within the state apparatus. (Ibid.: 260)  
International human rights principles inter alia have become one of the most 
influential norms accepted in international politics since the end of World War II, as a result 
of and a response to the arbitrary use of power by governments. The concept has come to 
signify a limitation to the employment of state power against its citizens, as ‘universal’ and 
‘inalienable’ rights that every individual is entitled qua humans. In world politics today 
there is a general acceptance of the moral status of human rights norms mainly in the West, 
as manifested in the fact that every state is part of at least one human rights instrument and 
no state opts to overtly denounce such rights. (Ruggie, 1983: 98) As put by Brown, “[t]he 
growth of the discourse of rights over the last fifty years has been one of the most striking 
changes in both the theory and practice of international relations.” (Brown, 2002: 116) The 
growing articulation of this discourse is due to its ability to be applied to claims to justice 
over different issues and in different contexts (Freeman, 2002), as well as in its power to 
evoke an understanding of moral objectivity imbued with ‘universalism’ (Langlois, 2002).   
As a result, many scholars have come to celebrate what has been termed as ‘the 
global human rights regime’, premised on various international bodies and conventions that 
have ingrained these sacrosanct rights, owing to the normative power they hold in world 
politics (Donnelly, 1986; Brown, 2002; Forsythe, 2000). Such celebrations are generally 
accompanied by arguments about the diminishing prevalence of state authority within its 
own territories and the growing significance of international norms upheld by respective 
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institutions, thereby heralding the insufficiencies of the realist paradigm in explaining 
contemporary politics. (Brown, 2002) Moravcsik suggests that unlike any other form of 
international institution created for inter-state cooperation, human rights regimes are distinct 
for regulating the internal activities of states, thereby granting individual citizens the power 
to challenge their own government. (Moravcsik, 2000: 217) States might be compelled to 
sign human rights conventions even though they are lukewarm or reluctant towards these 
principles, since being signatories to these conventions are perceived as “part of the script of 
modernity.” (Krasner, 1999: 33) These ‘cognitive scripts’ can exert the power to 
circumscribe boundaries of ‘appropriate’ behavior for nation states at a given context, such 
as the aftermath of World War II. In so doing, the concept of human rights regime confers a 
new set of responsibilities upon the nation state, one that bestows groups and individuals 
equal standing with states in the international arena. (Vincent, 1986: 93)   
Despite the fact that most international law pertaining to human rights are non-
binding (except for the European Convention on Human Rights), it is argued that they 
nonetheless exert their influence by setting certain standards for being a member of the 
international community, and in so doing, converge states’ expectations with respect to 
treating their citizens. (Freeman, 2002: 94-97) Thus, states are no longer the sole authority 
over their own population, since legitimacy and international standing is conditional on a 
respect for human rights (Evans, 2005: 1047). Subsequently, the concept of human rights, as 
they are enshrined in international bodies and documents, have not only come to constitute a 
legitimate moral claim that can be utilized by individuals or groups against state oppression, 
but also as a means to distinguish legitimate practices of state sovereignty.  
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From this vantage point, Reus-Smith repudiates conceptualization of human rights 
regime as “mutually contradictory” in relation to the sovereignty principle, and argues 
instead that the legitimacy of the latter (i.e. legitimate statecraft) has come to be defined in 
terms of the protection of fundamental rights. (Reus-Smith, 2001: 520) As a parallel 
development, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (hereafter 
ICIS) has endorsed a different conceptualization of the principle of sovereignty, one which 
is construed as a responsibility to protect the rights of its citizens rather than a right of states. 
(Chowdhury, 2011: 40) In so doing, it is suggested by Chowdhury that the ICIS has merged 
the internal and external conceptualizations of sovereignty and imbued it within the contours 
of international norms. (Ibid.) Hence, generally considered as a discourse appropriated by 
actors operating in what has been termed as ‘global civil society’ in order to justify their call 
for a sense of justice and universality, it is possible to suggest that international human 
rights norms can also be articulated by state actors for a sense of political legitimacy.  
In this respect, human rights constitute one of the most important contemporary 
international regimes of our age, by promoting the acceptable scope of state-conduct 
towards its citizens, manifested in international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, coupled by international legal documents. As cogently put by Savic, “[t]he 
unhindered functioning of human rights, and related to this, the democratic regulation of 
political and legal life, have become standard criteria for the legitimization of modern 
states.” (Savic, 1999 :5)  The issue of legitimacy carries material bearings as well, since 
human rights records of a country is one of the key indicators for allotting international 
loans or political/military help. (Ignatieff, 2001:11) This phenomenon is posited by 
Ignatieff: “Naming and shaming for human rights abuses now have real consequences.” 
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(Ibid.: 12) As a result, an appeal to international human rights by state actors has become a 
common phenomenon, since respect for such norms has come to constitute one of the pillars 
of legitimizing sovereignty. 
The most sophisticated account of the role human rights play in international politics 
have been elaborated in Risse et. al.’s work, entitled The Power of Human Rights (1999). 
The spiral model of human rights change that the authors have developed is predicated on 
the notion of socialization, defined as “[t]he process by which principled ideas held by 
individuals become norms in the sense of collective understandings about appropriate 
behaviour which then lead to changes in identities, interests, and behaviour.” (Ibid.: 11) This 
notion is borrowed from the social constructivist theory of IR, which lays emphasis on ideas 
and norms in shaping state’s behaviour.  In their account of norms socialization, the authors 
provide a two-fold critique to the dominant rationalist approaches in IR theory, which take 
states’ identities and interests as given and fixed and state behaviour as mainly influenced by 
material conditions. Firstly, they elucidate how interests and identities are formed via 
intersubjective and cognitive processes, thereby culminating in the development of 
collective meanings, as well as a set of values and norms that guide state behaviour. This 
vantage point is significant with respect to the growing salience of international human 
rights that have come to constitute a major element in determining the ‘civilized nations’, 
and in shaping actors’ identities and interest that aim to be part of it. Secondly, Risse et. al. 
circumvent the problem of treating states as a “black box,” by drawing attention to the 
domestic, international and transnational dynamics that exert a considerable impact on state 
policies. (Risse & Sikkink, 1999.: 7)  
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 The complex model that these scholars have developed is premised on a five phase 
process of norms socialization. The first phase of repression and activation of network 
involves the interaction of transnational advocacy networks with domestic societal 
opposition in gathering enough information to put the norm-violating state on the 
international agenda and alerting Western governments. (Ibid.: 22-23) This phase is 
followed by a phase of denial, in which the norm-violating government not only rejects the 
accusations themselves, but also questions the legitimacy of the opposition, thereby avoiding 
engagement with these actors. (Ibid.: 24) The third phase of tactical concessions occurs vis-
a-vis incremental international pressures, engendering the government to resort to 
instrumental adaptation and strategic bargaining over concerns of their international image 
or domestic legitimacy. Towards the end of tactical concessions, transnational networks and 
domestic opposition acquire greater recognition, and their claims are taken more seriously 
by the government, leading to the fourth phase of prescriptive status. (Ibid.: 26-28) The 
transition to this phase is marked by concrete steps such as the ratification of international 
human rights doctrines, institutionalization of human rights norms in the domestic law, 
establishment of complaint mechanisms, and articulation of human rights in the discourses 
of governments. Lastly, the final phase of rule-consistent behaviour is established when 
human rights are institutionalized and norm compliance becomes habitualized in state 
conduct. (Ibid.: 32-33) 
Thus, it can be argued that Risse et. al.’s work has been predicated on the following 
assumptions: 
a. States have an a priori interest to avoid human rights norms.  
b. Initiation of the spiral model necessitates the involvement of civil society actors.  
 35 
 
c. The spiral model applies to the socialization of ‘abusive’ states that have a tendency 
of defying international moral conduct. In so doing, it takes for granted that ‘liberal western 
states’ are part of a transnational advocacy network that aims to promote human rights.  
As noted earlier, human rights used to be construed as inimical to the sovereign 
power of the state since it entailed intervention in domestic affairs, however, in 
contemporary world politics, the concept has come to constitute one of the main pillars of 
sovereignty. This is due to the legitimacy conferred by the concept, which might yield 
material benefits, such as membership to international organizations, international funding, 
or even appeal to the relevant constituency. Hence, this study holds that even in the absence 
of the first phase of the spiral model, that is state repression followed by subnational and 
international reaction, states have an interest in exhibiting a stance that upholds human 
rights principles in order to acquire both internal and external legitimacy. Moreover, the 
logic of causality in the model presumes that international pressure is initially instigated by 
local or international NGOs, which might not be the case in the presence of an international 
monitoring institution (an obvious example would be the European Union or the Council of 
Europe).  Risse et. al.’s theory rests on an ex ante scenario in which a substantial repression 
takes place that is able to trigger national and international responses and thereby initiate the 
spiral model. This study argues that states might be compelled to straighten their human 
rights record and legislation without a significant involvement of civil society actors if there 
is a considerable influence of an international institution, particularly in the presence of 
clearly set conditionality.  
Another problematic assumption is that the model deals with ‘abusive’ states and 
how they are ‘socialized’ into complying with international human rights norms, but not 
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possible regressions in liberal democratic states. This perspective condones the violations 
inflicted by the liberal democratic states that have long extolled the human rights ideal, or 
instances where hitherto granted and protected human rights are withdrawn under conditions 
deemed as ‘state of emergency’. This is a rather pervasive phenomenon particularly in the 
aftermath of 9/11 events, as a growing number of liberal democracies have adopted counter-
terrorism measures that are debilitating for human rights principles. Hence, a key vantage 
point adopted by this study is to investigate in what ways consolidated democracies sidestep 
human rights principles by bringing into play the language of security and how such 
endeavor is perceived by the national and international audiences.  
1.4. Terrorism and Counter-terrorism:  
There has been a general tendency in the post-9/11 era on part of state officials and 
the measures they put forth to sidestep rights and freedoms as obstacles in the pursuit of 
‘national security’. Particularly with respect to counter-terrorism legislation since the ‘War 
on Terror’ a perceived inherent trade-off between human rights and security concerns tends 
to undergird this balancing act. Golder and Williams (2006) explicate some common 
features that can be traced in counter-terrorism measures in the aftermath of 9/11: firstly, 
these new laws undertake defining the concept of terrorism and terrorist acts, and mostly opt 
to formulate overly general definitions that cover additional offences; secondly they endow 
governments with the power to penalize membership to certain organizations; thirdly these 
measures aim to ‘quarantine’ the resources of these groups, while the authority of the police 
is by and large expanded; and lastly, these laws engender changes in deportation, 
immigration and asylum laws. (2006: 45-47) It is argued that there is a tendency on part of 
governments that pass counter-terrorist measures as a reaction to recent events, 
miscalculating the effectiveness of these measures and making rash decisions. Neal (2012) 
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concurs with this point, suggesting that following a terrorist attack politicians are often 
inclined to portray themselves as ‘doing something’; therefore, hastily passing new pieces of 
legislation that are difficult to reverse in the future. (Neal, 2012: 265) In turn, these counter-
terrorism laws that are predicated on an understanding of emergency and exceptionalism go 
on to violate long-established civil and political rights to an unnecessary extent.  
Yet, on what grounds do officials legitimize the bypassing of long-established rights 
and liberties in modern democracies? In her investigation of the US, the UK and Australia 
cases, Wolfendale (2006) notes a shared inclination to posit suspending certain rights and 
norms of legality as the most befitting strategy to effectively cope with the threats that are 
conceived as jeopardizing ‘our civilization’ or ‘our way of life’. Wolfendale contends that 
the fear of terrorism outweighs the actual threat posed by this phenomenon. She asserts that 
while it is statistically proven that different forms of threats such as environmental disasters 
or epidemics pose a greater threat to society, counter-terrorism measures evoke future 
possibilities of terrorist attack and hence enter the realm of uncertainty. In so doing, 
suspension of legal protections and civil rights, along with vast defense budgets are justified 
vis-à-vis the construction of an inflated notion of ‘super-terrorism’. (2006: 753-760) Thus, 
she indicates that the disproportionate counter-terrorism measures implemented by 
governments are in themselves grave security threats for individuals.  
On the whole, counter-terrorism legislation that has tremendous bearings on how the 
limitations of certain rights are formulated on the basis of perceptions and interpretations of 
policy makers, rather than on an objective threat. As a result, by evoking notions such as 
uncertainty, necessity, and emergency, policy-makers are able to justify the enactment of 
provisions that contradict with democratic principles. Notwithstanding this aspect of 
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lawmaking, there is an evident absence in conventional terrorism studies regarding the 
discourses and representations of terrorism, particularly in the context of liberal democracies 
(Stokes, 2009: 87), where the last decade witnessed some of the most draconian measures 
being passed under the banner of counter-terrorism. Still, there have been a number of 
studies that have addressed novel questions and undertaken innovative approaches in 
shedding light to this phenomenon. Most of these studies adopt a critical angle to the issue 
and tend to focus on the constitutive dimension of discourse in articulating terrorism, such as 
how understanding of threat is constructed and categorized, how subsequent policy outlooks 
are developed, in what ways the official rhetoric on terrorism shapes/resonates public 
opinion, and how counter-terrorism measures are legitimized and frame. Therefore, these 
studies illustrate in what ways liberal democracies have come to normalize illiberal practices 
for fighting terrorism.  
From the vantage point of the legitimate execution of sovereign authority, large-scale 
policies that entail the use of violence and a great amount of public resources need to be 
justified in the eyes of the constituents. Such a task requires the construction of persuasive 
discourse that is imbued with symbols of necessity, urgency and achievement in order to 
garner public approval and eliminate imminent doubts. One of the leading figures in critical 
terrorism studies, Jackson (2005) elaborates the inextricable relationship between the 
practice and the language of counter-terrorism, asserting that the former is premised on the 
latter. Jackson contends that the language of counter-terrorist measures is neither objective 
nor incidental, but rather is a product of carefully worked out assumptions and discursive 
formulations. The central aims of the construction of a language on ‘terror’ is: “…to 
normalize and legitimize the current counter-terrorist approach; to empower the authorities 
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and shield them from criticism; to discipline domestic society by marginalizing dissent or 
protest; and to enforce national unity by reifying a narrow conception of national identity.” 
(2005: 2) Jackson’s account of a political discourse is one which exhibits a certain coherent 
structure, a network of meanings and underlying assumptions.  
What is equally important for a discourse is its relationship to other narratives as 
well as those concepts or symbols that are deliberately left out. For instance, in the context 
of ‘War on Terror’, the construction of a category of ‘evil terrorist’ is intertwined with the 
notion of ‘innocent Americans’, which in turn necessarily rules out the articulation of the 
possibility of negotiation as a method of conflict resolution. As such, the framing of events 
and discursive constructions yield solid policy outcomes. This is also the case in the decision 
to call an event ‘political violence’ or ‘terrorism’, whereby the latter conveys a moral 
judgment rather than a mere description. Hence, discourses are a form of power that in time 
can become institutionalized and ingrained into the political culture of a society. (Ibid.: 19-
23) 
The construction of the counter-terrorism discourse juxtaposes extant national myths 
and narratives and links them with dominant foreign policy discourses based on binary 
oppositions of ‘we’ versus ‘them’ or ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. The decision to exclude certain 
notions and frames have significant bearings as well as the act of articulating opaque terms 
and concepts, such as ‘terror’, ‘freedom’, or ‘’civilization’. As a result, a successful 
discourse that has managed to prevail over other alternative narratives is one which is 
normalized in the larger society and can be traced in the public sphere. (Jackson, 2005: 153-
159)  This is also the case in the context of the EU, where the rhetoric on how to fight 
terrorism has been mutually constitutive with the dominant public opinion, and in turn has 
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influenced subsequent policy outcomes. In line with the US discourse on terrorism, the 
language articulated in EU policy-making is similarly imbued with notions of threat to a 
certain ‘way of life’ and ‘civilization’ carried out by networks of individuals that belong to 
marginalized groups in the society. (2007a: 236) The purported ‘way of life’ that is 
perceived as being under threat is usually articulated with conceptions of democracy, human 
rights, peace as well as the international system per se. A recurrent theme that permeates 
discussions on terrorism is that terrorist groups are taking advantage of the liberal and 
democratic structures in these societies in order to freely pursue their activities. Jackson 
illustrates this argument in the EU context by referring to the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy 
that proclaims “increasing openness” and “free movement of ideas, people, technology and 
resources” offer a conducive setting for terrorist objectives. (Jackson, 2007a: 237)  
While the EU language on terrorism has historically construed this concept as an 
external criminal activity even in the aftermath of 9/11, the following London and Madrid 
bombings marked a significant shift in this approach. The ensuing discourse tends to frame 
terrorism as both an internal and external threat with religious undertones that deems 
dialogue or diplomacy redundant. (Jackson, 2007a: 237) This argument presupposes that 
such a new form of threat requires new forms of counter-measures, such as an enhanced 
usage of surveillance, information sharing with US, and limitations on civil liberties. The 
upshot of this change of discourse can also be traced in new institutional setups, for instance 
the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, increased 
administrative powers of the Commission, and new responsibilities for Europol and Eurojust 
with respect to terrorism. (Ibid.: 241) As such, both in the context of the US and the EU, 
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new measures and laws are constituted through and backed up by discursive formulations on 
the nature of the threat and effective ways of handling it.  
These theoretical and methodological insights offered by Jackson are invaluable for 
the purposes of this study. Firstly, he lucidly explicates the fundamental aims of the 
discourse on terrorism thereby allowing us to investigate traces of the constitutive elements 
of this security narrative in a systematic way. Hence, his approach to the language of 
security provides a helpful framework for analyzing how state officials endeavor to balance 
and subsequently legitimize the trade-off between human rights and national security; and in 
turn, how these conceptualizations translate into concrete policies. In a similar vein, putting 
forth the power of discourse in the making of counter-terrorist strategies, Chowdhury and 
Krebs (2010) highlight the role played by public rhetoric in justifying policy alternatives. In 
line with Jackson, they argue that discourse employs a central role in deciding on the course 
of action to be taken, since it determines what constitutes a threat and what alternative routes 
are deemed plausible and necessary for dealing with it. As put by Chowdhury and Krebs, 
“…discursive fields constitute the range of socially sustainable counterterrorist rhetoric and 
thus shape policy outcomes as well.” (Chowdhury & Krebs, 2010: 127) Since counter-
terrorist strategies acquire authority through their legitimation, they are representational and 
thus the product of a public process. Hence, the elaboration of an ideal representational 
strategy entails a clear understanding of the societal context, the target audience to be 
persuaded and the deliberation of a message.  
The normative argumentations articulated by government officials are also addressed 
by Heller et. al. (2012), who analyze the trade-off between national security and human 
rights in the post-9/11 period. Turning Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) ‘life cycle’ theory of 
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norms upside down, they argue that amidst the exacerbated environment of security there 
has been a reverse trend of ‘bad norms’ diffusion, whereby long-established human rights 
norms have become eroded vis-à-vis claims of emergency and necessity. It is suggested that 
the innate value of these norms remain intact despite their infringement and hence, in order 
to justify such actions actors need to redefine what is ’appropriate’ in a given context. This 
proclivity finds expression in rhetoric such as ‘right to security’ over the ‘right to liberty’ for 
instance. As such, governmental actors utilize their predominance over security issues by 
resorting to strategic framing such as the appeal for ‘exception’, the ‘trivialization’ of rights 
curtailments, or reaffirmation of certain norms while condoning others (i.e. zero tolerance 
for torture but not ill-treatment). (2012: 280-288) The authors use framing analysis in order 
to assess how these frames find resonance in target audiences and maintain that the more 
frequent and convergent particular frames become, the higher it attains resonance from a 
wider variety of audiences. (Ibid.: 302)  
A similar theoretical and methodological angle is undertaken by Pisoiu (2013), who 
employs frame analysis for investigating the discourses of counter-terrorism measures and 
their ramifications for human rights norms in the EU and the US. Pisoiu argues that despite 
the growing literature on the discourse of ‘War on Terror’, there is a conspicuous absence of 
studies that focus on counter-terrorism discourse and how it is construed in relation to 
normative principles such as basic rights and freedoms. (2013: 297) As put by Pisoiu:”…a 
more thorough analysis of the argumentative structure and mechanisms of governmental 
counter-terrorism speech, as it relates to breeches of human rights, is necessary both on the 
empirical and theoretical level.” (Pisoiu, 2013: 298)  Moving on from the assumption that 
governmental actors attempt to legitimize and justify norms violating counter-terrorism 
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measures, Pisoiu suggests that such actors usually resort to the strategy of argumentation and 
persuasion. In order to justify policies that entail the restriction of fundamental liberties, these 
policies are ‘framed’ by drawing on from shared values and beliefs that are available in a 
cultural pool of meanings. Hence, for instance, the articulation of a neutral issue into a ‘threat 
frame’ is tantamount to the securitization of the relevant issue. (Pisoiu, 2013: 298-300) The 
finding of the study suggests that there are seven main justification patterns were detected, 
namely legality (the proposed measures are in line with the extant legal framework), judicial 
(individuals should be brought to justice), defense, prevention from future attacks, protection 
of the object of security, operational effectiveness (technical necessity of the relevant policy), 
and lastly the argument of exception. Pisoiu maintains that, contrary to the generally held 
belief the exception argument was hardly salient in the discourse of counter-terrorism, 
whereas, the pragmatic argument of operational effectiveness was more visible. (2013: 302) 
The framework provided by Pisoiu is helpful in interconnecting the concept of securitization 
formulated by the Copenhagen school and critical terrorism studies, by illustrating how 
certain frames operate to securitize certain aspects of social life, thereby depicting the 
suspension of rights as legitimate.  
One interesting manifestation of the plea for higher security measures and a concern 
over legitimacy presents itself when state officials resort to the language of ‘rights’ in order 
to restrict such ‘rights’, denoting the normative power of ‘rights-talk’. Both the language of 
security and that of rights are susceptible to a plethora of different interpretations and 
articulations. Lazarus and Goold (2007) point out that one such example is the 
conceptualization of security as a right, which sits oddly with the generally held dichotomy 
between rights and security. The authors suggest that the notion of ‘right to life, liberty, and 
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security’ which has been conventionally held to connote freedom from state intervention 
has been incrementally adopted as a positive duty on part of the state to provide its 
citizenry. (Ibid.: 18-21) Hence, amidst the tension between fundamental rights and security 
concerns, Lazarus and Goold point out to new articulations of this theme in a framework of 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ invoke a sense of legitimacy on part of the state by virtue of 
its claim to sovereignty. It is suggested that an alleged ‘super-terrorist’ threat has 
culminated in a ‘culture of control’, where the main task of the state is to provide ‘security’ 
to its citizens as a fundamental right. As cogently elucidated by Goold and Lazarus:  
In countries like the United States and the Unites Kingdom, the threat of super-
terrorism starkly exposed the limits of the state’s capacity to provide security for its 
citizens. But equally, this threat presented governments with a novel opportunity to 
develop new and powerful rhetorical arguments, in particular the claim to 
exceptionalism in favor of increased state power. Seen in this light, the popularity of 
exceptionalism is a product of a social transformation whereby the legitimacy of late-
modern states has become increasingly bound up their role as the guarantor of security 
and with a politics of security that seeks both to allay and exploit communal feelings of 
insecurity and fear.  
         (Goold & Lazarus, 2007: 5-6) 
From a different vantage point, Zarakol undertakes a constructivist assessment of 
different conceptualizations of ‘terrorism’ by resorting to the modern functions of the state. 
According to Zarakol, historically the modern state came to replace three sorts of authority, 
namely the religious, the personal, and the local. In so doing, the Westphalian state has 
acquired the monopoly over the use of force, a power that is circumscribed within the 
contours of legitimacy and ‘rightful’ state action.  (Zarakol, 2011: 2313-2314) As such, 
Zarakol concurs with Schmitt ([1927] 1996) that state’s function in providing security does 
not solely manifest itself physically, but also discursively by being the authority to decide on 
the distinction between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’. As put by the author, “[t]he modern state is 
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tasked therefore by not only providing physical security for citizens, but also the image of 
control and manageability through categorization and other symbolic ordering acts…” 
(Ibid.: 2314) At this juncture, terrorism as a concept jeopardizes the certainty and 
determinacy provided by the state since it challenges orderings and categorizations such as 
‘citizen/threat’, ‘stranger/enemy’, ‘civilian/official’…etc.  
Against this backdrop, Zarakol argues that it is possible to make a distinction 
between what she terms as ‘system-affirming’ and ‘system-threatening’ terrorist movements 
based on the level of ontological threat they trigger in the host state. More specifically, 
secessionist and national liberation movements that are rendered as ‘terrorism’ receive more 
legitimacy and are perceived as less ontologically threatening since their claims rest on the 
Westphalian ordering of the modern state and imbued with the undertone of territoriality. 
Such claims to local authority are not ultimately inimical to the international system and 
thus are named as ‘system-affirming’. On the other hand, the ‘system-threatening’ type of 
terrorist activity lends its name from the fact that its claims and justification are contrary to 
the main principles of the Westphalian order. Such instances can be anarchist movements in 
the past or religiously motivated groups such as the Al Qaeda and Taliban as the most 
salient manifestation of current political arena. (Ibid.: 2316)  
The insight offered by Zarakol is noteworthy, especially regarding the distinction 
being made on the basis of the perception of different terrorist motives. Such distinction is 
important to keep in mind in the post-9/11 political environment, particularly in the Turkish 
and British cases which will be the focus of this research. As both countries have 
experienced these two different types of groups, namely ‘separatist terrorism’ of IRA and 
PKK, as well as religiously motivated incidents such as the 2005 London and 2003 Istanbul 
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bombings, Zarakol’s constructivist classification of different forms of terrorism and their 
perception is helpful for analytical clarity. The next section will on go to elaborate the 
methodological contours of this study and offer a detailed account of the two cases that will 
be the focus of our analysis. 
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Chapter 2. Methodology: Comparative Policy Analysis and the Language of 
Law-making 
 
“If counter-terrorism rhetoric were a currency, it would have by now lost all its value 
through inflation.”  
          (Gearty, 2007: 14) 
 In world politics today, there is an marked challenge posed by the clash of national 
security interests and international human rights obligations, particularly in the post-9/11 era 
as the concept of ‘terrorism’ has resurfaced realist concerns within and across national 
borders. A growing number of states are becoming signatories to key international human 
rights treaties, while concomitantly pledging loyalty to the ‘War on Terror’ launched by the 
United States, which often lead to contradictory policies. At this junction, this study 
undertakes an investigation of the trade-off between international human rights and national 
security concerns in national contexts.  As such, the study addresses the following questions:  
1.       How do state officials balance counter-terrorism and human rights norms? 
2. How are controversial counter-terrorism measures legitimized by state officials vis-à-
vis human rights obligations?  
3. What are some salient framing strategies employed by state officials? 
4. Why does United Kingdom as a long-established liberal democracy display similar 
tendencies found in a yet democratizing country like Turkey? 
The relationship between the discourse and policy of counter-terrorism is a mutually 
constitutive process: while the language on terrorism shapes perceptions of ‘threats to 
national security’, these perceptions are in turn translated into concrete policy outcomes. In 
this regard, the study sheds light into the legitimization and institutionalization of security 
 48 
 
policies that restrict human rights as two different processes that reinforce one another. 
Therefore, this study undertakes a dual investigation of the research questions, in which both 
a comparative analysis of policy process and a frame analysis of the legislative process are 
presented in order to provide a comprehensive picture of different dynamics at work. Also 
known as triangulation, this approach to qualitative studies is suitable for enhancing the 
validity and the reliability in qualitative research, as well as offering a more thorough 
understanding of the phenomenon in question. In what follows, this section will first 
elaborate the tenets of discourse analysis in general, and the method of frame analysis in 
particular, as to elucidate in what ways this method is apposite for the research questions of 
the study. It will then go on to elaborate the advantages of the application of triangulation, 
entailing the mapping of policy outcomes that are underscored by discursive formations. 
After presenting an outline of the two selected cases for the analysis, the section will 
conclude with a brief discussion on validity and reliability.  
2.1. Discourse and the Language of Security 
Contrary to most quantitative studies, qualitative research is not premised on testing 
the relationship between a clearly defined dependent and independent variable. Instead, 
qualitative research firstly identifies the phenomenon to be investigated and specifies what 
exactly is intriguing in this particular subject. (Strauss & Corbin, 1998: 41) The study of 
discourse is rooted in the interpretivist tradition of qualitative research that opts to focus on 
understanding of social phenomenon rather than causal explanations advocated by positivist 
science. (Potter & Lopez, 2001: 8-9) Also termed as hermeneutics, or the theory of 
interpretation, this approach to social science maintains that all human action and interaction 
is embedded in understanding, without which society would cease to exist. In this paradigm, 
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language is taken as a social tool that is utilized to serve functions in human interaction, one 
which is intertwined with other social and cognitive phenomenon. (Alba-Juez, 2009: 11)  
The ‘linguistic turn’ in social sciences came about at a time when the constitution of 
knowledge or the conventional path to explanation was being questioned. While all academic 
knowledge is premised on forms of classification which is a function of language, the role of 
language itself in constituting knowledge came to the fore, setting the scene for discourse 
analysis. Jaworski and Coupland depict this process as extension of academic interest into 
“[c]onsiderations of meaning in general, and particularly of how language, meaning and 
society inter-relate…” (Jaworski & Coupland, 2006: 4) The term discourse6 itself is an 
essentially contested concept that is subject to myriad different definitions. Amidst various 
articulations of the term, this study opts to borrow from Schiffrin’s definition as connoting 
“…units of linguistic production (whether spoken or written) which are inherently 
contextualized.” (1994: 41) As such, the term does not merely come to denote the internal 
structures of a given text, but also that a text is embedded in and produced from a certain 
socio-political setting. But what do we mean exactly when we talk about discourse analysis 
per se? Although it can come to connote different approaches in a variety of disciplines (a 
linguist might have a distinct understanding than a critical discourse analyst for instance), this 
research employs discourse analysis as a method for uncovering “social practices that 
constitute ‘social structures’ and …the conventional meaning structures of social life.” (Ibid.: 
5) As such, the task of the researcher is to problematize systems of meaning that seem 
‘natural’ or ‘factual’, in other words the social construction of reality.  
                                                          
6
 Although the terms text and discourse are used in various ways by different analysts, generally the former is 
taken to connote internal characteristics and structures of a linguistic material;whereas, the latter 
accommodates a more inclusive meaning, one that takes into account the context that a text is produced.  
(Alba-Juez, 2009: 8-11)  
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the main theories that will be guiding 
this research is the ‘securitization’ approach developed by the Copenhagen school, which 
construes security as a speech act, thereby illuminating the impact of discourse in 
international politics. This approach endeavors to explore the question: “When does an 
argument with its particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make 
an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?” (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 25) Such a theoretical perspective entails a congruent methodology, in which the 
main aim is to investigate the relationship between texts on the one hand, social and political 
processes on the other hand. As put by Gee (1999: 5), “[m]ethod and theory cannot be 
separated, despite the fact that methods are often taught as if they could stand alone.” Hence, 
the question of how states balance counter-terrorism measures and fundamental freedoms 
invokes a textual analysis, investigating the role of language in acts of securitizing. A 
discursive approach allows the researchers to study how legitimate forms of knowledge and 
political practices are being constructed textually, and ingrained in ‘common sense’ in a 
particular social setting (Jackson, 2009: 68). 
Another important dimension where theory informs methodology is the 
epistemological position of the research, which deserves a short mention. The critical outlook 
this study entails is not merely with respect to extant power structures but also of ways of 
attaining scientific knowledge. In line with Toros and Gunning’s (2009) account on ‘minimal 
foundationalism’, this study undertakes a self-reflexive and critical research agenda, while 
acknowledging the centrality of the positivist notions of regularities and evidence. The 
mainstay lies in being critical of decontextualized timeless laws that are presented as 
‘universal’. Offering a new research agenda for International Politics, alternative to both 
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traditional and post-structuralist approaches, Toros and Gunning believe that a minimal 
foundationalism is conducive to a ‘theoretically grounded’ and ‘concrete’ framework. (Ibid.: 
88) Hence, this study rests on these epistemological foundations, whereby a critical research 
agenda that is in line with the primary tenets of scientific research is undertaken.  
 According to Gee, the human mind does not operate on abstract or decontextualized 
rules, but rather on the basis of patterns emanated from experience, and is thus dependent 
upon context. The upshot of this approach is to refute the ‘rationalist’ model of the individual 
as a “rule following logic-like calculator,” (1999: 50) in favor of a ‘social’ individual who 
derives generalizations from situated meanings. (Gee, 1999: 49-51) The significance of 
context in shaping our perceptions yields two other dimensions of discourse, namely its 
intertextual and intersubjective disposition. Since “[w]ords have histories” (Ibid.: 54), 
meaning is intertextual in the sense that any text refers to previous situated meanings and 
experiences in other texts and discourses. The term intertextuality has been coined by Julia 
Kristeva who has borrowed from Mikhail Bakhtin’s linguistic theory, and denotes that texts 
build on each other both vertically (those that precede and follow it) and horizontally (those 
that belong to the same category). On the other hand, intersubjectivity connotes the fact that 
meaning can take place only in an exchange by two or more individuals, whereby the 
participants shape discourse and in turn are influenced by it in the way they perceive the 
world around them. (Johnstone, 2002: 14)  
As such, all discourse one way or another addresses an audience and is therefore 
rhetorical in the sense of aiming to persuade. Both Johnstone and Wodak distinguish different 
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strategies of persuasion7, not only pertaining to the styles in which arguments are presented, 
but also how they constitute narratives of a given position with predefined identities and 
normative assumption, which in turn, work to legitimize such position. (Johnstone, 2002; 
Wodak, 2009)  Since the objective of discourse is to persuade, different strategies and styles 
need to be treated according to the context in which they stem and also to which they reflect. 
This feature of discourse is eloquently described by Bourdieu: “Since a discourse can only 
exist, in the form in which it exists, so long as it is not simply grammatically correct but also, 
and above all, socially acceptable, i.e., heard, believed, and therefore effective within a given 
state of relations of production and circulation, it follows that the scientific analysis of 
discourse must take into account… the laws defining the social conditions of acceptability…” 
(Bourdieu, 2006: 483)  
In order for a discourse to appeal and persuade an audience, it articulates 
argumentative strategies that portend certain conclusions. The concept that links these 
arguments to the conclusion enforced by the speaker is topoi that are “…central to the 
analysis of seemingly convincing fallacious arguments which are widely adopted in all 
political debates and genres.” (Wodak, 2009: 42) Wodak draws out several salient topoi that 
are prevalent in political speech: topos of burdening (the argument that an institution is 
burdened by a problem), topos of reality (i.e. the reality of a situation entailing certain 
solutions), topos of numbers (statistical evidence demanding a course of action), topos of 
history (lessons learned from the past), topos of authority (the position of an actor legitimizes 
the action), topos of threat (identifying threat that requires action) , topos of definition (the 
argument that an object should convey its definitional attributes), topos of justice (those with 
                                                          
7
 Since they will not be incorporated into the analysis, they are not dealt in detail. For more information see 
Johnstone (2002) and Wodak (2009). 
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equal entitlements should be treated equally), topos of urgency (a pressing matter 
necessitating urgent action). (Wodak, 2009: 44) This typology offered by Wodak is 
particularly useful for studying securitization, as it shed lights into the workings of the 
language of security and the prospective arguments that can be invoked for its legitimation, 
such as call of ‘duty’, ‘threat’, ‘emergency’, ‘lessons of history’…etc. In this respect, the 
notion of topoi is incorporated the study in understanding how certain arguments formulated 
entail predetermined conclusions.  
 It must also be noted that while a prevalent discourse is one form of representation, it 
necessarily suggests that an alternative representation has been revoked or silenced. This 
silencing is as significant as the words uttered in analyzing the structure and content of a 
given text. (Johnstone, 2002: 11)  As lucidly explicated by Johnstone, “…what is not said or 
be said is the background without which what is said could not be heard.” (2002: 58) This 
point is also emphasized by Jackson (2009), who describes discourse as indispensably 
excluding and silencing alternatives modes of representation, thereby historically and 
culturally contingent. (2009: 67-68)  As a result, any study of discourse and meaning 
conveyed through texts must incorporate an analysis of what is not being said as well as the 
arguments being presented.   
Due to myriad different forms of discourse analysis, there is a common 
misconception that this type of analysis involves heavy description and not much 
explanation. In response, Fairclough (1995) makes the distinction between descriptive and 
explanatory discourse analysis, where the former mainly engages in an analysis of the form 
and structure of the text as an isolated artifact, whereas an explanatory analysis employs a 
wider perspective taking into account discourse practices (the production and the 
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interpretation of a text) and the larger sociopolitical dynamics the text is embedded in. 
Fairclough advocates the integration of micro analysis of text and macro analysis of context 
in order to make sense of social and political processes, in other words the effects of 
discourse. (1995: 98) Congruently, pointing out the centrality of linking internal attributes of 
a text to the wider external influences, Wilson argues that “[u]terrances within the context of 
political output are rarely isolated grammatical cases; they operate within historical 
frameworks and are frequently associated with other utterances or texts.” (2001: 404) 
Van Dijk (2001) makes a similar point when he suggests that rather than merely 
describing the structures of a text, discourse analysis aims to explain social processes, 
especially those pertaining to the manifestation of power and dominance. Power is an 
important element of discourse, which is defined as the ability to control the minds and 
actions of others. One of the primary tasks of the analyst is to dismantle this intricate 
relationship between power and discourse, which is mostly discernable in political texts. 
According to Van Dijk, much political discourse operates as a means for enacting, 
reproducing or legitimizing power. Notwithstanding the evident advantages of employing 
discourse analysis in political science, Van Dijk points out that this method has largely been 
absent from the state of art with the exception of a number of studies. (Van Dijk, 2001: 353-
360) Amongst the latter is the approach of ‘frames’ which are schemes of meaning that in the 
field of politics work to organize and structure policies.   
2.2. Critical Frame Analysis  
 The concept of a frame as a central organizing idea was first introduced by sociologist 
Ervin Goffman, to connote “schemata of interpretation” which allows one to identify and 
make sense of our social world. (1986:10-11) Frames derive their power from the way they 
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impel individuals to focus on certain aspects of the multifarious social reality we live in, 
while ignoring others, thereby ‘filtering’ our perception of the world. (Kuypers, 2009: 181) A 
comprehensive definition of framing is provided by Kuypers, as “…the process whereby 
communicators act - consciously or not- to construct a particular point of view that 
encourages the facts of a given situation to be viewed in a particular manner, with some facts 
made more or less noticeable (even ignored) than others.” (Kuypers, 2009: 182) Hence, by 
helping individuals make sense of the vast and abounding information we find in our 
everyday lives, frames provides us with cues that guide the ways of interpreting issues and 
events. (Snow et. al., 1986)   
Moving on from this conceptualization of frames, frame analysis is a form of 
discourse analysis that focuses on the organization of experience, or how an object of inquiry 
is defined and problematized as to constitute an explanatory unit. (Goffman, 1986:11) Frames 
are built upon narratives of certain events that encapsulate interpretive cues such as 
metaphors, labels, naming, key concepts or symbols. The task of the analyst is to detect these 
regularly appearing cues which attribute meaning to a neutral event. Kuypers notes that 
frames are a fruitful tool particularly for comparative analyses, since it allows the researcher 
to investigate frameworks that operate in different contexts or across different issue areas 
(2009: 185). As such, critical analysis of policy-frames in a given issue-area entails the 
following: “Frame-critical policy analysis seeks…to enhance frame reflective policy 
discourse by identifying the taken-for-granted assumptions that underlie people’s apparently 
natural understandings and actions in a problematic policy situation. It seeks to explicate the 
conflicting frames inherent in policy controversies so that we can reflect on them and better 
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grasp the relationships between hidden premises and normative conclusions.”  (Rein & 
Schön, 2002: 150) 
Critical frame analysis focuses on the representation of an issue as constituting a 
problem, possible solutions for the problem, as well as actions and actors that are implicated. 
The main concept of the analysis is a ‘policy frame’ which is a “scheme that structures the 
meaning of reality.” (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007: 32) In addition to identifying a problem 
(diagnosis) and offering possible solutions (prognosis), a policy frame usually includes 
assertions with respect to the roles involved, designating actors that are deemed to be part of 
the problem and those that are put forth as having the duty to solve the problem, as well as 
target groups for the proposed actions. Hence, the identifications of actors are essential 
elements of a policy frame. The allocation of the problem and its solution is not merely a 
technical matter, but rather involves normative assumptions of the actors, processes, or other 
intertwined problem-areas. This attribute of a policy frame is called intersectionality and 
constitutes a significant part of the analysis. Other elements that provide useful insight into 
framing are the identification of a location and mechanism. While the former signals where 
the problem of an issue and its solution are located, the latter indicates the processes involved 
that reproduce or harbor the problem or the solution. (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007: 32-35) In 
light of the abovementioned criteria, a number of key terms have been formulated based on 
the literature review, which are utilized for analyzing the selected texts. These sensitizing 
questions are transformed into codes that correspond to different dimensions of a policy 
frame. 
An application of frame analysis method to the study of counter-terrorism policies is 
developed by Pisoiu (2013), who focuses on discourses prevalent in the EU and the US 
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contexts. Moving on from the assumption that governmental actors attempt to legitimize and 
justify norms violating counter-terrorism measures, Pisoiu suggests that such actors usually 
resort to the strategies of argumentation and persuasion. In order to justify policies that entail 
the restriction of fundamental liberties, governmental actors ‘frame’ policies that draw from 
shared values and beliefs that are available in a cultural pool of meanings. Hence, for 
instance, the articulation of a neutral issue into a ‘threat frame’ is a means for the 
securitization of the relevant issue. (Pisoiu, 2013: 298-300) Critical frame analysis is quite 
conducive to studying discourses on counter-terrorism and human rights since it offers a 
systematic tool for the in-depth analysis of these respective policy frames. One of the 
advantages of using this technique is that it allows the researcher to make comparisons with 
respect to different national contexts as well as cross-issue comparisons.  
Like all other forms of textual analysis, frame analysis also involves a process of 
coding, where the researcher seeks for “…regularities and patterns as well as for topics your 
data covers, and then you write down words and phrases to represent these topics and 
patterns. These word and phrases are coding categories.” (Boglan and Biklen, 1992: 166) In 
order to formulate refined categories, the analyst must engage in a constant procedure of 
going back and comparing the individuals incidents coded under a category, as well as 
comparing those coded under different categories. In so doing, the researcher can come up 
with well-defined categories composed of clear properties and dimensions. Such categories 
can either be data-driven (grounded in the data and materializing throughout the analysis) or 
concept-driven (based on a theoretical perspective or previous academic work). For the 
purposes of this study, I plan to utilize both by drawing on key concepts and themes initially 
premised on the literature review and afterwards extracting salient notions throughout the 
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analysis. Since the researcher does not have a comprehensive knowledge of the texts 
beforehand the analysis needs to take into account new codes that might be extrapolated from 
the data during the analysis. The ATLAS.ti programme is well suited for this type of research 
approach by allowing a variety of options for coding and extracting relations amongst 
different coding categories, and is therefore utilized for undertaking frame analysis.  
Based on the theoretical contours of this study, the analysis aims to unearth the policy 
frames of counter-terrorism and human rights, as well as their interaction in the legislative 
process. The main hypotheses of the study is that in the fight against terror, government tend 
to frame various aspects of social and political life as a security problem by invoking 
exceptionalism and urgency, which culminates in the securitization of these issue-areas. In so 
doing, actors lay the legitimate grounds for side-stepping established norms. The interpretive 
cues can be traced from a range of notions such as state of exception, emergency, necessity, 
threat, and the like. Moreover, a corollary hypothesis is that such framing is premised on a 
certain construction of ‘the enemy’ as the existential other and the victim as ‘our people’. On 
the other hand, as anticipated by the theoretical framework, this policy frame will be 
confronted by the policy frame of human rights that highlights the need to take into account 
normative obligations as the legitimacy conferred by them. Arguments for greater security 
measures are countered by arguments for democratic values and rights in the political arena; 
therefore, they are ultimately compelled to engage with notions such as international norms, 
standards of modern-nation states, universal morality, responsibility to uphold and protect 
rights…etc. Hence, the interplay of these two policy frames and the different concepts and 
themes that compose them informs the course of the policy-making process, culminating in 
new legislation. The legislative process in both the Turkish and the British contexts are 
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conducive for offering insight into the ways in which such conflicting frames find expression 
and interact with one another. Yet, the discursive approach is not the only method that will be 
guiding this study; it is one pillar of a twofold investigation, as elaborated in the following 
section.  
2.3. Triangulation and Comparative Policy Analysis 
 One of the most commonly addressed criticisms against critical discourse analysis is 
the subjective nature of the research process, or in other words its ‘critical bias’. In an attempt 
to overcome this problem of validity and to go beyond the textual dimension, researchers 
resort to the application of triangulation by borrowing from different methods as well as 
different empirical data. Building on the centrality of context in explaining the phenomenon 
at hand, triangulation works to bring into play historical, social and political dimensions to 
enhance our understanding of the research questions. (Wodak, 2008: 13) The main purpose 
of utilizing triangulation is to enhance arguments that undergird the analysis in the face of 
countervailing explanations, provided that different forms of evidences that strengthen one 
another are incorporated in the study. (Stoker, 2011: 2670-2671) While triangulation can take 
place at different stages of the research, this study undertakes triangulation involving both 
data collection and data analysis. (Rothbauer, 2008: 893) In order to complement and 
contextualize frame analysis which provides insights to the use of language, the study also 
offers a comparative policy analysis with respect to counter-terrorism and human rights laws. 
The dual disposition of the analysis allows one firstly to comprehend the political zeitgeist 
and legal framework where the discussion is taking place, and secondly to determine the 
important interconnections between discourse and policy.  
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 Contrary to a mixed-method research design which is comprised of both a 
quantitative and a qualitative analysis, this form of triangulation corresponds to a multi-
method qualitative research design. (Bergman, 2011) Hence, as put by Rothbauer, “[i]n 
qualitative inquiry, researchers tend to use triangulation as a strategy that allows them to 
identify, explore, and understand different dimensions of the units of study, thereby 
strengthening their findings and enriching their interpretations.” (2008: 893) Triangulation 
particularly endeavors to reduce bias inherent in a mono-method approach and enhance 
convergence validity, which is the “substantiation of empirical phenomenon” via the 
employment of multiple methods. (Cox & Hassard, 2010: 945) Moreover, triangulation of 
data and methods in qualitative research is also a means for strengthening the reliability of 
the study, since it provides the “…opportunity to repeat observed behaviors together with 
their explanation…” (Konecki, 2008: 23) As such, the confidence of the conclusions drawn 
from the research is increased through the verifying role played by complementary methods. 
Yet, enhancing the validity and reliability of a study is only one benefit offered by 
triangulation. (Konecki, 2008: 15)  
 According to Denzin and Lincoln, qualitative research is inherently a multi-method 
approach, as it brings into play a range of empirical materials such as observation, historical 
documents, case studies, interviews…etc., and also can utilize different methods for 
analyzing such data. Employing a pragmatic and self-reflective posture, they define the 
qualitative researcher as a bricoleur and the product of the research process as bricolage. In 
an attempt to acquire an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon, qualitative researchers 
tend to amalgamate various relevant data and forms of analysis, thereby generating greater 
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rigor and depth in a study. (1998: 4-5) Alternative forms of triangulation in qualitative data 
have been explicated by Denzin (1978) as follows:  
1. Data triangulation: the use of variety of data sources in a study. 
2. Investigator triangulation: the use of several different researchers or evaluators. 
3. Theory triangulation: the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data 
4. Methodological triangulation: the use of multiple methods to study a single problem.  
 
Based on this classification, the study undertakes both data and methodological 
triangulation, as various sources of data are accompanied by two different forms of analysis 
that complement each other: comparative policy analysis and frame analysis. This strategy is 
called ‘corroboration’ where the triangulation is a form of double-check and different sources 
and methods are utilized to substantiate the arguments presented (Deniz & Lincoln, 1998: 5). 
Following the guideless offered by Sutton (1999), the first part of the study seeks to trace and 
map out the development of policies in a given issue-area, including the events and actors 
that contributed to their production, and the debates they have generated. Congruent to the 
research questions at hand, the first part addresses how government policies pertaining to 
human rights and counter-terrorism are developed and weighed in relation to each other in 
light of international and domestic dynamics. It aims to reveal the process by which 
governments invoke the ‘state of exception’ in an attempt to securitize certain areas of social 
and political life, and in turn how this rhetoric is countered by human rights norms. Both 
cases have been analyzed in the period after the 9/11 event and the pursuant political 
environment in order to assess the influence of international expectations on nation states on 
the fight against terror and the obligations of human rights norms. The comparative policy 
analysis is developed with the employment of sources such as international covenants, 
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national legislation on human right and counter-terrorism, news articles, government reports, 
official declarations, and reports by international organizations.  
The second part of the analysis consists of a discursive account with the application of 
frame analysis as explicated above. This part of the analysis aims to illustrate how 
securitization works in the decision-making process, as various issues are being 
problematized as matters of national security, therefore, ought to be dealt with extraordinary 
measures. In turn, the discourse of human rights and democracy in confronting such 
arguments constitutes a central part of the investigation. Since the main focus is on the 
official representation of issues pertaining to national security and human rights obligations, 
the data analyzed is composed primarily of parliamentary debates, parliamentary commission 
reports and bills on counter-terrorism. Owing to the principle of democratic accountability, in 
both contexts parliamentary debates could be accessed easily from online archives. The 
biggest advantage of parliamentary debates is that unlike interviews or media coverage, they 
are unedited and unrefined. (Loizides, 2009: 282) More than being a problem-solving body, 
the parliament also exhibits the performative aspect of policy-making by providing an in-
depth insight into political positions and their justifications regarding security and/or human 
rights, from different perspectives. Since the executive is also present in the parliament in 
both cases, this entity allows us into the reasoning of law-making of ‘the sovereign’. (Neal, 
2012 :263) Nonetheless, in the face of an abundance of data, once the texts are chosen further 
criteria are employed in order to filter and select discourse segments to be analyzed, which 
was primarily based on key legislation, especially regarding controversial laws that have 
stirred heated debates not only in the respective parliaments, but also at the national and 
international levels. As such, purposeful sampling will be carried out for the selection of 
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texts, due to the fact that it allows the researcher to choose documents that are relevant to the 
research questions, given the large quantity of documents available (Silverman & Marvasti, 
2000: 104).  
As a result, the plan of research is novel in offering an eclectic perspective in 
analyzing how states balance human rights and counter-terrorism, through a comparative 
analysis of policy and discourse that complement each other. There is an evident void in the 
IR literature when it comes to the tension between human rights and fight against terror, since 
it is either studied only from a legal perspective or within a normative philosophical 
approach. In this regard, the contextual and discursive aspect of the interplay between norms 
and security concerns remains largely understudied. While considerations of both power and 
morality inform one another in concrete processes of policy formation, cognitive frames 
prevalent in the cultural pool of meanings and values shape how issues are to be 
problematized and in turn handled with. This point is also iterated by Rein and Schön (2002), 
who note the interwoven disposition of facts and values in policy frames, where “the 
participants construct the problematic situations through frames in which facts, values, 
theories, and interests are integrated.” (2002: 145) Copenhagen School offers productive 
theoretical and analytical tools for investigating this question at hand, yet interestingly 
‘securitization’ has rarely been applied to the issue of counter-terrorism, with some recent 
exceptions (Heller et. al., 2012; Pisoiu, 2013). This is particularly the case with respect to the 
framing of counter-terrorism measures in relation to human rights norms, in which an 
analysis of the interplay between the two narratives is by and large missing. As such, this 
study is novel in explaining how the development of counter-terrorism policies, that yield 
significant ramifications for rights and liberties, are shaped by cognitive frames. Thus, the 
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analysis seeks to answer the question of how state officials endeavor to balance these 
conflicting commitments and the ways in which their decisions are premised on frames that 
legitimize their actions to domestic and international audiences.  
2.4. The Cases: Turkey and the United Kingdom 
 This general research design is formulated and addressed to two particular cases, 
namely Turkey and the United Kingdom. These different political settings, the former still 
struggling to consolidate its democracy whilst the latter represents one of the oldest liberal 
democracies, converge significantly with respect to their experiences with terrorism and 
policies of counter-terrorism. Both countries have a history of terrorism due to the activities 
of the separatist organizations of PKK and IRA respectively that have eventually ingrained 
insecurity and an environment of ‘state of exception’ in each context. Moreover, both 
countries have experienced terrorism incurred by radical Islamist groups in the post-9/11 
period, namely the 2005 London bombings and 2003 Istanbul bombings, owing to their 
alliance with the US in the ‘War on Terror’. Therefore, both countries have experienced what 
Zarakol (2011) terms as ‘ethnic terrorism’ that aims at local authority within the confines of 
the Westphalian order, and also religiously motivated ‘global terrorism’ that defies such 
order. Concurrently, each country has been pursuing strict counter-terrorism measures, 
including certain draconian provisions infringing human right principles that have generated 
both domestic and international criticisms. As a result, in both cases there is a growing 
discontent and rejection of the authority of the ECHR, explicitly voiced by government 
officials (Travis, 2013; Hürriyet, 13 May 2014). Hence, against a backdrop of different 
political settings, shared historical experiences with similar forms of terrorism offer 
interesting observations to assess the discourses and strategies employed in order to balance 
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security concerns with human rights obligations. The following section will highlight some 
of the relevant characteristics of each setting.  
a. Turkey: Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe in 1949 and ratified the 
European Convention on Human Rights in 1954. After a long and oscillating relationship 
with the EU, it was granted candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki Summit. Following European 
Council’s announcement in 2002, which declared that full accession negotiations will begin 
without delay if Turkey succeeds in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, a process of intense 
political and legal reforms started to take place, particularly those related to democratization 
and the diminishing role of military in politics. (Müftüler-Bac,2005) Notwithstanding the 
momentum launched by the EU accession process, human rights record of Turkey is still the 
main hindrance to its EU membership-bid. Consecutive progress reports of the European 
Commission as well as reports written by the Council of Europe have pointed out the need 
for further reforms with respect to anti-terror laws and counter-terrorism policies. Strikingly, 
as revealed by the Associated Press’s 2011 report on arrests due to terror-related crimes, 
among 350,000 people convicted since 2001 world-wide, Turkey accounted for one thirds of 
such arrests (Mendoza, 2011).  
b. United Kingdom: The United Kingdom is a fully consolidated democracy with a 
long history of rights, as the home country of Magna Carta. It is a member of the EU since 
1973 and is a founding member of the Council of Europe. At a prima facie evaluation, it 
would be counter-intuitive to include the UK in an analysis of human rights violations, since 
most studies concentrate on ‘abusive’ countries and how they are socialized into complying. 
Nonetheless, United Kingdom has historically dealt with IRA attacks throughout 1970, 1980s 
and 1990s, leading to the adoption of several notorious counter-terrorism measures. 
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Moreover, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and also the following London 
bombings in 2005, there has been an accelerated sense of national security culminating in 
draconian laws that jeopardize established human rights norms. (Golder & Williams, 2009: 
46-47) As such, the UK case provides interesting insights as to how “…a retreat from core 
human rights values is not unthinkable in the world’s liberal heartland.” (Dunne, 2010: 153)  
 As illustrated above, these settings are conducive to examining the trade-off between 
national security and international norms, as they provide similar cases of terrorism that take 
place in distinct political and social contexts. Particularly in the post-9/11 period an 
interesting picture comes to the fore where the UK is relinquishing long-established rights by 
joining the ‘War on Terror’, while Turkey launches on the EU accession process marked by 
democratization and the institutionalization of a rights-based understanding. As will be 
explicated in detail in the following chapters, not only do both governments adopt similar 
counter-terrorism measures, but the UK is taken as a model for counter-terrorism legislation 
in the Turkish context. The comparative analysis of these cases has been particularly 
revealing in portraying how and why certain representational structures and policy frames in 
the context of counter-terrorism travel across different settings. Hence, in order to shed light 
on the politics of law-making and how this process is informed by the employment of 
language, the study rests on a comparative analysis of the Turkish and UK contexts.  
2.5. Validity and Reliability 
 The issue of validity for qualitative research is a perplexing one, given that an 
interpretive approach deems it unfeasible to separate the subject from the interpretation. 
Hence it has often been dismissed as too subjective and relativistic. In spite of such 
criticisms, qualitative researchers have established sets of standards for testing the validity of 
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their work. According to Gee, validity in discourse analysis is based on four elements, 
namely convergence (how compatible are the answers that the analysts posit), agreement 
(support from other discourses or other relevant research), coverage (the extent to which 
analysis can be applied to similar data), linguistic details (how grammatical structures are 
interlinked to the functions of the content). (Gee, 1999: 94-95)  The first two criteria are 
addressed through the application of triangulation, whereby two distinct methods that reflect 
on the same question enhance validity based on convergence and agreement by cross-
checking the answers attained respectively. On the other hand, the criterion of coverage is 
addressed through a comparative analysis of Turkey and the UK, which among other 
benefits, allows the researcher to assess the implementation of findings in different contexts. 
Lastly, the criterion of linguistic details does not take up an important part of the discourse 
analysis, since the focus is more on the content rather than textual details, yet will be referred 
to when necessary.   
 As is the case for other research methods, qualitative research is suitable for some 
type of research questions and not others. One of the weaknesses is with respect to the choice 
of data, since unlike quantitative methods a random sampling is not employed. Most of the 
time, qualitative and interpretive approaches will lack the confidence of making 
generalizations that their quantitative counterparts take pride in. Nonetheless, discourse 
analysis offers explanatory and critical depth that is by and large missing in quantitative 
studies which tend to conflate complex social phenomena for the sake of generalization and 
prediction. (Jaworski & Coupland, 2006: 30-31) As indicated above, the employment of 
triangulation, and the bipartite disposition of the study helps to circumvent those problems 
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generally associated with discourse analysis by offering a historical angle to the decision-
making process in light of significant domestic and international political dynamics.  
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Conclusion: Adjoining Theory and Methodology 
 
 As explained in detail above, the main objective of this study is to address the 
tension between national security concerns and international norms, and to investigate how 
nation states tend to juggle these two often contradictory entailments. Particularly in the 
aftermath of 9/11 as a growing number of long-established democracies opt to employ what 
are largely seen as draconian measures, the dissonance between counter-terrorism policies 
and human rights principles come to the fore that presents state officials with a conundrum: 
Amidst conflicting expectations, how can security concerns be balanced vis-à-vis human 
rights obligations? This section has tried to illustrate both the theoretical currents that have 
shed light upon this problematique as well as the methodological contours most apposite for 
investigating the phenomenon at hand.  
 By way of overview, the discussion on the theoretical premises has firstly 
demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches to security that aim to 
challenge the mainstay of realist assumptions on world politics. While the Constructivist 
position is useful for pointing out the indispensable role played by ideational factors such as 
identities, norms and values even in the hard-core security domain, it nonetheless fails to 
problematize the traditional conceptualization of ‘security’ which takes the state as its 
primary object. As such, from a Constructivist perspective the question at hand would be 
construed along the lines of a security community sharing similar values against a perceived 
common threat, namely the ‘War on Terror’ initiated by the US and partaken by its allies 
against Islamist terrorism that is deemed as a threat to a certain civilizational construct and 
democratic values. In so doing, this analysis of the ideational aspects of a security 
community fails to acknowledge how the articulation of security and threat are not only 
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intersubjective but also susceptible to power relations. On the other hand, the CSS school 
not only employs a critical stance towards the concept of national security per se, but also 
tends to negate the epistemological premises of positivist research agenda on the grounds 
that it reproduces extant power relations with its claim to objectivity. Instead, CSS scholars 
provide valuable insight into the relationship between the ideational dimension of the nation 
state and its material basis through notions such as national identity and official state 
ideology. Nevertheless, in order to critically evaluate the traditional terrain of security, this 
approach adopts a much inclusive definition incorporating myriad fields and manifestations 
of human insecurity (i.e. poverty, environmental degradation…etc.) which ultimately out-
stretches the concept and mars its analytical strength. In this respect, from a CSS perspective 
the study of security ought to undertake the ramifications of phenomena such as the 
economic crisis or global warming, thereby leading to a conceptual stretching where security 
becomes coterminous with  any form of well-being. As a result, this problem of conceptual 
stretching overshadows how the security mentality and discourse extends on other issue 
areas and paralyze the functioning of ‘normal politics’.  
At this point, the Copenhagen School whilst concurring with the critical perspective 
of CSS opts to retain the traditional conceptualization of ‘security’; not to treat it as an 
objective reality like the Constructivist school, but to depict how it is discursively 
constituted and extended to other areas of political life. As a given issue-area is incorporated 
into the terrain of security through acts of securitization, it is rendered beyond political 
deliberation and handled with the language of emergency, necessity, and exception. Parallel 
to the central argument of Copenhagen School, the insights offered by Schmitt ( [1927] 
1996) and Agamben (2003) cogently illustrate that this process eventually lends greater 
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power to the executive branch and security forces, which become endowed with the 
authority to by-pass normal legal procedures and practice de facto rule. Thus, the 
‘sovereign’ is conferred the capacity to sidestep established norms and revoke legal 
principles for the sake of security. These theoretical premises have important bearings in the 
context of counter-terrorism, as it succinctly illuminates how state actors articulate 
exceptionalism, while others point out the inherent problems associated with such 
conceptualization.  
 The theoretical insights offered by Copenhagen school and the accounts of the 
sovereign formulated by Schmitt ([1922] 1996) and Agamben (2003) converge to form one 
of the backbones of the framework for this study: how the depiction of exceptional 
circumstances are primarily speech acts that securitize areas of social and political life, 
thereby subduing fundamental rights. This point of convergence is adeptly put by Neal, who 
suggests that “[i]f ‘securitization’ is translated into ‘exceptionalization’ the ‘real referent’ of 
the exception is rendered a chimera; there is no ‘objective necessity’ to the exception, all 
there is is the exceptionalizing speech-act.” (Neal, 2010: 102) Hence, as noted by Schmitt 
and later Agamben in a critical light, the sovereign by virtue of being the sole authority to 
declare a state of emergency and to designate those elements that pose an existential threat 
to the national interest, is able to portray a given issue as a matter of ‘security’ or ‘existential 
threat’, in order to endorse a certain type of policy outcome.  
In order to conceptualize the tension between security concerns and human rights 
principles, this study recognizes the dual disposition of sovereignty in contemporary 
politics: firstly as an entity dedicated to providing security and thus entitled to declare state 
of exception, but also as an entity that is ever more obliged to uphold norms and principles 
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that are recognized and enshrined in international law. At this juncture, international human 
rights norms convey tremendous bearings on the legitimacy of a nation state, as they have 
come to constitute one of the main pillars of sovereignty in world politics. Congruent to 
Krasner’s (1999) conceptualization of human rights as one of the ‘scripts of modernity’, 
others have argued that legitimacy and international standing is conditional on a respect for 
human rights (Evans, 2005; Reus-Smith, 2001; Chowdhury, 2011). Subsequently, the 
concept of human rights have not only come to constitute a legitimate moral claim that can 
be utilized by individuals or groups against state oppression, but also as a means to 
distinguish legitimate practices of state sovereignty. In short, in contemporary politics, while 
the sovereign retains the authority over national security and emergency powers, it is 
concomitantly incumbent upon balancing the latter with the standards of human rights 
norms.  
The post-9/11 context and ensuing counter-terrorism measures offer significant 
insights into how this balancing and the resulting trade-off takes place in different societies 
with similar experiences. The account provided by Jackson (2005) illustrates how the 
practice and language of counter-terrorism are premised on one another, whereby the 
construction of a language of ‘terror’ justifies certain security policies both to domestic and 
international audiences. Such a theoretical perspective entails a congruent methodology, in 
which the main aim is to investigate the relationship between discourse on the one hand, 
social and political processes on the other hand. As put by Kurki, “constitutive 
theorizing…is not just about inquiring into conceptual relations (meanings) but about 
inquiring into how they play themselves out in the social world, giving rise to certain 
practices and social relations.” (2008: 181) Therefore, this study undertakes a twofold 
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analysis, whereby both a comparative policy analysis premised on historical developments 
and frame analysis of the legislative process are presented in order to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of the interplay between multiple dynamics. Also known as 
triangulation, this approach helps to enhance the validity and the reliability of the research 
design. 
Moving on from these grounds, the case studies of policy analysis (Sutton, 1999) 
offer a comparative account of the evolution of counter-terrorism policies in relation to the 
entailments of human rights law, as well as the dynamics involved that play a role in the 
formation of such policies. These chapters aim to provide a socio-political framework of 
how different and often contradictory obligations under both international and domestic 
expectations are being evaluated and balanced by state officials. With the purpose of 
pointing out the similarities and differences in the contexts of Turkey and the UK, it offers 
insight into how these countries set their preferences and what type of measures they enact, 
what type of powers and authorities they assign to various actors or bodies, and what 
principles are sacrificed. In so doing, it seeks to demonstrate how governments endeavor to 
strike a balance in the decision making process regarding national security concerns on the 
one hand, fundamental rights and freedoms on the other hand. This empirical section is 
followed by a section on frame analysis of the parliamentary debates on the drafting and 
enacting of relevant legislations, as to elucidate various cross-cutting framing strategies and 
discursive formulations employed. Like all other forms of textual analysis, frame analysis 
also involves a process of coding, where the researcher seeks for regularities in the data 
through the representation of words and phrases which constitute the coding categories. 
(Boglan and Biklen, 1992: 166). For the purposes of this study I plan to utilize both data-
 74 
 
driven and theory-driven categories, where the former is grounded in the data and solidified 
throughout the analysis; whereas, the latter is premised on the insights offered by the 
theoretical foundations and previous research on the topic.  
The coding process involves double coding, where salient concepts, themes, and 
arguments are analyzed alongside the structural frame elements. The first set of codes are 
comprised of topoi8 formulated by Wodak, in addition to an array of concepts that are 
pointed out in the theoretical framework focusing on both the discourse of security and that 
of human rights. These set of codes that are utilized in the analysis can be seen in Table 2 
below, with a distinction of data-driven and theory-driven categories. A second 
categorization involves the analysis of the text as a policy frame premised on relevant frame 
components, described in Table 3. These dimensions that come together to form a cognitive 
frame are delineated by Verloo & Lombardo (2007) as involving a diagnosis, a prognosis, 
roles attributed to different actors, mechanisms involved (processes that reproduce or harbor 
the problem), the location of the problem or the solution, and finally intersectionality 
(intertwined problem areas, references to other frames). Altogether, the dimensions 
elaborated above provide the fundamental analytical tools to map out policy frames and the 
underlying assumptions that support them. As a result of a process of double coding, 
whereby both sets of codes are coded alongside each other, the co-occurrence function of 
ATLAS.ti allows the researcher to bring together the frame elements with the data-driven 
and theory-driven codes, to observe which themes and arguments are more frequently 
articulated in framing the problem or the solution.  
                                                          
8
 Common arguments in political debates, which are seemingly convincing yet generally false or misleading.  
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All in all, the study is premised on a bipartite analysis of the tension between 
counter-terrorism measures and human rights, with a section on the empirical processes of 
policy development and a section on the discursive formulations of such policy outcomes. 
These different types of inquiry evolve around the theoretical framework and address the 
manifestations of sovereign power, conception of security and threat, the treatment of legal 
norms, and the act of balancing. Hence, next section will begin with an overview of the 
international political zeitgeist in the aftermath of 9/11 and the ensuing international 
resolutions, then go on to present the process of policy development in the contexts of the 
UK and Turkey.  
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Table 2. Theory-driven and Data-driven Codes 
 
Theory-driven Codes Data-driven Codes 
Turkey United Kingdom 
Abuse of open society 
Balancing 
Burden 
Democratic values 
Dialogue/diplomacy redundant 
Duty to protect 
Enemy 
Ethnic terrorism vs. international terrorism 
Exceptionalism 
Executive powers 
International community 
International institutions 
International norms 
Legal obligation 
Lessons from the past  
Necessity 
Operational effectiveness 
Police powers 
Prevention 
Right to security 
Rule of law/due process 
Threat to our way of life 
Threatening rights and liberties 
Threat/urgency/emergency 
Trivialization 
Universal morality 
Vague definition 
Victim 
 
Abuse of rights and 
liberties 
Civil-military relations 
Democratization 
Demonstration/protest 
Example of civilized 
societies 
Foreign imposition 
Freedom of press 
Freedom of expression 
Going soft 
Infamous policy 
Nationalism 
National sensibilities 
Necessary limits to rights 
and liberties 
Organized Crime 
Othering support for 
human rights 
Pluralism 
Pressing reality of 
terrorism 
Propaganda 
Public Opinion  
Reaffirming commitment  
to human rights 
Real terrorists vs. falsely 
accused 
Religion 
Requirement of 
modernity 
Separatist vs. 
fundamentalist terrorism 
Socio-economic 
development 
 
Demonstration/protest 
Discrimination 
Extremism 
Freedom of association 
Freedom of expression 
Going soft 
Human rights for ‘us’ 
Immigration and asylum 
Infamous policy 
Minority vs. majority 
Multiculturalism  
Necessary sacrifice 
Organized crime  
Othering support for human 
rights 
Our lands 
Public demand security 
Public opinion 
Reaffirming commitment to 
human rights 
Religion 
The nation/society 
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Table 3. Policy Frame Structure 
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Part II. Comparative Policy Analysis: The Evolution of Counter-terrorism Policies vis-
a-vis Human Right Obligations 
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Introduction: 
International Human Rights and Counter-terrorism in the post-9/11 World Politics 
 
When Strasbourg constantly moves the goalposts and prevents the deportation of dangerous men like 
Abu Qatada, we have to ask ourselves, to what end are we signatories to the convention?
9
 
 
Theresa May, 9 March 2013 
 
In world politics today, there is an evident tug-of-war between institutionalized 
human rights norms and national security concerns, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11 as 
security priorities have become increasingly salient at the expense of fundamental rights and 
liberties. While commitment to such rights and freedoms is recognized as a requirement of 
legitimacy in contemporary politics, the fight against terrorism particularly in the post-9/11 
era has given way to contentious practices that tend to undermine long established 
democratic values. A growing number of states are becoming signatories to key international 
human rights treaties whilst concomitantly pledging loyalty to the ‘War on Terror’ initiated 
by the United States, which often entails conflicting policies as well as contradictory 
expectations on part of the international society. In order to better grasp international 
obligations pertaining to counter-terrorism, this section will highlight some key documents 
that yield a substantial impact on national legislature. 
Notwithstanding its salience particularly since 9/11, there seems to be an evident 
difficulty in drawing the boundaries of the concept of ‘terrorism’ in world politics. As put by 
Hoffman, “[o]n 9/11, Bin Laden wiped the slate clean of the conventional wisdom on 
terrorists and terrorisms, and by doing so, ushered in a new era of conflict- as well as a new 
discourse about it.” (Hoffman, 2004: xviii)  During this period, a growing number of states 
                                                          
9
 http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21726612 
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have adopted new or additional counter-terrorism measures following President G.W. 
Bush’s declaration that “[e]very nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either 
you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” (CNN.com, 21 September 2001) Nonetheless, 
this worldwide trend of joining the ‘War on Terror’ and subsequently adopting necessary 
measures did not ensue in a unitary definition of the term, to the contrary, it has emanated in 
a myriad different interpretations both across different states and on a supranational level. 
Furthermore, there has also been international incongruence with respect to the state of 
‘emergency’ and what sort of extraordinary powers it bestows state parties, particularly with 
respect to the status of human rights.  
The 1999 International Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
adopted by the UN General Assembly formulates terrorism as “[a]ny other act intended to 
cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active 
part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” (International Convention 
for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999) By 2001, only four states had ratified 
the convention, an insufficient number for it to enter into force. Yet, following the 9/11 
attacks, the UN Security Council has made a call to state parties with the Resolution 1373, 
which resulted in a number of 155 states becoming signatories (UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373, 2001)10. This initiative has been considered as one of the first attempts at 
                                                          
10
 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Res
olution%201373%20%282001%29.pdf 
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reaching an internationally recognized definition of the term ‘terrorism’. (Steiner et. al., 
2008: 376)  
If 9/11 was an important watershed in the international security debates and 
discussions, another major turning point came in 2004 with the Beslan school massacre. On 
September 1, 2004 School Number One (SNO) in the autonomous region of North Caucasus 
in the Russian Federation was taken under siege along with 1.100 hostages in the leadership 
of Chechen separatist organization headed by Shamil Basayev, who was demanding the 
independence of Chechnya. The event resulted in more than 380 deaths including children, 
and approximately 780 individuals being injured. (Satter, 2006) This event led to a search 
for a re-definition of terrorism in the Security Council. The Russian government’s aim was 
to expand the focus on Al Qaeda and the Taliban to include different manifestations of 
terrorism, which in turn resulted in the 1566 resolution that stipulates “…criminal 
acts…committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of 
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular persons….are under no circumstances justifiable by consideration of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other similar nature…” (UN 
Security Council Resolution 1566, 2004)11   
It is important to note that these endeavors did not take place without objections. The 
Terrorism Financing Convention 1999 was ratified with reservations by Jordan, Egypt and 
Syria which demanded the recognition of the legitimacy of national armed struggles. 
Likewise, resolution 1566 in 2004 came into being with the compromises attained by 
Turkey, Algeria and Pakistan that upheld an adamant stance on the issue of liberation 
                                                          
11
 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/542/82/PDF/N0454282.pdf?OpenElement 
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struggles and the ‘legitimacy of national resistance’. (Steiner et. al., 2008: 378)  Hence, there 
has been an ongoing contestation among nation states over what constitutes international 
terrorism or international security risks and a key factor leading to this contestation is 
different perceptions of threat factors.  
Another international trend in counterterrorism that came into being in the aftermath 
of the London bombings with the strong endorsement of the Blair government, has been the 
Security Council Resolution 1624 enforced on 14 September 2005. The Resolution firstly 
condemned “…the incitement of terrorist acts and repudiating attempts at the justification or 
glorification (apologie) of terrorist acts that may incite further terrorist acts,” and called for 
all states to “prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts; prevent such 
conduct; deny safe haven to any persons with respect to whom there is credible and relevant 
information giving serious reasons for considering that they have been guilty of such 
conduct.” 12  (Security Council Resolution 1624, 2005) A similar international document is 
the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (hereafter CECPT), signed and enacted by 
the Council of Europe in 2005. This document requires the member states to criminalize 
‘public provocation to commit a terrorist offence’. (Marchand, 2010: 139)  This act is 
defined in the Convention as constituting “the distribution, or otherwise making available, of 
a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where 
such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one 
or more such offences may be committed.”13 (Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism, 2005) The Convention also foresees the criminalization of the 
recruitment and training of individuals for terrorist offence, regardless whether such an 
                                                          
12
 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/510/52/PDF/N0551052.pdf?OpenElement 
13
 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/196.htm 
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offence has taken place or not. Yet, the provisions are limited by the duty of upholding 
human rights during their implementation, and especially freedom of expression. Moreover, 
the Convention requires that domestic legislature criminalizing public provocation needs to 
be proportionate, “with respect to the legitimate aims pursued and to their necessity in a 
democratic society, and should exclude any form of arbitrariness.” (Ibid.) In order to 
determine whether the relevant domestic law and measures taken are ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’, the two-tiered test of the ECtHR apply: whether the restriction of 
certain rights and freedoms respond to a pressing social need, and whether the restriction is 
proportionate to that need. (Marchand, 2010: 149-150) 
The conjuncture of public emergency provides temporary grounds for state parties to 
derogate from their obligations under human rights treaties which are circumscribed within 
strict boundaries. For instance, Article 4 of International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (hereafter ICCPR) stipulates that “in time of public emergency which threatens the 
life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed…” states can derogate 
from their responsibilities. (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1976)14 
Nonetheless, by discerning between ‘absolute’ and ‘restrictive’ rights, international human 
rights law endorses a certain limit on the derogatory discretion a state can employ. Those 
rights that are deemed absolute and thus ought to be protected under all circumstances are 
namely the right to life and freedom from torture. One additional right that is posited as 
absolute by the ICCPR is ‘no punishment without due process of law’. The restrictive or 
derogable rights under public emergency or threat to national security are delineated in 
every relevant convention with certain limitations, namely that such derogations are lawful, 
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 http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx 
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necessary, and proportionate. (Sambei et. al., 2009: 348-349) Likewise, the Guidelines of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Human Rights and the Fight Against 
Terrorism allows for restrictions to the right of defense, such as access to counsel, to the 
case-file or the use of anonymous testimony, provided that these restrictions are 
proportionate and that fairness of the proceedings are ensured. (Council of Europe, 2002) As 
stipulated in Article 15 of the Guidelines: “When fight against terrorism takes place…a State 
may adopt measures temporarily derogating from certain obligations ensuing from the 
international instruments of protection of human rights…within the limits and under the 
conditions fixed by international law.”15 (Ibid.)  
Since acts of terrorism are not considered within the category of ‘core international 
crimes’ (i.e. genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity…etc.), they are not dealt under 
the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal, but rather fall within the purview of 
domestic jurisdiction. As such, state parties are expected to enact counter-terrorist legislature 
that is in line with the relevant international law. (Sambei et. al., 2009: 13) The unresolved 
situation regarding international rules on terrorism is reflected on national legal frameworks 
which differ both amongst themselves and within every national context, where a number of 
different definitions can be found in criminal code, in laws regulating immigration and 
deportation, or for regulating associations. Amidst this variety, the amorphous boundaries of 
the term trigger problems related to ‘legality’ and particularly bring up the issue of fair trial. 
This concern has been voiced by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which 
has maintained that,” [a]mbiguities in laws proscribing terrorism not only undermine the 
propriety of criminal processes that enforce those laws, but may also have serious 
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 http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/HR%20and%20the%20fight%20against%20terrorism.pdf 
 85 
 
implications beyond criminal liability and punishment, such as the denial of refugee status.” 
(quoted in Steiner et. al., 2008: 379) In a similar vein, Sambei et. al. argue that the UNSCR 
1373 obliges states to incorporate counter-terrorism measures in their legal framework albeit 
failing to offer a lucid definition of terrorism, and has therefore culminated in potentially 
abusive counter-terrorism laws that stigmatize political opponents under the rubric of 
fighting terrorism. (Sambei et. al., 2009: 14-15)   
 A comparison of the Turkish and the British cases offers interesting insights on the 
trade-off between international human rights obligations and counter-terrorism policies in 
national contexts. At first glance, such a comparison might seem untenable since the UK is a 
consolidated democracy with a long history of liberal rights, while Turkey is still going 
through a democratization process and has not yet habitualized the observance of human 
rights principles. Nonetheless, both countries have undergone similar experiences with 
respect to what have been categorized as both ‘ethnic’ and ‘global’ terrorism (Zarakol, 
2011), and therefore, have been adopting new anti-terror policies as a response. Overall, a 
number of revealing similarities come to the fore in terms of the content and implementation 
of the new counter-terrorism measures, as well as how these have been balanced vis-a-vis 
human rights principles. These cases not only provide insight into how international trends 
and expectations are translated into domestic legislation, but also in what ways a long-
established liberal democracy conveys striking similarities to a yet democratizing country 
when it comes to the issue of ‘terrorism’. The following sections will explicate the evolving 
course of both counter-terrorism and human rights policies in these two contexts in the light 
of political developments. 
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Table 4. International documents pertaining to fighting terrorism 
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Chapter 3. Counter-terrorism Policy in the Heartland of Liberal Democracy: An 
Account of Policy Development in the UK 
 
 The United Kingdom has a history of dealing with ‘terrorism’ that far predates the 
September 11 attacks. As such, necessary legislation and strategic measures for countering 
the threat of terrorism were already intact, before the ‘War on Terror’ took an international 
hold. These previous measures took place beginning from 1970s all throughout 1990s at the 
zenith of the prolonged conflict between the British forces and Irish Republican Army 
(hereafter IRA), and conveyed primarily a ‘reactive’ characteristic as temporary responses16. 
Consequently, such legislation gave way to controversial measures with respect to 
international human rights principles, engendering a perturbed relation between national 
security and fundamental rights and freedoms in British politics. (Golder & Williams, 2006: 
45). As put by Gearty, “[t]he problem of political violence arising out of the conflict in 
Northern Ireland had produced a large body of anti-terrorism legislation during the 
preceding thirty years, with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg having been 
frequently called upon to adjudicate in conflicts between terrorist suspects and the state, and 
on one celebrated occasion between two states, the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Ireland.” (Gearty, 2005: 20)  
The post-9/11 period brought about a different juncture triggered by the call for a 
‘War on Terror’ that culminated in a new international zeitgeist. In line with international 
demands, the UK became signatory to a number of covenants that were later adopted in the 
                                                          
16
 The conflict goes back to the 1916-1921 Anglo-Irish War and the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty partitioning 
Ireland whilst establishing Northern Ireland as a British Province.  This arrangement culminated in fierce 
clashes throughout what has been termed as Mainland Campaign between 1939-1945, Border Campaign of 
1956-1962, and finally the Troubles of 1969-1998. The clashes came to an end with the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998. More a detailed account see Parker (2006). 
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domestic law, which was tantamount to pledging loyalty to the ‘War’ launched by the 
United States. Following the London bombings in 2005, there has been a further shift in 
policy orientation, whereby the government became more wary of the ‘enemies within’ and 
undertook new anti-terrorism measures, due to the perception of the inefficiencies of the 
previous anti-terrorism acts. Recently, the government published a National Security 
Strategy 2010, wherein terrorism is singled out as one of the gravest threats facing the UK, 
suggesting that as an open society it is more vulnerable to the new unconventional types of 
attacks.17 (UK National Security Strategy, 2010: 3) As put in the Foreword of the report, 
“terrorist groups like Al Qaeda are determined to exploit our openness to attack us, and plot 
to kill as many of our citizens as possible or to inflict a crushing blow to our economy.” 
(Ibid.)  
Despite the fact that the UK has historically been the heartland of rights and liberties, 
within the framework of counter-terrorism it has condoned controversial policies in violation 
of democratic values. Amidst a growing sense of security concern, the British government 
has continued to adopt new and modified laws in order to address the perceived threat of 
terrorism, while concurrently seeking to legitimize contentious provisions and balance the 
latter vis-à-vis human rights standards. Hence, the UK context proves to be a conducive case 
for the study of the tension between international human rights norms and national security 
concerns, taking into account different actors involved in this struggle. In what follows, this 
section will first elucidate legislation pertaining to human rights in the UK, then go on to 
provide an account of the changing course of the counter-terrorism laws and strategies, in 
light of international and domestic dynamics.  
                                                          
17
 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-
strategy.pdf 
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3.1. Human Rights Legislation in the UK  
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK entails that acts of parliaments 
are the ‘supreme law of the land’, in the absence of a constitution. As a result, an Act of 
Parliament cannot be overturned by a judicial court since the judiciary is not endowed with 
the power of judicial review. One limitation to Parliament’s legislative supremacy is the 
Human Rights Act 1998, which enables a court to decide whether an Act of Parliament is 
against fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the European Convention of Human 
Rights. In such a case, since the courts lack the authority to overturn a legislation, they 
instead issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ which, albeit not binding, compels the 
Parliament to reconsider an issue. (Marchand, 2010: 127)  
Although the UK has historically been home to individual rights and liberties, the 
cornerstone human rights legislation in the UK has been the Human Rights Act of 1998 
which came into full force in October 2000. As described by Prime Minister Tony Blair in 
the White Paper on the Human Rights Bill, the Act aims to “increase individual rights, to 
decentralize power, to open up government and to reform Parliament.”18 (Human Rights Bill 
1997)  In the Introduction it is stated that the Act intends to “give further effect to rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights; to make provision 
with respect to holders of certain judicial offices who become judges of the European Court 
of Human Rights; and for connected purposes.” (Human Rights Act 1998) 19 In short, the 
main function of the Act is to entrench fundamental human rights as they take place in the 
ECHR into British law, thereby aligning domestic legislation with the criteria entailed by the 
international community it is a part of.  
                                                          
18
 http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/hoffice/rights/preface.htm 
19
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/introduction 
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In the aftermath of World War II, the UK was one of the first European states to 
ratify the European Convention on Human Rights, yet recognizing the jurisdiction of the 
Strasbourg Court and the right of its citizens to make individual application was only 
granted in 1966. Due to the dualist system of law prevailing in the UK, the treaty failed to 
wield any domestic effect and remained as an international treaty until then. The 
Conservative government since 1951 was adamant in resisting individual petition to the 
ECHR on the grounds that the Strasbourg Court would be able to scrutinize British common 
law. (Kirby, 2009) According to Moracsik (2000), the most common reason for avoiding 
individual applications put forth in official documents is that a judicial review would 
overshadow parliamentary sovereignty, with a particular concern over political extremes. 
This stance was evident in Lord Chancellor Jowitt’s complaint that “the Convention would 
prevent a future of British government from detaining people without trial during a period of 
emergency…” (quoted in Moravcsik, 2000: 238) 
The resistance on part of the UK to grant individual application despite being one of 
the first signatories of the ECHR is illustrative of the tension between sovereign power and 
universal rights. While pledging allegiance to internationally established norms is a sine qua 
non for a community of modern nation states granting the respective states international 
legitimacy, individual application to an international court is perceived as corroding the 
powers of the sovereign. The reaction of Lord Chancellor Jowitt is a case in point that 
demonstrates how ‘sovereignty’ is taken in a Schmittean sense as having the authority to 
demarcate the purview of emergency and thus, the state of exception. Yet, as human rights 
principles acquire a higher ground in international standards, so does their domestic 
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institutionalization, which was the case for the UK in 1998 with the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act.  
Given the primary aim of ‘bringing rights home’ as expounded in the White Paper, 
the Human Rights Act 1998 introduces a number of significant provisions in the British 
legal system and enhances the purview of the European Court of Human Rights (Human 
Rights Bill 1997). To begin with, the Act makes it unlawful for public authorities to act in 
ways that are incompatible with the Convention, unless an Act of Parliament (as the primary 
legislation) provides no other choice. Concurrently, the Act allows human rights cases to be 
handled in domestic courts or tribunals, without the need to apply to the Strasbourg Court. 
The Act also requires all UK legislation to be in line with the Convention rights; however, if 
this is not possible judges do not enjoy the right to override primary legislation. Under such 
circumstances, the higher courts are expected to issue a declaration of incompatibility. In 
general, section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 stipulates a statement of compatibility 
from the relevant Minister whenever a Bill is proposed, explaining whether or not the Bill is 
attuned with the ECHR. (Human Rights Act 1998) 
  One important characteristic of the Human Rights Act 1998 was the provision that 
foresees the establishment of an independent human rights committee within the Parliament 
that would ensure enacted legislations are consonant with the ECHR.  (Human Rights Act 
1998) This provision culminated in the establishment of the House of Lords and House of 
Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights comprised of 12 members chosen from both 
chambers. The Joint Committee is responsible of evaluating human rights issues in the UK 
(with the exception of individual cases), thereby formulating proposals for remedial orders, 
draft remedial orders and consider remedial orders made under the purview of Human 
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Rights Act 1998.20 (Joint Select Committee on Human Rights) In order to fulfill its 
obligations, The Joint Committee is conferred with the powers to ask for written evidence, 
to examine witnesses, and to appoint specialist advisers. (House of Lords & House of 
Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2007a)  
Nonetheless, despite the long established tradition of rights and liberties in the 
British society, there is a wide-spread reluctance towards both the ECHR and the Human 
Rights Act that has entrenched the former in domestic law. The skeptical attitudes towards 
the ECHR are prevalent both in the discourses of politicians and the media. Loader (2007) 
points out that a negative stance towards the ECHR is particularly prevalent among 
conservative circles, which is construed as ‘foreign’ and a European imposition upon British 
common law, notwithstanding the fact that the British government played a central role in its 
creation. Following two recent decisions made by ECtHR, namely endorsing the right to 
vote for prisoners and the deportation case of Abu Qatada21, government officials have been 
criticizing the Court for being too intrusive in national matters. In November 2012, the 
former Lord High Chancellor of Britain Jack Straw has stated that it is time for the ECtHR 
to “pull back from the jurisdictional expansion it has made in recent decades. Otherwise, 
Strasbourg will be the architect of its own demise." (The Guardian, 14 November 2012) A 
similar remark has been made by Prime Minister Cameron, who has accused the ECtHR of 
overstepping its own purview and intruding into national decisions where it does not need 
to. (Cameron, 2012) A number of other MPs have proposed to withdraw from the ECtHR, a 
move no democracy has ever undertaken. Donald et. al. point out that misleading media 
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 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/ 
21
 Initially in 2002, The EctHR did not allow the UK to deport Abu Qatada. Later developments of this case is 
explicated below.   
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coverage of the ECHR has reinforced a context of hostility towards human rights. Often 
times either the costs of ECHR are exaggerated, or inaccurate information is given about the 
European Court system, such as the common fallacy of portraying Strasbourg Court judges 
to be unelected, whereas they are in fact elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. (Ibid.: 2)  
When it comes to public perceptions of the Human Rights Act 1998, there is a 
widely held belief that the Act receives meager support from the general public. 
Nonetheless, the findings of a survey commissioned by the Ministry of Justice in 2008 
reveal that 84 % of the respondents feel the necessity of having a law in Britain pertaining to 
human rights. Likewise in Liberty’s Human Rights Act Poll conducted in 2010, it is reported 
that 96 % of the respondents endorsed the existence of a law that protects fundamental rights 
and freedoms in Britain. (Liberty, 2010) Both studies concur that a great majority of British 
citizens consider rights as crucial, however, this tendency drastically changes when human 
rights issues are incorporated in a security context. The British Social Attitudes Survey 2008 
has asked respondents to choose between the protection of civil liberties and right to privacy 
or protection of safety and surroundings from terrorism. While 63.4 % of the participants 
opted for greater security, 33.1 % have indicated that they prioritize civil rights. (British 
Social Attitudes Survey 2008)  
In short, the institutionalization of international human rights norms has not been an 
easy process in the UK context, despite the long history of liberal rights and freedoms in the 
political culture of the country. One of the most evident reasons for such lukewarm posture 
is a concern over the principle of sovereignty, understood particularly in Schmittean terms 
of the authority to declare state of emergency and invoke extraordinary measures. This was 
 94 
 
particularly the case for the recognition of the authority of ECHR, which even though 
established, is still subject to government criticism especially when dealing with ‘terrorist 
threats’. The public opinion on human rights also exhibit a similar inclination, as a majority 
of the population express their support for such principles in general, but not when they are 
weighed against security concerns. This trade-off is also present within the legal framework, 
as policy makers seek grounds for bypassing the obligations imposed by the 1998 Human 
Rights Act in the context of counter-terrorism. The following section will provide an 
account of the counter-terrorism legislation in the UK in the post-9/11 era and its uneasy 
relationship with human rights.  
3.2. Counter-terrorism Legislation in the post-9/11 era 
In the eve of September 11 attacks, The British Parliament had already passed the 
Terrorism Act 2000 which provided a highly inclusive definition of terrorism that has 
proved to be quite influential for successive policies. The Act defines terrorism as a “means 
to use or threat of action where… (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves 
serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person 
committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a 
section of the public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system.”22 (Terrorism Act 2000) According to the Act, the contours of a terrorist 
activity also includes acts when “…the use or threat is designed to influence the government 
or an international governmental organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the 
public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial 
or ideological cause.” (Ibid.) In addition, the 2000 Act regards it as a criminal offence for an 
individual to wear “an item of clothing” or to wear, carry or display an article that raises 
                                                          
22
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1 
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reasonable suspicion that the individual is a member or supporter of a terrorist organization. 
(Ibid.) Overall, this definition of terrorism reflects an understanding of public order as the 
main object of security in the UK context, and counter-terrorism aiming to maintain such 
order. 
However, this definition of terrorism is manifestly broader compared to previous UK 
legislation as well as international law pertaining to this issue. For instance, the 1989 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) defines the phenomenon of terrorism as 
“the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of 
putting the public or any section of the public in fear.” 23 (Prevention of Terrorism 
Temporary Provisions 1989) The definition in Act 2000 is also more inclusive compared to 
the definition offered by the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism24, especially with respect to the clauses that render property damage 
or disruptions in electronic services. This characteristic of the legislation is problematic with 
respect to the expression of discontent, since such an overbroad definition risk criminalizing 
both legitimate demonstrations and also unlawful protests which pertain to issues of public 
order, but not terrorism per se. For instance, demonstrations including anti-globalization 
protest, animal rights protests, or even flash mobs can fall within the purview of this 
provision (Article 19, 2006).  
Another pressing problem that presented itself within the framework of Terrorism 
Act 2000 was the introduction of the controversial stop and search provision known as 
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 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/4/section/20/enacted 
24
 Which defined a terrorist act as “intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any 
other person not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such 
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act.” (International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism 1999) 
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‘section 44’. The provision allows police forces to stop and search individuals and vehicles 
in the absence of a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that a crime has taken place. This policy has 
aimed to address the issue of terrorism from a preventive vantage point, where failure to 
cooperate with the security forces could result in 6 month imprisonment or £5000 fine, and 
sometimes both. The implementation of this provision had been restricted by safeguards 
such as authorization from the Home Secretary, geographic and temporal limits on the 
practice, assessment of community impact and finally guidance of its usage for the police. 
(Human Rights Watch, 2010) Human Rights Watch has indicated that the safeguards for 
section 44 have nonetheless been largely ineffective. Between the years 2007 and 2009, the 
application of this method has proliferated seven-fold, from 37,000 to 256,000. During this 
period, there has been a total of 450,000 recorded stop and search cases, none of which 
resulting in a prosecution of terrorist offense or useful information on a terrorist plot. 
(Human Rights Watch, 2010: 1-2) As poignantly explained by the report, “[a]uthorizations 
by the Home Secretary appear to be little more than rubber stamping exercises, with rolling 
authorizations across the whole of London for April 2002 until May 2009.” (Human Rights 
Watch, 2010: 2) 
Moreover, section 44 has been criticized for being abused by the police for 
intimidating protestors, and therefore discouraging protests. Together with the Public Order 
Act 198625 and Serious and Organized Crime and Police Act 200526 which regulate 
demonstrations, section 44 has been executed in a way that hinders the right to assembly. 
                                                          
25
  While the Public Order Act does not necessitate a notice in advance for static demonstration, a week’s 
advance notice is required for protest marches. Moreover, with the consent of Home Secretary the police can 
ban a protest if it is deemed to cause disorder, disruption or damage. (Public Order Act 1986) 
26
 The Serious and Organized Crime and Police Act enforced in 2005 resulted in further restrictions upon 
demonstrations, as it prohibited the right to demonstration within a designated area of one kilometer from 
any point of Parliament square, in addition to increasing the authority of the police to arrest individuals. 
(Serious and Organized Crime and Police Act 2005). 
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The practice has been used in lawful demonstrations, such as the arms fair protest at 
London’s Docklands in 2003, or the demonstrations during the 2005 Labor Party 
Conference when more than 600 individuals got arrested, including an 82 year old activist. 
(Article 19, 2006) Eventually in 2010, the Strasbourg Court has overturned the decision by 
Britain’s highest court and in the case of Gillian and Quinton v. UK27 declared that section 
44 was in violation of the right to privacy, right to liberty, as well as the principle of non-
discrimination considering the ethnic profiling incurred by the practice.  
Hence, it can be observed that the two most salient problems inherent in Terrorism 
Act 2000 have been the extensive ‘stop and search’ powers granted to the police coupled 
with the vague definition of terrorism that is against international standards. These 
characteristics herald the normalization of the ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2003), paving 
the way for the extension of executive powers under the aegis of security. Particularly 
interesting is the interactive effect of these two measures, as they lead to the securitization of 
lawful acts of dissidence, thereby infringing the right to assembly and the right to protest28. 
As put by Waever, “[b]y uttering security, a state-representative moves in a particular 
development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means 
are necessary to block it.” (1995: 55) Thus, one of the most alarming ramifications of 
extensive police powers coupled with a broad account of terrorism provided by Terrorism 
Act 2000 has been the securitization of dissent or protest, as these areas of political life are 
deemed possible sites that might harbor elements of threat to national security. This 
                                                          
27
 The full decision of the case can be found at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
96585. 
28
 In addition to the blatant violation of right to privacy induced by section 44.  
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tendency is also in line with Jackson’s (2005) argument that draconian counter-terrorism 
policies seek to discipline domestic society by marginalizing dissent and protest.  
Following the 9/11 bombings, many western countries including the UK enacted 
new counter-terrorist legislation as required by the Resolution 1373 of the United Nations 
Security Council unanimously approved by all members in 28 September 2001. The 
Resolution stipulated that all states shall prevent the financing of terrorist groups and 
become party to the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, deny support to any form of terrorist organization and establish necessary 
domestic laws in order to effectively punish such crime. In addition, this resolution brought 
about the creation of Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) as a monitoring body, which has 
requested all states to report within 90 days regarding the steps taken in national legislations. 
According to Roach, SCR 1373 has played an important role in the adoption of hasty 
measures in different settings, as well as exerting its impact through reporting duties 
expected from state parties in compliance with the Resolution. (Roach, 2007: 231)  
Notwithstanding the fact the UK was one of the few countries that have ratified the 
1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism prior to the 
September 11 events, the government undertook further steps by enacting the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (hereafter ATCSA). The ATCSA 2001 made 
several modifications to the preceding Terrorism Act 2000, and also brought to the fore a 
number of contentious provisions. The Terrorism Act 2000 entailed individuals who are 
“engaged in a trade, profession, business or employment” to report beliefs and suspicions of 
terrorist fundraising and money laundering, whose breach stipulates five years’ 
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imprisonment. (Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001)29 Congruous to Security 
Council Resolution 1373, ATCSA expanded these controversial reporting duties and added 
a general provision that demands the reporting of any information that an individual deems 
as “…material assistance in preventing the commission by another person of an act of 
terrorism, or in securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of another person, in 
the United Kingdom, for an offence involving the commission, preparation or instigation of 
an act of terrorism” (Ibid.). Moreover, not disclosing such information is once again 
considered as a criminal offence. In other words, this provision entails that individuals 
become informants, reporting on ‘suspicious’ activities of others, thereby actively partaking 
in counter-terrorism. Thus, such elevated sense of security stipulates that they either become 
part of the security apparatus or be punished for not fulfilling the ‘duty to report’.  
One striking feature of the Resolution was the clause which called upon the states to 
be vigilant regarding border controls, particularly with respect to issues of immigration and 
refugee status to make sure it was not being exploited by terrorist groups. The Resolution 
calls for necessary measures that would ensure “the asylum seeker has not planned, 
facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist attacks,” and that “refugee status is 
not abused.” (Security Council Resolution 1373) In accordance with this clause, ATCSA 
included a provision that allowed non-UK nationals suspected of being affiliated with 
terrorism-related activities to be indefinitely detained, provided that they cannot be sent back 
to their country of origin or another country. The process of determining and categorizing a 
detainee as a ‘suspected terrorist’ or a ‘national security risk’ is conducted with secret 
evidence that is not accessible by the suspect, whose final certification must be done by the 
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 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/contents 
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Secretary of State for Home Affairs. (Human Rights Watch, 2003)30 Since the UK 
government could not deport non-citizens that faced the risk of being tortured in their home 
countries in light of international law, it opted to condone the practice of ‘indefinite 
detention’ instead. Unlike Article 5 of the ECHR, Article 3 is a non-derogable right and 
therefore must be upheld by the UK government, who contends that the policy does not 
constitute detention since the detainee is free to leave the country. (Chakrabarti, 2005: 144)  
Under these circumstances, the only plausible alternative at the detainee’s disposal is to 
appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission31 (hereafter SIAC) and be 
represented by a special advocate appointed by the court. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, 
the detainee is deprived of the right to access the evidence through their advocate, thereby 
lacking any feasible ground to formulate a defense. (Human Rights Watch, 2003) In fact, the 
HM Prison Belmarsh in London used to accommodate indefinitely detained suspects without 
charge or trial, therefore referred to as the ‘British version of Guantanamo’. In 2004, 17 men 
had been detained under this provision, 9 of which have been in Belmarsh for more than 3 
years without being charged.  
                                                          
30
 The contentious practice of pre-charged detention in the UK goes back to the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provision) Act 1984 that aimed to address terrorist activities in Northern Ireland, as exemplified 
in the well-known 1988 Brogan and other v UK case brought before the ECtHR. The four individuals who were 
detained for being suspected terrorists were held for a period of six to four days in the absence of any judicial 
oversight and none has been charged after their release. The ECtHR contended that such an act, albeit the 
underlying objective of protecting the community from terrorism, constituted a breach of the principle of 
‘promptness’ as delineated in Article 5(3). The ECtHR’s ruling in the Brogan case has been a leading decision 
that has been applied to many subsequent cases. Nevertheless, this decision has not been upheld by 
Strasbourg in the 1993 Brannigan and MacBride v UK case, whereby the practice of pre-charge detention was 
justified on the grounds that there was a threat jeopardizing the “life of the nation.” (Donald et. al. ,2012: 60) 
 
31
 SIAC is a significant body that is responsible for striking a balance between human rights obligations of the 
UK and security risks presented by asylum seekers and immigrants, following the Strasbourg ruling on the 
1996 Chahal v. UK case. (Sambei et. al. 2009: 357) One contentious issue regarding the operations of SIAC, 
inter alia, has been the question whether evidence extracted through the use of torture could be accepted. 
Initially, SIAC and the Court of Appeal concurred that such information could be received on the condition 
that it was obtained by foreign officials without the complicity of British authorities. As the question was 
referred to the House of Lords, it was unanimously decided that the usage of any information acquired 
through torture, with or without the involvement of British officials, was unacceptable. (Ibid.)  
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This tendency is a cogent example of the trade-off between international human 
rights norms and national security requirements, where states aim to strike a balance 
between the two often to the advantage of the latter. As soon as ATCSA came into force, the 
government submitted a Derogation Order under the ECHR and ICCPR with respect to the 
new provisions it entailed. (Steiner et. al., 2008: 417) The Derogation Order refers to Article 
15 (3)32 of the ECHR and asserts that the government of UK is acting under its obligations to 
the SCR 1373 by taking necessary steps in order to “to prevent the commission of terrorist 
attacks, including by denying safe haven to those who finance, plan, support or commit 
terrorist attacks.”33 (Derogation Order, 2001) Furthermore, the Order declares that the 
context incurred in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, considering the threat of a possible attack 
and the presence of foreign nationals suspected of being affiliated with international 
terrorism, the state is in a situation of public emergency as delineated in Article 15 (1)34. 
(Ibid.) Hence, consonant with Immigration Act 1971, the Order sustains that the government 
has a right to deport individuals on national security grounds or detain them “pending their 
removal or deportation.” (Ibid.)   
Being the only European country to invoke indefinite detention that specifically 
targets non-nationals, the UK has paved the way for the suspension of due process with the 
onset of ATCSA 2001. Under the state of exception, the government has created a “space 
devoid of law,” (Agamben, 2003: 50) rendering such individuals to be susceptible to what 
Agamben defines as the “de facto rule” of the sovereign (Ibid.: 3). This is also clearly the 
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 Stating that the derogation must be in compliance with the state’s obligation to other international law. 
33
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/3644/schedule/1/made 
34
 This article states that the derogation is permissible if there is a “public emergency threathening the life of 
the nation.” (European Convention on Human Rights) Retrieved at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf 
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case in the usage of secret evidence to determine those reckoned to be posing a risk to 
national security and the positioning of the executive above the law. Yet, what is striking is 
that such a decision to overtly violate established rights is not taken unilaterally, but through 
the process of compliance with international standards imposed by the ECHR. The decision 
to issue a derogation order is pivotal in this sense, because the government is appealing to 
exceptionality impelled by the post-9/11 environment while pledging loyalty to human rights 
norms on the whole, and concomitantly referencing other more pressing ‘international 
duties’ as the basis of the derogation. Hence, in the midst of a perceived threat environment 
the UK government is attempting to frame its derogation from human rights principles on 
the language of ‘state of exception’, thereby securitizing the issue area of immigration.  
  Subsequently, in 2004 the House of Lords have maintained that the derogation was 
disproportionate and discriminatory, while pointing out that terrorist suspects can also be 
citizens, which poignantly turned out to be the case in the 7/7 London bombings. Following 
the 2004 House of Lords’ decision in the case of A and others v Secretary of State for Home 
Department (2004), the indefinite detention provision was repealed by the Parliament, later 
to be replaced by ‘control orders’35 with the advent of Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. In 
this landmark case, the appellants rejected the derogation of Article 5 of the Convention in 
ATCSA 2001 on the grounds that there was no public emergency in the UK that fulfilled the 
requirements of being imminent and temporary in nature. In addition, the appellants argued 
that sections 21 and 23 were discriminatory on nationality grounds since it applied only for 
non-nationals, thereby breaching Article 14 of the ECHR that prohibits discrimination. In 
his speech, Lord Hope has elucidated the situation as follows:  
                                                          
35
 These measures will be further elaborated below. 
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…The distinction which the government seeks to draw between these two groups- 
British nationals and foreign nationals- raises an issue of discrimination. But, as the 
distinction is irrational, it goes to the heart of the issue about proportionality also. It 
proceeds on the misconception that it is a sufficient answer to the question whether the 
derogation is strictly required that the two groups have different rights in the 
immigration context. So they do. But the derogation is from the right to liberty. The right 
to liberty is the same for each group. If derogation is not strictly required in the case of 
one group, it cannot be strictly required in the case of the other group that presents the 
same threat.  
                                      (House of Lords, 16 December 2004)
36
 
The UK had been the only European country to derogate from Article 5 of the ECHR 
within the context of counter-terrorism, notwithstanding Resolution 1271 of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in January 2002 which clearly asserts that 
“[i]n their fight against terrorism, Council of Europe members should not provide for any 
derogation to the European convention on Human Rights.” (quoted in Steiner et. al., 2008: 
421) In a similar vein, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Mr. Alvaro 
Gil-Robles has elucidated in Opinion 1/2002 that the post-9/11 conjuncture of an elevated 
sense of national security is not a valid ground for derogating from the Convention. The 
Commissioner went on to indicate that states that have a history of facing terrorism have not 
considered it as a necessary measure to derogate, and therefore the decision on part of the 
UK to derogate from the ECHR needs to be backed up by “[d]etailed information pointing to 
a real and imminent danger to public safety….” (Joint Committee on Human Rights Fifth 
Report, 2002) 
While the practice of indefinite detention mainly targeted non-citizens and hence 
securitized immigration policies in general, its annulment brought back the issue of 
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 The full text of the decision made by the House of Lords can be found at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&others.pdf 
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deportation into the political debate. Shami Chakrabarti argues that the right to seek asylum 
as an indispensable international norm first came to be recognized in the UK with the 1951 
Refugee Convention in the aftermath of World War I. As put by Chakrabarti, “…it might be 
argued that much of our polity and judiciary were first introduced to concepts and analysis 
of fundamental human rights via the 1951 notion of asylum.” (2005: 132) The 1951 
Convention prohibits the practice of expulsion in Article 32, except for situations where 
national security is involved. Yet, this ‘state of exception’ is not exempt from the duty to 
uphold due process. Since the UK became a signatory to this Convention, it has served as a 
safe haven for refugees and immigrants fleeing oppressive regimes, ranging from the Jewish 
refugees to the ‘economic migrants’ from the old Communist bloc. Nonetheless, official 
discourse on the matter has started to take a different turn, as portrayed by the ex-Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s statement that,” [t]he UN Convention on Refugees, first introduced in 
1951…has started to show its age…” (The Guardian, 26 April 2004)  
More recently, discussion revolving around the practice of deportation37 has come to 
the fore once again with the case of Abu Qatada, escalating to a point where Prime Minister 
David Cameron has come to express the possibility of a temporary withdrawal from the 
ECHR. Arriving to the UK as an asylum seeker38 in 1996, Qatada was first arrested in 2001 
for being involved to plot the bombing of Strasbourg Christmas market, and has been known 
for his infamous speeches justifying violence against Jews, Muslim converts as well as 
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 Similar to the practice of deportation, the practice of extradition is also imbued within the nexus of national 
security concerns and human rights obligations. Coming into effect in 2003 as a product of the European 
Arrest Warrant, the Extradition Act allowed for surrender from the UK territory, provided that the offence in 
question is criminalized both in British law and in the law of the state seeking extradition, in addition to the 
conditionality that the request for extradition is not premised on political bases. For more information on this 
topic see Extradition Act 2003.  
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 In 1999 while residing in the UK, he has been convicted of terror charges in his native country Jordon. 
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praising 9/11 attacks. Since August 2005, Qatada had been arrested under the immigration 
rules while the government tries to find legitimate grounds for his deportation. Finally in 
2009, in a landmark decision the Law Lords unanimously supported the government’s 
policy of deporting terrorist suspects, provided that the country of arrival assures the 
individual will not be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment and will benefit from the 
right to fair trial.39 (Bindman, 2012)  As deportation preparations were initiated, Qatada’s 
appeal to the ECtHR was rejected on the grounds that he did not face torture if he was 
removed from the UK and sent to Jordon40, thereby eliminating the legal obstacles to his 
deportation and returning Abu Qatada to the purview of British courts. (Travis, 2012) With 
the objective of legalizing (and concomitantly justifying) his deportation, in April 2013 the 
British government has signed a mutual assistance treaty with Jordon, ensuring that Abu 
Qatada will be subject to fair trial and use of torture evidence will not be permitted. (BBC 
News UK, 24 April 2013) 
The Abu Qatada incident is a case in point that demonstrates the acts of balancing 
and legitimization governments are compelled to undertake in the face of human right 
obligations. The responsibilities under Human Rights Act 1998 (and thus the ECHR) inhibit 
British authorities to simply dispose of an individual deemed a security threat. The power 
human rights exert, even in matters pertaining to national security, is demonstrated by Prime 
Minister Cameron’s proclamation that they might withdraw from the ECHR. Ultimately, the 
officials are compelled to formulate an arrangement in which the deportation is conditional 
upon the guarantee of the basic rights of a suspect, thereby seeking to portray the act within 
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 The ECtHR concluded the case by awarding Abu Qatada £2,500 compensation.  
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 Although in an initial ruling the Court maintained that Qatada’s deportation and detention without trial as 
stipulated by anti-terrorism laws in the UK has been against human rights principles. 
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the contours of international principles. As such, this case clearly exemplifies how the 
execution of sovereignty in the sense of bestowing security is conditional on the legitimacy 
conferred by international norms of appropriate state conduct.  
3.3. Counter-terrorism Measures in the Aftermath of 7/7 London Bombings 
A different international trend regarding counter-terrorism measures was invoked in 
the aftermath of the London bombings, as Security Council Resolution 1624 came into force 
on 14 September 2005 with the strong endorsement of the UK government. The Resolution 
firstly condemned “…the incitement of terrorist acts and repudiating attempts at the 
justification or glorification (apologie) of terrorist acts that may incite further terrorist acts,” 
and called for all states to “prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts; 
prevent such conduct; deny safe haven to any persons with respect to whom there is credible 
and relevant information giving serious reasons for considering that they have been guilty of 
such conduct.” (Security Council Resolution 1624) During the Security Council meeting, 
Prime Minister Tony Blair advocated the Resolution claiming that terrorism could only be 
eliminated not by sheer acts of condemnation on part of the Council, but also by “fighting 
the poisonous propaganda” (quoted in Security Council Resolution 1624). He also went on 
to argue that the Council should seek to eliminate root causes of terrorism “by fighting not 
just their methods, but their motivation, their twisted reasoning, wretched excuses for terror” 
(Ibid.).  
The British government already displayed a tendency towards limiting freedom of 
expression and association in relation to terrorism, as in the case of broadcast bans against 
the IRA or the provision in the Terrorism Act 2000 that criminalizes inciting terrorism 
overseas. Congruently, following 7/7 attacks the Blair government initially put forth a 
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proposal that criminalized any statement that “glorifies, exalts or celebrates the commission, 
preparation or instigation…of acts of terrorism,” coupled with a proposal to monitor and 
close down religious institutions that promote extremism and terrorism. In addition to these 
measures, the proposal included a notorious provision that extended the pre-charge detention 
period to 90 days. The Prime Minister made a public announcement regarding the incidents 
and proclaimed: “Let no one be in doubt. The rules of the game have changed. If you come 
to this country from abroad, don't meddle with extremism, because if you do, or get engaged 
with it, you are going to go back out again.” (The Guardian, 6 August 2005) In the same 
speech, he also indicated that the government was willing to engage in a ‘war’ with the 
courts for their objections to the new counter-terrorist measures on the grounds of ECHR 
articles, claiming to amend the Human Rights Act 1998 if necessary. (Ibid.)  
Yet on 8 November 2005, the proposed law was rejected in the House of Commons, 
leading to the first Commons defeat of the Blair government. The draft bill was also rejected 
by the House of Lords twice due to the controversial ‘glorifying terrorist acts’ clause. 
Eventually, while the 90 days detention period was lowered to 28 days, a sanction against 
‘encouragement of terrorism’ was incorporated under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 
despite widespread criticisms not only from civil society actors and the UN, but even Labour 
MPs. (The Guardian, 19 January 2009) This provision criminalizes any “…statement that is 
likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published 
as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.” 41 (Terrorism Act 
2006) The nature of a statement that falls within the purview of this provision involves those 
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 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents 
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that “…glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or 
generally) of such acts or offences; and is a statement from which those members of the 
public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as 
conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances.” (Ibid.) Hence, this 
provision aims to eliminate ‘terrorist speech’ including publications and internet activities 
that are deemed as promoting terrorism. One salient feature of the section is that whether 
any individual is actually ‘encouraged’ or ‘induced’ by the statement at hand is considered 
to be irrelevant.  
The second clause of the Act goes on to criminalize the ‘dissemination’ of terrorist 
publication, including its distribution and circulation, as well as the conduct of giving, 
selling or lending such publication. Other conduct that fall within the purview of this 
provision include “provid[ing] a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to 
or look at such a publication, or to acquire it by means of a gift, sale or loan; transmit[ing] 
the contents of such a publication electronically; or have such a publication in his 
possession” with the aim of conducting the aforementioned acts. (Terrorism Act 2006) 
Under such circumstances, the individual might be found directly or indirectly encouraging 
terrorist acts. Cram (2007) argues that this clause in particular might ensue in substantial 
media restrictions, those that are more extensive than the 1988 and 1994 broadcast bans 
imposed by both the Irish and British governments regarding the Sinn Fien interviews. He 
contends that while denying the ‘oxygen of publicity’ to terrorists is a common strategy, the 
previous bans did not prevent the broadcasters from publishing such news, but simply forbid 
them from using the exact wording of the members of Sinn Fien. Hence, it was a narrowly 
circumscribed provision which was considered by the European Commission of Human 
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Rights as proportionate. On the contrary, the clause in Act 2006 is a ‘content-based 
measure’; in other words, it also encompasses the broadcaster’s own representation of the 
news and therefore entails a much broader restriction, in the absence of a ‘threat of 
immediate violence’.  (Cram, 2007: 345) 
The underlying mentality in Terrorism Act 2006 is the perception that the British 
government has been so far ‘soft’ on extremism going on in their own territory. It is 
suggested that the government was already wary of the recruitment of young individuals for 
jihad within UK borders, yet it was believed that these individuals were to target countries 
overseas instead of the UK, a belief that was poignantly invalidated with the 7/7 London 
bombings. (Marchand, 2010) Compared to Irish terrorism, the new type of threat was 
claimed by government officials to instigate ‘change of rules’ as it did not seek to bring 
about political change but merely to cause mass killings triggered by hatred. (Marchand, 
2010: 141; Loader, 2007: 35) In the international context, in addition to the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1624 another source for Terrorism Act 2006 has been the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CECPT) that came into force May 
2005. The Convention demanded member states to issue laws that criminalize the ‘public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offense’. (Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention 
of Terrorism, 2005) However, the requirement found in CECPT that the incitement be 
intentional and create an actual danger was not reflected in the Terrorism Act 2006, which 
criminalizes ‘reckless’ incitement instead without the condition of causing danger. The UN 
Human Rights Commission has voiced its concern over this particular provision, indicating 
that “a person can commit the offence even when he or she did not intend members of the 
public to be directly or indirectly encouraged by his or her statement to commit acts of 
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terrorism, but where his or her statement was understood by some members of the public as 
encouragement to commit such acts.” (UN Human Rights Committee, 2008) 
The provision fighting the ‘encouragement’ of terrorism also finds expression in the 
official counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the government in 2011, known as CONTEST 
that is comprised of 4 areas of work, namely pursue (to stop terrorist attacks), prevent (stop 
people from becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism), protect (to strengthen protection 
against a possible attack), prepare (to mitigate the impact of an attack). Concurrent to the 
undertones of Terrorism Act 2006, the second working area entitled Prevent deals with the 
ideological challenge posed by terrorism, thereby endeavoring to stop individuals from 
being drawn into extremist networks and preventing the radicalization of groups. In this 
respect, it is indicated that the government works with local authorities to provide help and 
assistance to people in order to stop them from joining radical groups. It is claimed that this 
strategy does not seek to undermine freedom of speech, yet it purports to challenge radical 
ideas that are conducive to terrorist inclinations through open debate. (CONTEST, 2011: 9-
10) In particular, Prevent includes policies such as preventing “apologists for terrorism and 
extremism” from travelling to the UK, funding of a special police unit that is in charge of 
eliminating online content that is against anti-terrorism laws, cooperating with civil society 
organizations to offer an alternative outlook to “vulnerable target groups.”42 (Home Office 
UK, 2011) 
Interestingly, in 2011 nation-wide student protests against education cuts, the 
Prevent programme of the Counter-terrorism Command became actively involved in hunting 
down ‘extremism’. It was reported that an officer from the Prevent programme contacted 
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universities in London and asked for intelligence regarding the students protesting. An e-
mail sent by the officer has requested that “any relevant information that would be helpful to 
all of us to anticipate possible demonstrations or occupations,” be passed onto him. (Taylor 
& Vasagar, 2011) The president of the National Student Union Aaron Porter has responded 
to this event, underlining the disturbing fact that even student protests are now handled by 
counter-terrorism measures. (BBC News, 17 January 2011) 
On the whole, Terrorism Act 2006 has not only introduced problematic provisions 
that sit oddly with the freedom of expression, but when coupled with active counter-
terrorism strategies like CONTEST, it jeopardizes any form of opposition deemed as 
‘extreme’ or ‘radical’. Particularly with respect to the articulation of vague terms such as 
‘indirect encouragement’ and ‘other inducements’, the legislation can lead to the 
criminalization of peaceful expressions of radical or unpopular views, as was the case in the 
arrest and imprisonment of a number of Muslim protestors. (Article 19, 2006)
 
Rioting 
outside the Danish Embassy to protest the cartoon incident which satirized prophet 
Muhammed, four individuals were sentenced to a highly disproportionate term of six years 
for encouraging murder and terrorism through offensive slogans (BBC News, 2007). This 
new legislation has not only rendered the Muslim minority living in the UK as potential 
‘suspects’ (Silvestri et. al., 2011) but also other forms of opposition and protest, while its 
implementation through security forces have operated in a way where various groups risk 
being subsumed under the overarching category of ‘terrorism’. 
Taken together, this political constellation constitutes a securitizing move as defined 
by Buzan et. al. (1998), whereby the government restricts the enjoyment of certain rights by 
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evoking a sense of emergency and pressing danger not only in material terms, but also as an 
ideational threat against a certain worldview. Elusive notions such as ‘indirect incitement’ 
and the ‘dissemination of terrorist publication’ lay the grounds for securitizing freedom of 
expression and the labeling of groups deemed as an ‘existential threat’, thereby extending 
the purview of ‘the state of exception’. As indicated by Buzan et. al. (1998), once an issue-
area is securitized it moves beyond the functioning of normal politics, and in this case 
minority religious beliefs and worldviews have been drawn under the remit of security. 
Nonetheless, this was not automatically the case for Terrorism Act 2006 as mentioned 
above, since the legislation was subject to both domestic and international criticism (even 
from within the Labor Party), so much so that an earlier more draconian version was 
repealed and reformed. In the face of reverberating security narrative such challenges 
illustrates the ongoing authority of established human rights norms even in national security 
matters. 
Two years later in 28 November 2008, the Counter-terrorism Act 2008 acquired 
Royal Assent after a period of ping-pong politics amongst the chambers and joined its 
predecessors in introducing new contentions provisions. The Act aimed to boost the 
government’s power in fighting terrorism through proposed changes such as:  
 a provision to allow the pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects to be extended from 28 days 
to 42 days in certain circumstances
43
 
 changes to enable the post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects and the drawing of adverse 
inferences from silence  
 enhanced sentencing of offenders who commit offences with a terrorist connection  
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 Government’s proposal to extend this period to 90 days in 2005 was rejected in the Parliament. For more 
details, see Tempest, Mathew. 2005 “Blair defeated on terror bill,” in The Guardian 9 November. Retrieved 
from http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/nov/09/uksecurity.terrorism. 
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 provision for inquests and inquiries to be heard without a jury. 
                      (Counter-terrorism Act 2008)
44
 
In addition to the abovementioned changes, the Act also expands the authority to gather and 
share information as a counter-terrorism measure, along with modifying the law on asset-
freezing. Furthermore, section 76 of the Act criminalizes extracting or attempting to extract 
information about a member of the armed forces, the intelligence services, or a police 
officer, if there is a likelihood of such information being used for terrorist activities. (Ibid.) 
Anyone found guilty faces up to ten years imprisonment and an unlimited fine. As a 
response to this Act in February 2009, a mass protest was held outside of Scotland Yard by 
journalists who were concerned that the provision would work as a pretext for the police to 
threaten journalists taking photographs of their activities. (Bone, 2009) The law was 
nonetheless endorsed by Gordon Brown, who has reiterated the right of the police to restrict 
taking photography in public places and added that the law applies to anybody else, not just 
reporters. (Brown quoted in Laurent, 2009)  
Although the clause pertaining to secret coroner’s inquest was later dropped and the 
proposal to extend the pre-trial detention period to 42 days was modified into a temporary 
provision to be held in reserve if the parliament deemed it necessary, the Act was passed 
following much heated debate in both Chambers. In addition to such a ‘reserve power’ 
granted to the parliament, the right to silence and protection from ‘oppressive or coercive 
questioning’ are also seriously impeded by the new law, due to the provisions that entail 
broadening post-charge questioning and drawing adverse inferences from failing to mention 
facts that are later used in court. These measures by and large undermine the principle of due 
process, as the sovereign invokes a sense of imminent threat to national security and 
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exempts itself from public scrutiny or democratic accountability. This tendency was evinced 
by Home Office Security Minister Tony McNulty’s remark on the new legislation, claiming 
that Britain could face “two or three 9/11s” in a single day. (quoted in The Guardian, 2009a) 
Sami Chakrabarti has commented on the bill, stating that this “…new damning 
evidence…makes embarrassing reading for all of us in the land that gave Magna Carta to the 
world.” (quoted in The Guardian, 2009a) Likewise, Amnesty International released a report 
on the bill, conceiving it not only as a ‘missed opportunity’ to amend the illiberal provisions 
of earlier Acts, but to the contrary as a step towards entrenching such policies. (Amnesty 
International, 2008: 1) Thus, what is remarkable about Counter-terrorism ACT 2008 is that 
the provisions it introduces is a normalization of exceptional measures, fortified by the idea 
that security is constantly under threat.  
3.4. New Provisions, Old Practices: Accounting for Lost Liberties 
One of the recent legislations pertaining to counter-terrorism has been the Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigations Measures Act 2011 that purports to bring “a new regime to 
protect the public from terrorism.”45 (Terrorism Prevention and Investigations Measures Act 
2011)  As put by the Home Secretary Theresa May in the Ministerial Foreword, while 
national security is the primary duty of the government, officials “must…correct the 
imbalance that has developed between the State's security powers and civil liberties, 
restoring those liberties wherever possible and focusing those powers where necessary.” 
(HM Government, 2011)46 This Act foresees the annulment of Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005, along with the controversial control orders that are to be replaced by what has been 
termed as Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (hereafter TPIMs). The 
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Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 had involved extensive control orders including both 
citizens and non-citizens suspected of terror-related affiliations that debilitated rights to 
liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR.  (Ibid.: 240) The control orders were intended to apply 
in the absence of sufficient evidence to undertake criminal prosecution, involving measures 
such as forced relocation, electronic tagging, limited house arrest, curfews, restrictions in 
occupation, association and communications. (Steiner et. al., 2008: 430; Ryder, 2011) In 
fact, control orders were first introduced as an alternative to pre-charge detention of terrorist 
suspects in Belmarsh prison, following a House of Lords ruling against the practice of 
indefinite detention of non-nationals. (House of Lords, 2004) 
While the new Act aims to account for those rights and liberties sidestepped in the 
fight against terrorism, it has been criticized for simply ‘renaming’ old measures yet with a 
more restricted scope. The changes include the powers of the Secretary of State in imposing 
control orders, which have been somewhat restricted through alterations such as the 
abolishment of undue bans on internet and phone access, along with excessive restrictions 
on association with others. The implementation of TPIMs will be ensued if the Home 
Secretary ‘reasonably believes’ they are necessary, a more solid conditionality compared to 
the ‘reasonable suspicion’ for control orders. Another significant change is related to the 
practice of ‘exclusion’ in which individuals are forbidden to enter certain premises such as 
airports, mosques, or railways. The TPIMs substantially restricts exclusion measures, and 
introduces a more limited scope to those enforced by control orders. (Terrorism Prevention 
and Investigation Measures Act 2011) Although the TPIMs are subject to a two year 
limitation, the period can be extended for an indefinite amount of time if the home secretary 
considers the individual in question still poses a threat to national security. The major 
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problem with TPIMs, as was the case for control orders, is inter alia, the circumvention of 
due process. Control orders had condoned the prerequisites of criminal due process in favor 
of security measures predicated on ‘suspicion’ and ‘secrecy’, an attribute that by and large 
remains intact with the TPIMs according to Ryder. (Ryder, 2011)  Thus, notwithstanding the 
fact that the government exhibits a stance against control orders, it nonetheless endorses 
problematic measures as the only guaranteed way of containing a threat when there is 
insufficient evidence to prosecute a person.  
As a result, TPIMs fail to address the most fundamental problem imminent in 
previous anti-terrorism legislations, namely the fact that terrorist suspects are dealt outside 
criminal law and thus unable to enjoy their basic rights. While the underlying reason of the 
control orders was to replace the practice of indefinite detention, they sustained the 
deprivation of those individuals deemed as ‘suspects’ from the right to due process. Instead 
of charging and prosecuting these individuals, control orders provided the grounds for 
treating them as possible security risks to be contained, in the absence of any clear evidence 
for their crimes. That being said, as controversial provisions become subject to both 
domestic and international criticism, they threaten the legitimacy of the government due to 
their negation of established rights and freedoms, and are therefore replaced by newer, 
ostensibly less controversial ones. Although most of the powers bestowed by previous 
legislation are passed on in these new laws under a different banner, the fact that 
governments cannot hold on to security measures that are blatantly against human rights, or 
that they opt not to be affiliated with earlier controversial policies is an important aspect of 
the evolving counter-terrorism prevalent in the UK.  
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An important recent development has been the enactment of the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012, marking a significant step towards protecting civil liberties and 
reducing the power of the government to intervene in individuals’ private lives, as well as 
bringing new limits to counter-terrorism strategies. According to the new arrangements, 
fingerprints and DNA profiles of individuals will be destroyed if the “arrest was unlawful or 
based on mistaken identity.”47 Furthermore, the Act urges the Secretary of State to introduce 
a ‘code of practice’ to be applied to CCTV usage, while requiring the judicial approval for 
disclosing communications data. Another important alteration in counter-terrorism measures 
has been the reduction in the 28 day pre-charge detention period for terrorist suspects to a 
maximum of 14 days. (Protection of Freedoms Act 2012) Within this framework, the 
Regulation on Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (hereafter, RIPA) that dealt with issues of 
national security in communications and information technology has also been amended. 
RIPA first came to force in 2000 as a counter-terrorism policy that regulates the execution of 
covert techniques by the police or government officials in acquiring private information. 
(Home Office UK, 2013) With the onset of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the 
employment of RIPA by local authorities came under the condition of obtaining judicial 
approval from a magistrate for using covert techniques, while the application for lower 
offences48 has been terminated altogether. (Ibid.)  
One of the most important changes the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 has 
introduced is abolishment of the controversial section 44 of Terrorism Act 2000 pertaining 
to stop and search powers of the police. This practice has been condemned due to the 
suspect stereotyping it has engendered, in addition to the targeting of peaceful protestors. 
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(Liberty, n.d.) It has been indicated that between 2009 and 2010, among the 101,248 section 
44 searchers, none led to an arrest related to terrorism. (Vallee, 2012) In the 2010 Gillian 
and Quinton v. UK case, the Strasbourg Court had maintained that the stop and search 
powers were too broad and violated right to private life. This decision was materialized in 
the Protection of Freedoms Act which albeit retaining the practice, restricted its scope within 
the purview of a ‘code of practice’. With the new provision, a senior officer can grant stop 
and search powers in a certain location if he reckons there is reasonable suspicion.  
(Protection of Freedoms Act 2012)  
On the whole, while the Protection of Freedoms Act invokes a language of rights and 
liberties, it attempts to retain former contentious practices within a limited scope. Once 
again, a similar process can be observed in this recent development. As the infamous 
practice of section 44 came under heavy criticism both on the level of civil society and also 
by international institutions such as the Strasbourg Court, the government felt impelled to 
distance itself from contentious policies that are deemed as violating fundamental rights and 
liberties. In response, a new Act that accentuates such norms are passed, which restrict the 
scope of earlier practices whilst concurrently normalizing and keeping them intact. As a 
result, exceptional measures become ingrained and normalized in legislature as preventive 
practices.   
3.5. Conclusion 
In the UK context, neither the plea for security nor that of freedom is an easy path. 
While being the home of liberal rights and freedoms, the country accommodates some of the 
most controversial counter-terrorism measures that can be found in a liberal democracy. Yet, 
unlike the previous experience with IRA, which is perceived as ‘system-affirming’ terrorism 
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driven by the incentive of ‘national liberation’ as an established and recognized principle in 
international politics, the new religiously-oriented terrorism is considered as ‘system-
threatening’ since they operate outside the Westphalian principles (Zarakol: 2011). As 
proclaimed in the Foreword of the National Security Strategy 2010, new forms of terrorism 
and terrorist groups are identified as the “most pressing threat” the country faces today, who 
seek “to kill as many…citizens as possible or to inflict a crushing blow” to the economy 
(The National Security Strategy, 2010: 3).  
In response to these perceptions, the subsequent counter-terrorism legislation have 
exhibited characteristics of engaging with ‘an enemy’ deemed as existentially different, and 
strategically willing to manipulate the assets of a democratic country. One inclination is to 
contain and strictly monitor the actions of ‘foreign’ elements which the government cannot 
simply dispose of, through measures such as indefinite detention, control orders, and more 
recently TPIMs. This lineage of counter-terrorism measures demonstrates that as diversity is 
being perceived as a threat, difference is thereby contained (Blaney & Inayatullah, 2000). 
Another characteristic is the extensive powers conferred to the security forces within the 
aegis of counter-terrorism, which together with a vague and overbroad definition of 
terrorism result in excessive employment of such powers upon any form of political 
opposition that is reckoned as radical or extreme. This is also the case for provisions that 
infringe the freedom of expression, as their implementation also influences the freedom of 
demonstration. In the face of perceived security threats, the governments endeavor to 
securitize areas of social and political life, to exempt themselves from the requirements of 
international norms. Once an issue-area is deemed as a security issue per se, state officials 
evoking a sense of emergency can legitimately employ the right to use extraordinary 
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measures in overcoming such threats (Buzan et. al. 1998) Hence, by invoking 
exceptionalism practices that are tantamount to the suspension of law are introduced and 
eventually normalized in the legislature, in the face of the ubiquitous threat posed by 
‘extremism’.   
Nonetheless, while the ongoing modifications to counter-terrorism measures are 
products of the experiences and perceptions of terrorism, there is another discernible 
dynamic at play, namely the pressure exerted by human rights principles. Particularly with 
the enforcement of the Human Rights Act of 1998, the UK government has been more 
susceptible to complying with such norms, through the operations of both domestic (i.e. 
Joint Committee of Human Rights) and international (i.e. ECtHR) institutions. 
Consequently, while pursuing security policies, the government is under the obligation of 
balancing such concerns vis-a-vis rights and liberties, in order to present its conduct as 
legitimate to its constituents and the international community it is a part of. As indicated by 
Risse and Sikkink (1999), human rights norms shape actors’ identities and interests, thereby 
determining the codes of ‘civilized nations’. The inclination of changing contentious 
practices, while trying to hold on to most of the content under a different banner is an 
example of this trade-off UK government has been engaging with. As such, the UK case 
demonstrates how even in the area of national security, state conduct is circumscribed by 
human rights norms, which have come to constitute one of the bastions of legitimizing 
‘sovereignty’ (Reus-Smit, 2001). Therefore, in the context of counter-terrorism these two 
concerns have come to transform a conventional understanding of sovereignty, where state 
actors endeavor to pave way for greater security powers, whilst ultimately being bound to 
justify and balance their policies in accordance with established norms.  
 121 
 
 
 122 
 
 
Table 5. Development of Counter-terrorism and Human Rights Policies in the UK 
 
 123 
 
Chapter 4. Breaking with the Dark Past? Security Policies and the Status of Human 
Rights in Turkey 
 
In Turkey, human rights principles have never acquired a higher ground either in the 
minds of the people or the policy makers. The balance between security concerns and human 
rights norms in the Turkish political culture always tilted towards the former, as ‘state of 
exception’, ‘emergency situations’, and ‘extraordinary powers’ granted to the government 
and security forces have been common practices since the establishment of the Republic. 
This tendency has been blatantly illustrated in three consecutive military coups in 1960, 
1971, and 1980, as well as the fierce clashes that took place between the security forces and 
the Partiya Karkerin Kurdistan (hereafter, PKK) throughout the 1990s, marking some of the 
most atrocious human rights abuses in Turkey’s history49. Hence, Turkey has not 
habitualized upholding fundamental rights and freedoms to start with as was the case with 
the United Kingdom, or most of its counterparts in Europe for that matter. Yet this legacy 
gives way to an interesting comparison in the post-9/11 context. As the primacy of human 
rights have been overridden by security concerns in the post-9/11 context in many Western 
countries, a reverse process was taking place in Turkey, with the adoption of the EU aquis.  
While the aftermath of 9/11 has been a turning point in instigating draconian 
counter-terrorism measures in Western liberal democracies, first and foremost the US and 
the UK, during the same period Turkey has been undergoing a thorough democratic reform 
process in order to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. Nonetheless, the international counter-
terrorism trends coupled with domestic criticisms for ‘going soft’ on security matters 
ultimately laid the grounds for the Turkish government to reverse such democratizing 
                                                          
49
 Throughout the 1990s, human rights situation was plagued by the widespread practices of torture and 
disappearances. For more information see Helsinki Watch (1993).   
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attempts. As such, the case of Turkey provides interesting insights for the study of the 
tension between human rights principles and national security concerns, since it inhabits 
various dynamics at work, such as the impact of the EU accession process and 
democratization, as well as the traditional role of the military and the prevalence of national 
security. The aim of this section is first to provide an overview of Turkey’s EU-membership 
bid and its impact on the balance between human rights and national security, followed by 
an account of the evolving nature of counter-terrorism measures in the country.   
4.1. Human Rights in Turkey and the EU-accession process 
Turkey’s quest in taking part in the European integration first started with late 1950s 
and has proceeded in an uneasy path. The negotiations to become a member of the European 
Common market were launched in 1959, and continued with the 1963 Ankara Association 
Agreement, leading to the application for full membership in 1987. Moreover, Turkey 
became the member of the Council of Europe in 1949 and ratified the European Convention 
on Human Rights in 1954. Following a long and oscillatory period, the 1999 Helsinki 
Summit marked a turning point in Turkey-EU relation as Turkey acquired candidacy with 
the withdrawal of the Greek veto. (Müftüler-Bac, 2000: 21-23) After the European 
Council’s announcement in 2002, which declared that full accession negotiations will begin 
without delay if Turkey succeeds in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, a process of intense 
political and legal reforms started to take place. Eventually, as the new developments were 
found to be satisfactory by the European Council, full accession negotiations have been 
initiated on 3 October 2005 despite a clause that states the outcome is an open-ended process 
which cannot be guaranteed in advance. (General Affairs and External Relations Council, 
2005)  
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 EU’s enlargement process encapsulates a vision of democratization and the creation 
of open market economy in the rest of Europe, which is expected to culminate in economic 
and political integration. (Müftüler-Bac, 2008: 201-207) The Copenhagen Criteria have been 
formulated during the European Council meeting in 1993, to serve as the yardstick for 
evaluating a country’s eligibility for membership. These criteria require a country to prove 
its competence in the stability of its institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, respect for minorities and the adoption of EU acquis, along with a functioning 
market economy. (Parslow 2007: 3) The political dimension of the Copenhagen criteria has 
been a pressing issue in Turkey’s membership bid as asserted consistently by EU officials. 
Among the critical issues that have been voiced on this matter the institutionalization and 
implementation of human rights, role of the military in politics, transparency of the public 
sector, and the Kurdish question come to the fore. Turkey’s first step towards meeting the 
EU standards after the 1999 Helsinki Summit came into existence with the 2001 National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (Avrupa Birligi Muktesebatinin Ustlenilmesine 
Iliskin Turkiye Ulusal Programi), which covers a wide range of issues aiming to fulfill 
institutional, financial, and political criteria for membership in the EU. (Parslow 2007: 2-5) 
Since 2001 numerous reforms have been made with regards to a broad spectrum of socio-
political issues, namely those pertaining to freedom of thought and expression, freedom of 
association, gender equality, minority rights, recognition of the supremacy of international 
human rights laws and diminishing the military clout over politics. (Benhabib & Isiksel 
2006: 224-226; Kalaycioglu 2003: 10) 
The EU accession process and the concomitant legal reforms that were passed in 
order to comply with the Copenhagen criteria has been an important political stimulus in 
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Turkey for bringing about a rights-based understanding. According to Müftüler-Bac (2005), 
both the prospect of membership and the established institutional ties have been decisive in 
laying the necessary grounds for an “increased assimilation of rules and norms of liberal 
democracy in Turkey since 1999,” and have bestowed the domestic actors pushing for 
further democratization greater bargaining power. (2005: 17) With the aim of fulfilling the 
objectives under the adoption of the aquis, between 2001 and 2003, a number of important 
Constitutional reforms have been passed leading to significant steps such as the abolishment 
of death penalty with the adoption of Protocol 6 and 13 of the ECHR to be converted to life 
sentences, and the authorization of broadcasting in other languages. (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, n.d.) The 4th package in January 2003 introduced adjustments to 
the Penal Code regarding the punishment of torture with the adoption of a measure that 
prevents torture cases being converted into monetary fines. In a similar vein, in order to 
prevent occurrences of torture incidents a new clause has been inserted to the Civil Servants 
Law, whereby ECtHR rulings against Turkey due to torture and mistreatment cases will be 
claimed from the perpetrators. (Ibid.)  In 2005, the government signed the Optional Protocol 
of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment of 
Punishment which was yet to be ratified six years later in 2011 (Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 2002). All these developments have been in tandem with the ‘zero tolerance for 
torture’ campaign promoted by the government.  
One of the most groundbreaking amendments to the Constitution came about during 
the coalition government in 2001, bringing important modifications with respect to rights 
and freedoms. Firstly, the 2001 amendment foresaw that Article 13 delineating general 
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grounds for restricting fundamental rights and liberties, such as national security, the 
indivisible integrity of the State, the principle of sovereignty, public order and public 
morality was repealed. This Article was replaced by a provision which stipulates that 
“[f]undamental rights and liberties may be restricted only by law and solely on the basis of 
the reasons stated in the relevant articles of the Constitution without impinging upon their 
essence. These restrictions shall not conflict with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, the 
requirements of democratic social order and the secular Republic, and the principle of 
proportionality.” (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey) As a result, Özbudun indicates 
that instead of serving as a restrictive clause, Article 13 was transformed into a protective 
clause. (Özbudun, 2007) The change of mentality that underscores this ostensibly simple 
modification in Article 13 of the Constitution is actually a significant one. It is the 
manifestation of a wider process, whereby the primacy of national security concerns has 
been challenged by principles such as rule of law and fundamental rights.   
Likewise, Article 14 that addressed the ‘abuse of fundamental rights and freedoms’ 
was modified to be more in line with Article 17 of the ECHR. While conditions that 
constitute an abuse were reduced, the new article acknowledges that such abuses can be 
inflicted not only by individuals but also by the State. Whilst the older version stipulated 
that “none of the rights and liberties in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim 
of…placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of 
people, or establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating 
discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion, or sect…”; the new version states 
“[n]o provision in the Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that would enable the 
State or individuals to destroy the fundamental rights and liberties embodied in the 
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Constitution or to engage in an activity with the aim of restricting them more extensively 
than is stated in the Constitution.” (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey) Once again, 
there is a dramatic shift in the understanding that undergirds this Article, from a presumption 
that rights and liberties are susceptible to abuse by citizens against societal order, to one 
which accentuates the indispensable role of human rights norms. Similarly, the pre-trial 
detention period as indicated in Article 19 was reduced to 4 days from 15 days for 
collectively committed crimes, notwithstanding the condition that the period might be 
extended under state of emergency, martial law and war. An additional clause was added to 
this article, which states that individuals who suffer due to unlawful detention or arrest shall 
be compensated by the State. (Ibid.)  Interestingly, these developments were taking place 
whilst the UK was passing the notorious indefinite detention for non-nationals provision the 
same year, with the advent of Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001. Such 
modifications have heralded the move towards establishing a rights-based understanding to 
Turkish legal framework and an enhanced understanding of the rule of law in general.  
Within the democratization impetus provided by the EU accession process, the laws 
pertaining to counter-terrorism have also undergone some important transformation. In July 
2003 with the 6
th
 and 7
th
 harmonization package, Article 7 of the 1991 Anti-Terror Law was 
amended so that the crime of making propaganda for a terrorist organization was restricted 
within the contours of “advocating the use of violence and other methods of terror.” (Law on 
Fight Against Terrorism, Law no. 3713)50 Since one of the most salient problems in anti-
terror laws are the overbroad definition of crimes, this narrowing and refining of the 
provision bears important results, particularly with respect to its implementation. Moreover, 
                                                          
50
 http://www.justice.gov.tr/basiclaws/Law_on_Figh.pdf 
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Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law that penalized “written and oral propaganda and mass 
demonstrations and marches aiming to disrupt the unity of the Republic of Turkey with its 
land and nation” has been repealed altogether (Ibid.). This was one of the most significant 
steps taken during this period in eliminating obstacles to the freedom of thought and 
expression, since this provision has given way to a great number of political prisoners 
throughout the years. 
Finally in 2004, the amendment of Article 90 of the 1982 Constitution has 
culminated in the supremacy of international human rights conventions ratified by Turkey. 
In other words, this move ensured that Turkish jurists will need to abide by international law 
in cases when there is a clash with the domestic law (Benhabib & Isiksel 2006: 224). The 4
th
 
and 5
th
 harmonization packages established the grounds whereby ECtHR rulings finding 
Turkey in violation of the Convention can constitute a basis for a renewal of the trial in civil, 
criminal, and administrative courts. It was first in 1987, that Turkey recognized that right to 
individual application to the ECtHR and subsequently in 1989 the binding judicial 
competence of this international institution51. Hence, these last developments marked the 
institutionalization of ECtHR’s authority in Turkey. Other major steps in establishing human 
rights principles in the legal framework took place during the accession process including 
the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 2003, albeit with a 
number of reservations concerning the rights of women and minority groups. (Müftüler-Bac, 
2005: 25)  
                                                          
51
 During this period, both the European convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, and the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment were also signed.  
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Since the granting of EU-candidacy, Turkey has established a number of 
mechanisms and bodies for monitoring the human rights situation in the country. First in 
2001, Human Rights Presidency was set up under the aegis of the Prime Ministry, with the 
aim of monitoring the implementation of human rights principles and the alignment of 
national legislation with that of international covenants. Likewise, in line with UN Paris 
Principles and the 2010 revisions made to the Turkish Constitution, a law was passed in 
2012 for the onset of a national human rights institution (in other words an Ombudsman’s 
Office), also known as the Public Monitoring Institution (Kamu Denetleme Kurumu). 
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011) As depicted in the Law number 
6328, the task of the Ombudsman is to, “…examine and investigate the complaints of 
natural and legal persons regarding functioning of the administration in the framework of 
characteristics of the Turkish Republic set out in the Constitution and all kinds of acts, 
transactions, attitude and behaviors of the administration in the light of justice, respect for 
human rights and rule of law and to make recommendations to the administration.” (Draft 
Law on Ombudsman, 2012) The first Ombudsman to be elected in 27 November 2012 was 
Mehmet Nihat Ömeroğlu, an outcome that caused much controversy. Ömeroğlu had been a 
judge in the Court of Cassation upholding the contentious decision of convicting Hrant Dink 
for ‘insulting Turkishness’, an Armenian journalist who was later assassinated. (Bianet, 28 
November 2012) 
Regarding human rights mechanisms, two additional national bodies come to the 
fore, namely the Human Rights High Council and the Human Rights Inquiry Commission. 
The former was established as part of the Council of Ministers and is headed by the Deputy 
Prime Minister responsible for human rights. Its main task is to consider the reports 
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submitted by the Human Rights Advisory Council, consisting of governmental officials and 
NGO members for the purpose of presenting recommendations to the Government. 
Nonetheless, the Advisory Council became by and large inactive due to the prosecution of 
the head of the organization and others members for a report they had released in 2005 on 
the situation of minorities in Turkey. Although later acquitted, members of this body were 
accused of ‘insulting Turkishness’ and ‘dangerous incitement of public hate and enmity’. 
(Önderoğlu, 2006; The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, 2012: 
23) This incident vindicated that the body cannot operate independently; therefore, many 
human rights groups refused to cooperate with the Advisory Council. Concurrently, regional 
Human Rights Boards were set up that worked in cooperation with this higher body 
composed of the undersecretaries of the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of National Education, and Ministry of 
Health. On the other hand, the Human Rights Inquiry Commission is a parliamentary 
monitoring mechanism and the first national body on human rights to be found in 1990. 
(Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, n.d.) Its responsibilities range from inspecting the human 
rights situations in detention centers and prisons to sustaining dialogue with NGOs. 
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011) 
Although the election of the first Ombudsman and the incident regarding the report 
prepared by the Advisory Council on Human Rights indicate that a rights-based 
understanding has not yet been habitualized and embedded in the Turkish political culture, 
the EU bid has nonetheless offered a significant impetus for initiating an unprecedented 
process of democratization and institutionalization of rights and freedoms. Particularly in the 
period leading to the opening of negotiation talks, Turkish officials have pushed forward in 
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order to fulfill the standards entailed by the Copenhagen criteria, which in turn embedded 
the conception of international norms and principles in some of the primary laws, first and 
foremost the Turkish Constitution. This period has marked a transformation in the long-
instituted (im)balance between national security concerns vis-à-vis rights and freedoms that 
traditionally worked to prioritize the former. With the onset of the aforementioned reforms, 
democratic norms and human rights principles started to acquire a more favorable ground in 
the Turkish context.  
Hence, the accession process of Turkey is a clear example of how the recognition of 
a state actor in the international community is predicated on its standing with respect to 
international norms that underwrite appropriate state conduct. As suggested by Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998), increasing number of states start recognizing the newly emergent norms 
due to a concern over legitimacy as well as international and domestic reputation. (1998: 
255-258) The Turkish case illustrates how the principle of human rights is a pivotal part of 
such international legitimacy, which in turn favors the government’s domestic standing as 
well. Human rights has been construed as inimical to statehood since it entailed intervention 
in domestic affairs, however, in contemporary world politics, the concept has come to 
constitute one of the main pillars of sovereignty (Reus-Smith, 2001). This is due to the 
legitimacy conferred by the concept, which might also yield material benefits, membership 
to the EU being a case in point. Thus, the legal reforms within the purview of the EU 
accession process have been essential in mitigating the prevalence of the national security 
and highlighting rights and liberties. The legitimacy and international standing conferred by 
human rights principles are exemplified in an interview with the Turkish Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has proudly claimed that while a security discourse has prevailed 
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around the world in the aftermath of 9/11, Turkey has been the only country to proceed in 
the opposite direction and strengthen rights and liberties during this period (Anlayış, 21 
February 2004).  One of the most important manifestations of the EU-accession process and 
the democratization packages it introduced has been the changing role of the Turkish 
military, which is explicated in the following section.  
4.2. The Changing Role of the Military in Turkish Politics  
The military has historically enjoyed a preponderant position in Turkish politics, as 
the vanguards of the Republic. Such an ‘above-politics guardianship’ role engendered 
numerous military coups in the history of Turkey, and has undermined the legitimacy of 
democratically elected governments. Yet, instead of establishing a direct involvement in 
politics, which is not only deemed inimical to the principal of democracy but also to its 
internal ‘professional cohesion’, the Turkish military has opted to preserve indirect 
influence. (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997) As described by Sakallıoğlu, Turkish military has 
retained a hold on political life by wielding influence “in the structuring and vetoing of 
political initiatives from a position outside of civilian authorities’ Constitutional control.” 
(Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997: 153)  
Congruent to the vanguard role of the military, ‘national security’ concerns have 
enjoyed a privileged status in the political agenda particularly in the 1990s, superseding 
concerns over democratization and the entrenchment of rights and freedoms. This was due 
to the clashes in the south east region with the PKK, which became ever more intensified 
and spilled-over to relations with neighboring countries. Considered as the primary terrorist 
threat in the country, PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) first initiated violent attacks in 1984, 
leading to a three decade long armed conflict in the south east region, as well as terrorist 
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attacks in the main cities of the country. The clashes in the south east led to the application 
of ‘martial law’ for 26 years, and subsequently state of emergency from 1987 up until 2002, 
endowing state officials operating in this area with ‘emergency powers’. (Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti Dış İşleri Bakanlığı, 2011) The regional governor for this whole region was 
bestowed with ‘quasi-martial law’ powers including the authority to remove people who are 
deemed as a threat to public order from the region. The fight against terrorism that marked 
the south east during this period culminated in numerous human rights violations, and thus 
posed one of the biggest obstacle to EU membership. Nonetheless, the granting of EU-
candidacy has changed the priorities of the political agenda, shifting the focus on 
consolidation of democracy and human rights have. In addition to the removal of the ‘state 
of emergency’ in 2002 as specified by the Accession Partnership Document, other steps 
were taken in order to diminish the role of the military from political life. (Cizre-
Sakallıoğlu, 2003: 220)  
The National Security Council and the State Security Courts have been two key 
institutions that constituted the backbone of the military presence in Turkish politics. First 
coming into being with a 1973 amendment to the 1961 Constitution, State Security Courts 
were established to address cases directly related to the internal and external security of the 
state and threats posed against the Republic. (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemelerinin Kuruluş ve 
Yargılama Usulleri Hakkında Kanun 1973) Providing the necessary grounds for the military 
to exert its influence in the judiciary, these courts tried ‘crimes against the state’, particularly 
those crimes classified under terrorism. First in 1999, the military judge of the court was 
replaced by a civilian judge following a decision by the European Court of Human Rights in 
1998. Thus, the composition of the State Security Court in the trial of Abdullah Öcalan in 
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1999, the leader of the PKK who was captured that year, consisted of all civilian judges in 
order to prevent criticism from Europe. Yet, subsequent European Commission Progress 
Reports have indicated the continuing need to bring these courts in line with EU standards. 
(European Commission, 2001; European Commission 2002) In 2003, the cases decided by 
State Security Courts were allowed to be retried, including the cases of Democracy Party 
(Demokrasi Partisi, hereafter DEP) parliamentarians who have been in prison since 1994 for 
supporting Kurdish separatism, including the well-known Leyla Zana case. The retrials that 
took place in March 2003 resulted in the release of DEP parliamentarians in June 2004. 
Eventually in 2004, the Constitutional amendment packages foresaw the abolishment of 
State Security Courts, which were instead replaced by Specially Authorized Courts in 2005. 
(Müftüler-Bac, 2005: 26) 
A similar move in diminishing the role of the military has been changes in the 
composition and the role of the National Security Council (hereafter, NSC), which is 
comprised of the Chief of Staff, the Council of Ministers and the President of the Republic. 
The NSC has occupied a pivotal position and has been the sole organ endowed with the 
authority to formulate National Security Policy Documents52 (hereafter, NSPD). These 
documents are prepared and accepted by the NSC, thereby being implemented as 
government policy without any involvement on part of the Parliament. As such, it is argued 
by Cizre-Sakallıoğlu that NSC has been an institution which provided the grounds for the 
military to put forth its own agenda. (2003: 222) First coming into effect after the 1960 
coup, the NSC acquired priority before the Council of Ministers in the aftermath of the 1980 
military coup. (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 2003: 222) With the EU accession process, initially the 
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 Canonical texts pertaining to the national security outlook of the Turkish State. 
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internal structure and the regularity of the NSC meetings were modified. Subsequently, in 
August 2004 for the first time a civilian Secretary General of NSC has been appointed, a 
post which has traditionally been employed by a military commander. (Müftüler-Bac, 2005: 
26) 
These democratizing moves did not come about without any contestation. In January 
2001, Commander of the Armed Forces Academy Brigidaire General Halil Şimşek made the 
statement that the EU Accession Partnership Document aspired to “break up our country in 
the name of ‘cultural rights,’ ‘broadcasting in mother tongue,’ and ‘educational rights,’” by 
referring to those rights granted to the Kurdish population in early 2000s. (Hürriyet, 11 
January 2001) The next year amidst the ongoing EU reform packages, Secretary General of 
the NSC General Tuncer Kilinç announced that EU will never accept Turkey, and hence the 
country ought to seek alternative allies such as Iran and Russia. (Gürgen, 2002) A similar 
remark has been made by Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök, who has stated that the 
military has been trying to fight terrorism with devotion despite the restrictions in their 
authority, by suggesting the reforms initiated with the EU accession process. (Milliyet, 14 
July 2005) These declarations exemplify how fundamental rights and freedoms were 
deemed in the eyes of the security personnel either as instrumental norms that would 
ultimately lead to national interests undergirded by realpolitik calculations, or worse, as 
threats to national unity and security.  
The latest legal reforms that aimed to eliminate the privileged status enjoyed by the 
military came about with the Constitutional amendments in 2010 that were endorsed by a 
referendum.  The influence of the military has been entrenched in the Constitution of 1982, 
which was formulated under the auspices of the military coup in 1980. Certain provisions in 
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the Constitution included exit guarantees for the military manifested in elusive tutelary 
powers along with specified reserved domains. The latest amendments ensued in the 
removal of the temporary articles of the 1982 Constitution that bestowed legal impunity to 
the coup leaders. Furthermore, amendments in the Articles 145, 156 and 157 pertaining to 
military justice stipulates that crimes against state security inflicted by military personnel 
shall not be tried in military courts henceforth, but in civilian courts; likewise, the same 
amendment foresees that civilians shall not be brought forth a military court. (Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti Anayasasının Bazı Maddelerinde Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun 2010) 
On the whole, all these legal reforms aimed at achieving the standards of EU-
membership have targeted military power in the political affairs of the country that worked 
to accentuate a security agenda at the expense of human rights. Nonetheless, particularly 
since the second term of the Justice and Development Party government (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi, hereafter AKP), the power of the military was heavily impaired as a result 
of another dynamic at play. Contrary to the process of democratization and the 
institutionalization of fundamental rights, a different process that weakened the military’s 
hold on politics has been two terrorism-related cases, namely the Ergenekon and Balyoz 
(Sledgehammer) trials. Initiated in June 2007, The ‘Ergenekon trial’ came to constitute one 
of the biggest terror related trials in recent history, as hundreds of former special operations 
personnel of the police and the military were arrested for being accused of conspiring to 
overthrow the AKP government. By February 2012, approximately 500 individuals were 
arrested including journalists, writers, academics, lawyers, businessmen, priests, former and 
current members of the security establishment for being members of this organization and 
conspiring against the democratically elected government. (Balci & Jacoby, 2012: 138) 
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Within the purview of these trials, numerous individuals have remained under custody for 
several years, generating wide-spread concerns from human rights circles and the political 
opposition. (Kalaycıoğlu, 2011: 2-4) Finally, in August 2013, the court took a shocking 
decision of 17 life sentences and other aggravated penalties, including the former Chief of 
Armed Forces General Başbuğ among nine other generals (BBC, 5 August 2013) 
The Ergenekon case came to signify more than a trial, but rather embodied the 
prevalent ideological cleavages in the Turkish society, most eminently reflected along the 
Islamic-secular and civil-military dichotomies. Congruently, the interpretation of the 
Ergenekon trials within the wider Turkish society has differed tremendously. While some 
have perceived these developments as part of the democratization of the country and the 
diminishing role of the deep state structures, others view it as a pretext for the AKP 
government to eliminate pro-secular oppositional figures as well as their legitimacy. (Balcı 
& Jacoby, 2012; Deveci, 2013; the Economist, 10 August 2013) On the other hand, some 
have even gone further as to suggest that the trials have constituted a revenge for the ousting 
of the previous coalition government led by Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in 1998 by a 
military memorandum (also known as a post-modern coup), and the closure of Virtue Party 
(Fazilet Partisi) in 2001 by the Constitutional Court, both of which were Islam-oriented 
parties where most of the current AKP members came from. (Balcı & Jacoby, 2012; the 
Economist, 10 August 2013)   
A similar case has been what came to be known as Operation Sledgehammer (or 
Balyoz Harekatı), which again involved an accusation of plotting a coup d’état against the 
AKP government by secularist military officials due to its pro-Islamist ideology. (Taraf, 20 
January 2010) Hundreds of retired as well as active military officers have been arrested and 
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subsequently tried in the court house of Silivri prison, including high ranking generals. 
(Hürriyet Daily News, 04 June 2010) In response to these trials and the extensive application 
of pre-trial arrests53, a scandalous wave of resignations took place in the Turkish military, 
involving first and foremost the General Chief of Staff Işık Koşaner. Following his lead, the 
head of the army, navy and air force also resigned in protest of the convictions of their 
colleges which they have deemed as unjust and resting on false accusations. (BBC, 29 July 
2011) On September 2012, the final verdict was declared, charging in total 300 of the 365 
suspects, most of which have been held in prison during the trial. Furthermore, three retired 
generals namely Çetin Doğan, İbrahim Fırtına, and Özden Örnek have been sentenced to life 
imprisonment. (Hürriyet Daily News, 22 September 2012) Similar to the Ergenekon trials, 
interpretations of the Balyoz case varied amongst different circles. Some have welcomed it 
as heralding the end of military tutelage in Turkish politics, which has for decades cast its 
shadow on the democratically elected governments, while others interpreted it as a 
manifestation of the growing authoritarian tendencies on part of the AKP government, 
whose objective in diminishing the role of the military is not for the sake of democracy, but 
instead for revenge (Deveci, 2013; Tisdall, 2012). 
In both the Ergenekon and the Balyoz cases, the European Union retained a reserved 
position in its reflection on the events. In 2010 Progress Report, European Commission has 
commented on these trials that aim to track alleged criminal networks plotting coup against 
the government as “…an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper 
functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law.” (European Commission, 
2010) While welcoming these cases as concrete steps towards democratization, the 
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 Pre-trial detention on remand can take up to ten years in terror related offences according to Turkish 
Criminal Procedure Law. (Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu, 2004)  
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Commission has voiced its concerns regarding the handling of the cases and the 
infringement of due process. The problems that were pointed out include the time lapse 
between arrests and indictments, as well as pre-trial detention periods. (Ibid.) 
Notwithstanding Article 19 of the Constitution which restricts pre-trial detention period to 4 
days for collective crimes, provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law foresees the extension 
of this period up to ten years for crimes against ‘national security’ or the ‘Constitutional 
order’, giving way to excessive use of pre-trial detention in terror-related cases. (Ceza 
Muhakemesi Kanunu, 2004) In the 2012 progress report, the Commission noted that the 
judicial proceedings of the trials, underscored by ‘catch-all indictments’, excessive pre-trial 
detentions and violations of the rights of the defense, have overshadowed the prospect these 
trials held with respect to strengthening the rule of law and democracy in the country. 
(European Commission, 2012) 
In sum, as the EU accession process initiated ground-breaking political reforms and 
ingrained fundamental human rights principles in key legislation, it has also altered the 
traditional role of the military by diminishing its hold on Turkish democracy. Therefore, the 
steps taken to institutionalize a rights-based understanding also entailed weakening the 
influence of the military in political life. Only then would the Turkish state acquire 
legitimacy as a functioning democracy that pledges allegiance to international human rights 
principles, and thus be accepted as a member of an intergovernmental institution that 
upholds shared values and norms. That being said, the Ergenekon and the Balyoz cases have 
come to constitute a paradoxical situation, whereby the undemocratic auspices of the 
military that entrenched a dominant security agenda in Turkish politics, have been crushed 
by another security apparatus, namely that of counter-terrorism. Although these cases were 
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first welcomed within the framework of democratization, as harbingers of the crumbling 
deep state structures and the end of military tutelage, the unfolding of events and the 
alarming magnitude of the trials engendering the arrests of hundreds of individuals with 
heavy penalties, have raised serious concerns. Having the authority not only to classify what 
constitutes as public order and safety, but also who constitutes a threat to national security, 
the sovereign has the power to eliminate what it deems as the existential ‘others’ of the 
political community (Schmitt, [1922] 1985). Ultimately, these cases have culminated in the 
silencing of oppositional groups and eliminating old power structures, whereby draconian 
provisions in the anti-terrorism legislation provided the conducive grounds.  
4.3. Counter-terrorism in the Turkish Legal System 
The main legal document pertaining to counter-terrorism in Turkey is the 1991 Law 
on Fight Against Terrorism. Also known as the Anti-Terrorism Law, this document was passed 
amidst fierce clashes in the south east region between the security forces and the PKK 
rebels, constituting one of the “strongest legislative tools for the ‘securitization’ of state and 
society”. (Aytar, 2006)  The 1991 Anti-Terror Law (Law no. 3713) defines terrorism as:  
Any criminal action conducted by one or more persons belonging to an 
organization with the aim of changing the attributes of the Republic as specified in the 
Constitution, the political, legal, social, secular or economic system, damaging the 
indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, jeopardizing the existence of 
the Turkish State and the Republic, enfeebling, destroying or seizing State authority, 
eliminating basic rights and freedoms, damaging the internal and external security of 
the State, the public order or general health, is defined as terrorism.   
                            (Law on Fight Against Terrorism of Turkey 1991) 
Article 6 of the 1991 Law that deals with ‘announcements and publications’ stipulates that 
disclosure or publication of the identities of state officials fighting terrorism shall be 
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punished by imprisonment of one to three years. The 1991 Law also criminalizes financing 
and fundraising terrorist organizations; however unlike Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 of the UK, it does not place duty on part of individuals to report such suspicion, 
where the failure to do so invokes penalties. (Roach, 2007: 233) Overall, this definition of 
terrorism clearly reflects on understanding of the nation state as the main object of security 
in the Turkish context. While the EU accession process as explicated above has pushed 
forward democratic reforms in anti-terror legislation until 2004; however, the domestic and 
international zeitgeist henceforth have provided the grounds for the reversal of these 
developments. 
On July 2006, the parliament passed a number of amendments to the 1991 Law on 
Fight Against Terrorism of Turkey amidst the heightened conflict between the security 
forces and PKK insurgencies in the region. These amendments took place following the end 
of a cease-fire with the PKK in 2004 and the Security Council Resolution 1624 that came 
into force in the aftermath of London bombings in 2005, calling all states to “prohibit by law 
incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts; prevent such conduct; deny safe haven to any 
persons with respect to whom there is credible and relevant information giving serious 
reasons for considering that they have been guilty of such conduct.” (Security Council 
Resolution 1624) During the same period, Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention 
of Terrorism (CECPT) came into force in 2005, which also demanded member states to 
issue laws criminalizing the ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist offense’54. (Marchand, 
2010: 140) Congruently, Turkish officials took the steps to enforce necessary legal 
arrangements.  
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 Bearing in mind that the common criminal law proved insufficient in persecuting indirect incitement.  
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Interestingly, the Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ had already voiced a request in 
2005 for the necessity of new regulations on counter-terrorism, “those that are comparable 
to the counter-terrorism legislation in the UK”. (Aydın, 2005) In turn, a Parliamentary 
Justice Commission had been formed to draft new amendments to the 1991 Anti-Terror 
Law, with the reference of both older British legislation and the new Terrorism Bill, whose 
earlier version had been rejected by both Chambers. (Milliyet, 14 July 2005) At this 
conjuncture, the controversial amendments have been by and large justified with reference 
to the Terrorism Act 2006 of the UK, wherein a clause that criminalizes the encouragement 
or glorification of terrorist acts was first introduced. (Aytar, 2006; Dumanlı 2005) As put by 
Aytar, “the TMK [Turkish Anti-Terror Law] signifies how global anti-terror fears and some 
administrative/legal measures such as those in the UK, provide additional pretext or alibis 
for authoritarian revisions.” (2006) During the drafting period, it was asserted that the 
amendments aimed for a balance between security measures and human rights protection, 
yet a number of articles incorporated into the law have proved otherwise.  
  Also known as the Law on the Amendment of the Anti-Terror Law (Law no. 5532), 
the amendments included provisions such as the Article 3 which lists 50 different offenses in 
the Penal Code to be considered as ‘terrorist offences’ if the latter was to be committed 
within the framework of a terrorist organization.  Likewise, Article 5 increases the penalties 
for the press while concomitantly allowing prosecutors and judges to be able to halt 
publications of periodicals for a period of one month. Article 6 criminalizes printing or 
publishing declarations or announcements of terrorist organizations, while Article 7 
penalizes “covering the face in part or in whole, with the intention of concealing identities, 
during public meetings and demonstrations that have been turned into a propaganda for 
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terrorist organization…as to imply being a member or a follower of a terrorist organization, 
carrying insignia or signs belonging to the organization, shouting slogans or making 
announcements using audio equipment or wearing the uniform of a terrorist organization 
imprinted with its insignia…” (Law on Fight Against Terrorism of Turkey) This clause was 
also modeled after section 13 of the UK Terrorism Act 2000, which criminalized wearing 
clothing or an item that raises reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member of a 
terrorist organization. (Terrorism Act 2000; Milliyet, 14 July 2005) Article 9 limits the 
number of lawyers that a terrorist suspect can hire and allows a judge to prohibit the 
communication between a suspect and a lawyer for 24 hours. On the other hand, Article 11 
stipulates that security officers are able to hire up to three lawyers, the expenses of which is 
to be covered by the state. (Aytar, 2006) 
Particularly, two modifications have come to the fore in the 2006 amendments, 
namely, changes in the provision on making propaganda for a terrorist organization and the 
jurisdiction regarding children. The first brought about changes in the Article 7/2, expanding 
the purview of ‘propaganda’ to include demonstrations, speeches, writing or broadcasting. 
Moreover, with the new amendments children 15 to 17 years of age charged with terrorist 
offenses were to be tried in Special Authorized Courts, instead of juvenile courts under the 
Article 250 of Penal Procedures Code dealing with terrorism. Nevertheless, following a 
campaign pursued by civil society actors and criticism voiced by the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, this provision has been modified in 2010. According 
to the new provision55, children will be subject to juvenile courts or adult courts acting as 
juvenile courts. Secondly, children affiliated with ‘propaganda crimes’ or who resist the 
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 Terörle Mücadele Kanunu ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun 2010 
(Kanun no. 6008) 
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dispersal of the police will not be charged by “acting on behalf of a terrorist organization,” 
as well as being exempt from subsequent aggravated penalties. 
Similar problematic articles have been introduced with the new Penal Code in 2004. 
Particularly under Article 220, entitled Forming Organized Groups with the Intention of 
Committing Crime, certain clauses have given way to contentious indictments such as the 
treatment of an individual as a member of organized groups even if they are not. (Türk Ceza 
Kanunu, 2004) Article 220/6 stipulates that, “[a] person who commits a crime on behalf of 
an organization although he or she is not a member of such organizations shall also be 
punished as though a member of the organization.”  Likewise, Article 220/7 states that, “[a] 
person who aids or abets the organization knowingly and willingly, although he or she does 
not belong to the hierarchical structure of the organization, shall be punished as though a 
member of the organization.” (Ibid) Moreover, Article 220/8 asserts that “[a] person who 
makes propaganda for the organization or its objectives shall be punished to imprisonment 
of one to three years. If the crime is committed by the media or the press, the punishment 
will be increased by half.” (Ibid.) 
All in all, these modifications have reversed the earlier reforms that have attempted 
to bring counter-terrorism legislation in tandem with international norms, with the 
momentum provided by the EU accession process. Regarding the new provisions introduced 
in 2006 and its subsequent implementation, Human Rights Watch (2010) has indicated that 
the counter-terrorism measures pursued by the government have become incrementally 
tougher in the last couple of years, to a point where individuals are not punished with 
reference to their violent acts, but on the sole ground that they support the separatist 
ideology. As such, it is asserted that the extant anti-terror laws violate the rule of law and 
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human rights both because of their vaguely defined framework giving way to arbitrary 
execution of the law, and also due to the fact that they infringe freedom of opinion, 
expression, and assembly. (2010: 1)  Contrary to previous court rulings where protestors 
were being convicted of “making propaganda of a terrorist organization”, with the new 
amendments to anti-terror law such individuals are charged with committing crimes on 
behalf of a terrorist organization without being a member. As evidence for such accusations, 
the prosecutors and courts trace PKK’s declarations in congresses and various media outlets 
and interpret public demonstrations as a response to the calls for ‘social unrest and uprising’. 
The fact that whether the individual actually heard such an ‘appeal’ made by the 
organization or was motivated by it, let alone having links with the organization, remain 
irrelevant for court proceedings. (Ibid.: 2-3)  Hence, this legal framework fails to distinguish 
between an armed PKK combatant and a civilian demonstrator.  
Such legal framework provided the grounds for a major wave of arrest in relation to 
the Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma Civaken Kurdistan, hereafter KCK) operations, an 
umbrella organization in which the PKK constitutes the armed branch. The harsh stance of 
the government on KCK trials amounting to the detention of hundreds of individuals, 
including renowned academicians, journalists, and other MPs from the Peace and 
Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) has been a clear obstacle for the progress of 
the democratizing move endorsed by the government, also known as the ‘Kurdish opening’. 
(Gunter, 2013:441) Similar to the aforementioned Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, in the face 
of growing domestic and international criticism, new waves of arrests continued to take 
place in the KCK trials, encompassing prominent figures such as Ragıp Zarakolu a 
renowned publisher and human rights activist and Buşra Ersanlı an international political 
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scientist. (Ibid.: 443) In 2011 it has been reported that 605 individuals faced pre-trial 
detention for being affiliated with the KCK, and several thousands imprisoned. The 
overarching problem is that most accusations are not based on acts of violence, but merely 
grounded on the fact that these individuals are part of a pro-Kurdish establishment. (Human 
Rights Watch News, 2011) As a result of this legal framework, by the end of 2012, the 
country has been characterized as ‘world’s biggest prison for journalists’, most of whom are 
charged under the controversial provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Law, either allegedly being 
member of a terrorist organization or promoting such ideals. (Reporters Without Borders, 
2012) 
Hence, it can be argued that the government started to push forward controversial 
legislation related to national security and the international zeitgeist of post-9/11 provided a 
strong pretext. While the 2006 amendments to the Anti-Terror legislation is one example of 
the reverse steps taken, another move in this direction has been the enhanced powers granted 
to the police. Similar to the controversial stop and search powers of the British police force, 
the Law Amending the Powers and Duties of the Police passed in 2007 granted the Turkish 
police equivalent powers. (Polis Vazife ve Salahiyet Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılmasına 
Dair Kanun, 2007)
 56 The new regulations abolished the need for a judge order for practices 
such as the authority to stop and search, ask for identity cards and de facto arrest individuals. 
Moreover, the practices of taking fingerprints and photographs that were used only for 
criminal investigations now became common procedures, resorted to for bureaucratic 
actions such as applications for passport, citizenship, or refugee, without a judge ruling. 
Another provision introduced by these amendments is with respect to the surveillance and 
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monitoring conducted by the police, which now on can be conducted without a judge order. 
Most importantly, the new amendments have given the authority to use weapons when faced 
with resistance, a move that can engender lethal consequences. (Eryılmaz, 2007; Balzacq & 
Ensaroğlu, 2008) This disturbing development is even exacerbated in light of the 
‘entrenched culture of impunity’ in Turkey, as the state is predisposed to protect its 
personnel in criminal justice system, rather than the victims. (Amnesty International, 2007) 
At the time of writing, a new regulation has been introduced to the Parliament 
following nation-wide protests that was instigated by the Gezi movement of 2013, which 
turned out to be an unprecedented expression of discontent with the authoritative policies of 
the AKP government and found wide-spread expression in various parts of the country 
(Demirsu, 2013). These protests have been followed by demonstrations taken on by the 
Kurdish political movement on October 2014, due to the lukewarm position of the 
government in the face of Islamic State
57
 attacks on the Kurdish population in the bordering 
town of Kobane. (Human Rights Watch News, 2014) Amidst such proliferating 
manifestations of public dissent, the government introduced a new bill that grants the police 
broader powers, particularly with regards to dealing with protests which have been 
increasingly framed as sites of potential threat to security. 
It is stated that the Draft Law changing various articles on the Law on the Powers 
and Duties of the Police has been put forth as a result of “public events turning into terrorist 
propaganda, protestors threatening the wellbeing and bodily integrity of citizens…with the 
purpose of introducing new measures without upsetting the freedoms-security balance.” 
(Polis Vazife ve Salahiyet Kanunu ile Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde 
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Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Tasarısı, 24 November 2014) This draft law grants 
extensive preemptive powers to the police, including the authority to detain individuals that 
‘pose a serious threat to public order’ up to 48 hours without the order of a prosecutor or a 
judge. Congruently, the provision foresees the treatment of protestors covering their face as 
potential criminals, parallel to the amendments in 2006 that have been modelled after the 
British legislation. Moreover, the purview of stop and search powers provided in the earlier 
amendment which is extended, whereby the condition for a strong belief based on concrete 
evidence is watered down by the new notion of ‘reasonable suspicion’. (Ibid.) Hence, the 
bill epitomizes the attempt on part of the government to securitize expressions of public 
dissent as suggested by Jackson (2005), thereby pushing them beyond the workings of 
normal politics into the sphere of exceptional measures.  
While the EU-accession process has initiated a stimulus for democratization and 
institutionalization of human rights, the situation at home and abroad justified the re-launch 
of a heavy security agenda and congruent counter-terrorism laws. At this juncture, the 
government has not only enforced provisions similar to those in the UK, but the British 
legislation was actually referred to as a legitimate model. Whereas the vague and over-
inclusive definition of terrorism has already culminated in contentious implementations of 
the law, with the new contours of ‘making propaganda’, what is taking place is the 
securitization of intellectual life and political opposition. Freedom of expression has been 
heavily undermined, as more and more journalists, academics, lawyers, and other 
intellectuals are being sentenced for membership to a terrorist organization on basis of their 
nonviolent opinions, particularly with the KCK and Ergenekon cases. Furthermore, these 
amendments also jeopardize the right to peaceful assembly and hence demonstrations, since 
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participating in protests can easily be interpreted as acting on behalf of a terrorist 
organization. This tendency is exacerbated due to the enhanced powers granted to the police 
that are similar to the stop and search powers in the UK. As such, the situation in Turkey 
heralds the normalization of the ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2003), yet unlike the blatant 
state violence of the 1990s, this time within the contours of an ostensibly democratic regime. 
Thus, through problematic counter-terrorism measures, individuals are easily categorized as 
‘terrorists’, while those groups that are deemed as an existential threat and unable to be 
integrated into the political system are eliminated from the public sphere.  
More recently, under the scrutiny of the international community and in the face of 
growing domestic opposition against these draconian measures, the government felt 
impelled once again to reform counter-terrorism legislation during 2012-2013 via judicial 
reform packages. These packages aimed to address some of the highly controversial clauses 
that set the legal grounds for the imprisonment of hundreds of journalists, as well as 
politicians and academics for expressing their opinions. Two evident impetuses undergird 
the drive for these latest developments, namely the criticism raised by international 
institutions and the momentum of the Kurdish peace process
58
. On the one hand, the 
European Court of Human Rights has cited the Anti-Terror Law as the number one reason 
for its critical rulings in Turkey (Reporters Without Borders, 2013) while both the European 
Commission and the Council of Europe have been continually voicing similar concerns and 
urging Turkey to reform its anti-terror legislation (European Commission, 2012; Council of 
Europe, 2013) On the other hand, the Kurdish peace initiative sponsored by the AKP 
government has gained pace with Abdullah Öcalan’s announcement during Newroz 
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celebrations that henceforth Kurdish rights will be pursued through political means instead 
of armed clashes, resulting in the withdrawal of approximately 2,000 PKK fighters outside 
the borders of Turkey. (Reuters, 8 May 2013) According to Yeğen, Öcalan’s declaration has 
constituted a new roadmap for ending the armed conflict once and for all, and channeling 
the struggle for Kurdish rights on the political platform. (Yeğen, 2013) 
Initially in 2012, with the 3
rd
 reform package, Article 6/5 of the Anti-Terror Law had 
been repealed for violating Article 10 of the ECHR, which used to allow judges the 
authority to ban future edition of periodicals59. In addition, articles 250, 251, 252 of the 
Criminal Procedure Law have been abolished parallel to the amendments to the Article 10 of 
Anti-Terror Law, whereby Special Authorized Courts that deal with cases concerning 
national security have been replaced by regional heavy penal courts. (Hammarberg, 2012) 
More importantly, the 4
th
 package foresees that the definition of ‘propaganda’ become more 
nuanced and differentiated from being a member of an organization. (İnsan Hakları ve İfade 
Özgürlüğü Bağlamında Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun, 2013) Article 
6/2 and 7/2 on “printing or publishing of declarations or statements of terrorist 
organizations” and “making propaganda for a terrorist organization” respectively, have been 
revised to penalize only those statements that “praise, legitimize or encourage the 
employment of methods that involve the use of coercion, violence, or threat”. Likewise, 
Article 215 of the Penal Code which penalizes the’ praising of a crime or the criminal’ has 
been conditioned to constitute a crime only when there is an open and imminent threat 
involved due to such statements. Moreover, the statute of limitations for officers convicted 
of incurring torture or inhuman and degrading treatment have been removed. (Ibid.)  
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 This package also foresaw the possibility of parties to respond the written statement of the public 
prosecutor before the Council of State, as has been indicated in various ECtHR rulings. 
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Nevertheless, such endeavor to reform extant counter-terrorism has been found 
unsatisfactory by human rights circles, particularly in overcoming obstacles to freedom of 
expression. Amnesty International has indicated that the reforms fall short of addressing the 
more general problem of convicting individuals as “committing crimes on behalf of a 
terrorist organization,” merely on the basis of their opinions. (Amnesty International, 2013) 
In an interview, Associate Professor Kerem Altıparmak maintained that the amendments of 
the 4
th
 judicial reform package are superficial modifications in order to impress the 
European Commission and the Council of Europe. Altıparmak has pointed out that the new 
provisions introduced with the amendments are still too broad and vague, therefore, 
insufficient to engender changes in implementation. For instance, the newly added condition 
of praising, legitimizing or encouraging methods that involve the use of coercion, violence, 
or threat can still be interpreted to involve simple expressions of opinion, such opting to 
term PKK ‘guerillas’ instead of ‘terrorists’. (Karaca, 2013) Furthermore, Article 7 of the 
Anti-Terror Law pertaining to covering the face or wearing insignia belonging to an 
organization in demonstrations that are deemed as terrorist propaganda have been rearranged 
so that such acts are criminalized under this provision even if they take place outside of 
meetings or demonstrations. (Ibid.) What is significant at this juncture is that the 
government feels compelled to modify counterterrorism practices that are deemed to be in 
violation of international norms thereby jeopardizing the international standing of the 
country. In the face of growing criticism and pressure from different circles, the government 
opts to repackage old controversial measures under a different and ostensibly more 
democratic banner. Thus, although such international standards do not automatically exert 
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enough power to steer a thorough reform process, they nonetheless circumscribe the limits 
of sidestepping rights and freedoms even in matters of national security.  
Most recently, a new law entitled Law on the Prevention of the Financing of 
Terrorism was passed on February 2013, which regulates the entailments of the 1999 UN 
International Convention for Fighting Terrorism that was ratified by Turkey in 2002. With 
the objective of fulfilling obligations to international law, this legislation provides the legal 
framework for penalizing the financing of terrorist organizations, including freezing assets 
and imprisonment from 5 to 10 years. While the criteria of ‘knowingly and willingly’ 
funding a terrorist activity will be imperative, the condition of such an act occurring is not 
necessary for a conviction. (Radikal, 07 February 2013; Terörizmin Finansmanının 
Önlenmesi Hakkında Kanun Tasarısı 2011) According to Paulsworth (2013) the adoption of 
this law carries important economic ramifications, as it prevents Turkey from being 
excluded from the Financial Action Task Force (hereafter FATF), which had recently 
notified Turkish officials “to remedy deficiencies in its terrorist financing offense and 
establish an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets consistent 
with the FATF Recommendations.” (Paulsworth, 2013) Failure to do so by 22 February 
2013 would have had serious economic ramifications for the country, such as restricted 
foreign activity for Turkish banks, decrease in its credit ratings, and moving into a black list 
alongside North Korea and Iran. (Ibid.) The main opposition party, Republican People’s 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, hereafter CHP) has condemned the law on the grounds that 
it is a US imposed piece of legislation in order to fight Al Qaida and Taliban, which will 
render Turkey susceptible to foreign interests. This concern is grounded in past experience, 
when Turkey became the target of ‘global terrorism’ as a relatively new phenomenon, onset 
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by September 11 events. The attacks of November 15 and 20 in 2003 targeted two 
synagogues, the British Consulate, and the headquarters of HSBC Bank A.S., resulting in 57 
deaths and 700 injured, on the day George W. Bush met Tony Blair in London. According to 
Çağaptay, not only the fact that Turkey is a secular country upholding Western values, but 
also a strong ally of the US and the UK, made it a susceptible target for the Al Qaida.  
(Çağaptay, 2003) 
As these recent developments illustrate, while trying to strike a balance between 
human rights norms and national security concerns in the post-9/11 environment, Turkey is 
susceptible to various and often contradictory international influences. On the one hand, the 
contentious anti-terrorism laws that were enhanced in 2006 to include more and more 
offences under the rubric of terrorism have been subject to severe criticism from the Council 
of Europe and European Commission. On the other hand, a number of UN resolutions 
pertaining to terrorism and other international obligations such as the FATF have demanded 
stricter counter-terrorism measures and international cooperation. It is yet to be seen whether 
the attempt to narrow and refine the purview of anti-terrorism laws will yield any significant 
changes in its extensive application. Nonetheless, the Turkish case demonstrates that 
although the ‘War on Terror’ has continued to yield its influence in world politics and 
heightened the security agenda, international norms and human rights obligations exert a 
limitation to the extent to which state actors can sidestep certain rights and liberties in the 
name of security concerns.   
4.4. Conclusion 
With respect to human rights norms, the Turkish context has historically exhibited a 
dim picture, as the military tutelage overshadowed democratic processes and subjugated 
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many forms of political expression by invoking ‘extraordinary measures’. The fight with the 
PKK has played an indispensable role in the wide-spread employment of dubious counter-
terrorism practices, yielding grave consequences for fundamental rights and freedoms. 
However, the momentum triggered by the granting of EU candidacy status has provided a 
good opportunity to push forward political reforms that would strengthen the rule of law and 
democratic credentials of the country, the biggest obstacle in becoming a full member. As 
cogently put by Savic, “[t]he unhindered functioning of human rights, and related to this, the 
democratic regulation of political and legal life, have become standard criteria for the 
legitimization of modern states.” (Savic, 1999:5) During this short period when the prospect 
of candidacy seemed within reach, a number of groundbreaking legal reforms took place 
that aimed to ingrain a rights-based understanding in the Turkish legislation.  
Within the scope of the EU accession process, a parallel development has been the 
diminishing hold of the military from the political life, via various legal reforms. As the 
government adopted new democratic reforms, the military establishment became more 
susceptible to the legal order by losing most of its impunity. Ironically, the last and the most 
destructive blow to the military came from two terror-related trials, coupled with the 
controversial anti-terror laws that allowed any form of opposition perceived as a threat to be 
categorized under terrorism. Not only the military personnel, but also other vocal figures 
either adhering to a secular ideology or expressing pro-Kurdish ideas have been arrested in 
growing numbers under terror-related accusations filling up prisons in large numbers. Thus, 
as political opposition and the expression of radical views become securitized through 
counterterrorism legislation, “the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of 
entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political 
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system” has taken place (Agamben, 2003: 2). The international counter-terrorism trends 
incurred by the ‘War on Terror’ have provided conducive grounds for these controversial 
practices and the reversal of political reforms. In this regard, the UK legal framework has 
constituted a viable precedent for adjusting anti-terror laws in Turkey. 
In the face of growing domestic and international criticism, as well as the complaints 
that abound at the ECtHR, more amendments have been made in order to narrow the 
application of counter-terrorism measures once again. As such, in order to attain 
international legitimacy, state officials adopt new provisions that are in line with 
international standards, albeit being criticized for merely repackaging old contentious 
provisions under a new banner. As put by Clark, “what international society endorses them 
[states] as being, is possibly more important than what they do, as far as international 
legitimacy is concerned.” (2005: 173) That being said, despite the elevated sense of security 
provoked by the ‘War on Terror’ or its authoritative past, the country has become 
increasingly susceptible to human rights norms due to the international commitments of the 
Turkish state, inter alia its EU-bid. While the government has been enjoying the privileges 
of sovereign power by invoking terrorism in order to repress dissident groups (even the 
military establishment), its movements are restricted by the entailments of international 
norms comprised of fundamental rights and liberties. Hence, the balancing of human rights 
and counter-terrorism transforms the notion of sovereignty both as an entity bestowed with 
the authority to declare the state of exception thereby sidestepping the legal order, yet 
concomitantly one that is ever more bound by the legitimacy conferred by human rights 
obligations.  
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Table 6. Development of Counter-terrorism and Human Rights Policies in Turkey 
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Conclusion: 
Different Contexts, Convergent Practices 
 
In these two chapters, the study has undertaken an analysis of the process of policy 
development in an attempt to answer the question: How do states balance human rights 
commitments and national security concerns? The two cases have demonstrated that this 
question is particularly relevant as growing number of states are pledging loyalty to the 
‘War on Terror’, whilst institutionalizing human rights norms. These commitments often 
entail conflicting policies as well as contradictory expectations on part of the international 
and domestic audiences. Despite such human rights obligations, the UK and Turkey have 
been adopting new anti-terrorism legislation while attempting to legitimize and justify 
controversial provisions. At this juncture, a number of similarities come to the fore not only 
with respect to the content and implementation of the new counter-terrorism laws, but also 
how they have been balanced vis-a-vis human rights principles. Governments in both 
contexts securitize areas of political and social life as the ‘state of exception’ suspends 
established rights and liberties, yet they are ultimately under the pressure of legitimacy and 
need to justify their decisions or alter them.  Hence, the act of balancing entails a number of 
convergent trends, not only regarding acts of securitization, but also with respect to the ways 
in which state actors endeavor to portray their conduct in line with international standards.  
1. Vague definition of terrorism:  
One problematic commonality in both the Turkish and British legislation is the 
vague and overbroad definition of terrorism, which is not only against the principle of 
legality, but also incurs controversial implementations. In the UK context, despite the 
adoption of a number of terror-related Acts, the definition provided by the Terrorism Act 
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2000 remained intact, which is manifestly broader compared to previous UK legislation as 
well as international law pertaining to this issue. Such an overbroad definition risks 
criminalizing both legitimate demonstrations and also unlawful protests which pertain to 
issues of public order, but not terrorism per se. Demonstrations such as anti-globalization 
protest, animal rights protests, or even flash mobs can fall within the purview of this 
definition. (Article 19, 2006)  In the Turkish context, the main legal document pertaining to 
counter-terrorism is the 1991 Law on Fight Against Terrorism that also adopts a highly inclusive 
definition of terrorism. (Law on Fight Against Terrorism of Turkey 1991) Similar to the UK case, 
this extensive definition has enabled the treatment of myriad forms of political opposition 
under terrorist charges, including pro-Kurdish, Kemalist, Islamist, and leftist organizations 
depending on the political context. This picture demonstrates how defining an act as terror 
can have grave consequences, demarcating the scope of ‘sanctioned politics’ and those that 
fall under the category of an existential threat to the nation. Thus, the adoption of vague 
definitions of terrorism that are susceptible to various interpretations engenders the 
securitization of political life and the paralysis of the democratic process.  
2. Controversial provisions on ‘propaganda/encouragement’:  
A prevalent tendency present in both contexts that is also interconnected with 
adopting a vague definition of terrorism is the securitization of dissent through controversial 
measures criminalizing ‘propaganda’ or ‘encouragement’. Following the London bombings 
in 2005, the UN Security Council Resolution 1624 with the strong endorsement of Blair 
government called on all states to “prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or 
acts....”  (Security Council Resolution 1624). Likewise, during the same period Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CECPT) came into force in 2005, which 
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demanded member states to issue laws that criminalize the ‘public provocation to commit a 
terrorist offense’60. (Marchand, 2010: 140) These demands were materialized in the UK with 
the advent of Terrorism Act 2006 which criminalizes any “…statement that is likely to be 
understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or 
indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.” (emphasis added, Terrorism Act 
2006) This provision has aimed to eliminate ‘terrorist speech’ including publications and 
internet activities that are deemed as promoting terrorism. One salient feature of the section 
is that whether any individual is actually ‘encouraged’ or ‘induced’ by the statement at hand 
is considered to be irrelevant. Moreover, the phrase ‘indirect encouragement’ is also 
problematic as it is open to various possible interpretations. Human rights organizations 
have raised their concern over the possibility that such vaguely worded legislation can lead 
to the criminalization of peaceful expressions of extreme or unpopular views (Article 19, 
2007). This was the case in 2011 amidst nation-wide student protests against education cuts, 
when the Counter-terrorism Command became actively involved in hunting down 
‘extremism’, where one officer contacted universities in London asking for information 
about the students. (Taylor & Vasagar, 2011) In tandem with the murky political 
environment endorsed by utilizing an overbroad definition of terrorism, this provision lays 
the ground for the securitization of dissent, wherein any idea deemed radical or extreme can 
be labeled as a threat to national security.  
Turkish officials also took the steps to enforce similar legal arrangements. 
Interestingly, top-ranking military personnel explicitly voiced their demand for new 
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 Bearing in mind that the common criminal law proved insufficient in persecuting indirect incitement.  
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regulations on counter-terrorism that are comparable to the counter-terrorism legislation in 
the UK, which was taken up by a Parliamentary Justice Commission incumbent on drafting 
these amendments. (Aydın, 2005) As suggested by one commentator, “the TMK [Turkish 
Anti-Terror Law] signifies how global anti-terror fears and some administrative/legal 
measures such as those in the UK, provide additional pretext or alibis for authoritarian 
revisions.” (Aytar, 2006) This suggests that not only are the two governments adopting 
similar counter-terrorism measures, but also that Turkey perceives the UK as a model in 
security matters. The amendments made changes in the provision on making propaganda for 
a terrorist organization, expanding the purview of ‘propaganda’ to include demonstrations, 
speeches, writing or broadcasting. Yet more strikingly, with the new amendments 
individuals charged by making propaganda for a terrorist organization are legally treated as 
members of a terrorist organization whether they have ties with the organization or not.  
Moreover, as a result of this legal framework by the end of 2012 the country has been 
characterized as ‘world’s biggest prison for journalists’, most of which are charged under 
the controversial provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Law, either allegedly being member of a 
terrorist organization or promoting their ideology. (Reporters Without Borders, 2012) 
 By evoking a sense of emergency and pressing danger not only in material terms, 
but also as an ideological threat against a certain worldview, the display of dissent whether 
in the form of expressing an opinion or taking part in public demonstrations are being 
suffocated by the security constellation. The strategy to ‘root-out’ ideologies considered to 
be associated with terrorist motives induces the securitization of dissent, whereby 
individuals expressing them risk being accused of engaging in terrorist activity. Thus, as 
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suggested by Jackson (2005), these policies seek to discipline domestic society by 
marginalizing opposition and protest. 
3. Enhancing the Powers of the Police:  
Another shared characteristic within the framework of counterterrorism is the 
enhancement of the powers of the police. In the eve of September 11 attacks, the British 
Parliament had already passed the Terrorism 2000 Act which marked the introduction of the 
controversial stop and search provision known as ‘section 44’. This provision allows police 
forces to stop and search individuals and vehicles in the absence of a ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
that a crime has taken place, therefore, is predicated on a preventive perspective. 
Nonetheless, the incidents of recorded ‘stops’ have escalated to unprecedented degrees since 
2007, increasing almost seven times (37,000 in 2007, 269,244 in 2009) without any 
prosecution or useful information attained. (Human Rights Watch, 2010) Moreover, section 
44 has been criticized for being abused by the police for discouraging protest, since the 
practice has also been used in lawful demonstrations, such as the protests during the 2005 
Labor Party Conference when more than 600 individuals got arrested, including a 82 year 
old activist. (Article 19, 2006)  
Similar to the stop and search powers of the British police force, a law passed in 
2007 that granted the Turkish police equivalent powers. While previously, the Penal Code 
authorized search powers only with a judge order, with the introduction of the Law 
Amending the Powers and Duties of the Police (Law no. 5681) in 2007 the police have 
attained the authority to stop and search, ask for identity cards in the absence of a judge 
order and de facto arrest individuals. In line with international trends the practices of taking 
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fingerprints and photographs that were used only for criminal investigations now became 
common procedures, resorted to for bureaucratic actions such as applications for passport, 
citizenship, or refugee, without a judge ruling. (Polis Vazife ve Salahiyet Kanununda 
Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun, 2007) As the state of exception gets normalized in 
everyday life, close scrutiny and policing of the public become common practices for the 
greater cause of providing security. Most importantly, the new amendments have given the 
authority to use weapons when faced with resistance, a move that can engender lethal 
consequences. This disturbing development is even exacerbated in light of the ‘entrenched 
culture of impunity’ in Turkey, as the state is predisposed to protect its personnel in criminal 
justice system, rather than the victims. (Amnesty International, 2007) 
At the time of writing, a new regulation has been introduced to the Parliament that 
primarily deals with public demonstrations which have been increasingly framed as sites of 
potential threat to security amidst proliferation of dissent and expressions of discontent with 
the government. It is stated that the Draft Law changing various articles on the Law on the 
Powers and Duties of the Police has been put forth as a result of “public events turning into 
terrorist propaganda, protestors threatening the wellbeing and bodily integrity of 
citizens…with the purpose of introducing new measures without upsetting the freedoms-
security balance.” (Polis Vazife ve Salahiyet Kanunu ile Bazı Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde 
Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Tasarısı, 24 November 2014) This 
draft law grants extensive preemptive powers to the police, including the authority to detain 
individuals that ‘pose a serious threat to public order’ up to 48 hours without the order of a 
prosecutor or a judge. Congruently, the provision foresees the treatment of protestors 
covering their face as potential criminals, parallel to the 2006 amendments modelled after 
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the British legislation. Moreover, the purview of stop and search powers provided in the 
earlier amendment which is extended, whereby the condition for a strong belief based on 
concrete evidence is watered down by the new notion of ‘reasonable suspicion’. (Ibid.) 
Hence, the bill epitomizes the attempt to securitize expressions of political opposition, 
thereby pushing such public displays beyond the workings of normal politics into the sphere 
of exceptional measures. This process requires the close monitoring and policing of society 
to eliminate those elements that are perceived to threaten public order.  
4. Suspension of due process:  
One of the most notorious manifestations of invoking a state of exception and 
thereby sidestepping established rights is the suspension of due process. In both contexts, 
various counterterrorism policies have authorized excessive pre-trail and pre-charge 
detention measures along with practices such as secret evidence that blatantly breach 
fundamental principles of justice. The contentious practice of pre-charged detention in the 
UK goes back to the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provision) Act 1984 that aimed to 
address terrorist activities in Northern Ireland. Yet, in 2001 with the Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act the practice of indefinite detention was incorporated in the law. This 
notorious clause in the ATCSA included a provision that allowed non-UK nationals 
suspected of being affiliated with terrorism-related activities to be indefinitely detained, 
given that they cannot be sent back to their country of origin or another country. Since the 
UK government could not deport non-citizens that faced the risk of being tortured in their 
home countries in light of international law, it opted to condone the practice of ‘indefinite 
detention’ instead. In fact the HM Prison Belmarsh in London used to accommodate 
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indefinitely detained without charge or trial, causing it to be referred to as the ‘British 
version of Guantanamo’.  
Being the only European country to invoke indefinite detention that specifically 
targets non-nationals, the UK has created a “space devoid of law,” (Agamben, 2003: 50) 
rendering such individuals to be susceptible to what Agamben defines as the “de facto rule” 
of the sovereign (Ibid.: 3). In the face of domestic and international criticisms, ATCSA was 
repealed along with the provision on indefinite detention, and was replaced by ‘control 
orders’ in 2005, and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2011.  Therefore, 
this lineage of counter-terrorism policies have continued to accommodate the most 
fundamental problem imminent in previous anti-terrorism legislations, namely the fact that 
terrorist suspects are dealt outside criminal law and thus unable to enjoy their basic rights.   
In 2001, within the framework of the EU-accession process, Turkey has passed 
several reforms that aimed to institute a rights-based understanding in the political structure. 
These included amendments in the Constitution with respect to the principles of due process 
and the rule of law. One such instance was reducing the pre-trial detention period as 
indicated in Article 19 of the Constitution from 15 days to 4 days for collectively committed 
crimes. Nonetheless, provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law foresees the extension of 
this period up to ten years for crimes against ‘national security’ or the ‘Constitutional order’, 
giving way to excessive use of pre-trial detention in terror-related cases. (Ceza Muhakemesi 
Kanunu, 2004) Particularly in the recent terror-related cases which mainly aim opposition 
figures that are vocal, be it secular Kemalists or pro-Kurdish intellectuals, this practice has 
been widely resorted to. The official numbers announced by Human Rights Watch in 2011 is 
that 605 individuals face pre-charge detention only in relation to the KCK operations. 
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(Human Rights Watch News, 2011) As can be seen, once again by invoking a ‘state of 
exception’, governments bypass established rights and the normal legal process, whilst 
legitimizing such acts on the grounds of national security. In so doing, they treat strip the 
individual of any legal entitlement and subject to arbitrary treatment under the rubric of 
containment of threat.   
5. Repackaging old contentious provisions under a different banner:  
Lastly, an interesting tendency of repackaging old problematic counter-terrorism 
practices under a different banner is observable in both the Turkish and the British context, 
as governments avoid being associated with what are largely seen as illiberal measures. One 
of the recent legislations in the UK pertaining to counter-terrorism has been the Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigations Measures Act 2011 that purports to bring “a new regime to 
protect the public from terrorism.” (Terrorism Prevention and Investigations Measures Act 
2011)  As put by the Home Secretary Theresa May in the Ministerial Foreword, while 
national security is the primary duty of the government, “we must…correct the imbalance 
that has developed between the State's security powers and civil liberties, restoring those 
liberties wherever possible and focusing those powers where necessary.” (Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, 2011) The Act foresees the annulment of Terrorism Act 2005, 
along with the controversial control orders that are to be replaced by what has been termed 
as Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures. The control orders were an alternative 
practice to indefinite detention of non-nationals (which was later revoked by a House of 
Lords ruling), and intended to apply in the absence of sufficient evidence to undertake 
criminal prosecution, involving measures such as forced relocation, restrictions in 
occupation, association and communications. (Steiner et. al., 2008: 430) Although TPIMs 
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have retained the central problem of bypassing the due process inherent in their 
predecessors, they have introduced a relatively more restricted scope. Instead of charging 
and prosecuting these individuals, control orders provided the grounds for treating them as 
possible security risks to be contained, in the absence of any clear evidence for their crimes.  
As controversial provisions become subject to both domestic and international 
criticism, they threaten the legitimacy of the government due to their negation of established 
rights and freedoms, and are therefore replaced by newer, ostensibly less controversial ones. 
Although most of the powers bestowed by previous legislation are passed on in these new 
laws under a different banner, the fact that governments cannot hold on to security measures 
that are blatantly against human rights, or that they opt not to be affiliated with earlier 
controversial policies is an important aspect of the evolving counter-terrorism policies. In 
the Turkish context, this tendency is also evident particularly with respect to the recent 
amendments to the Anti-terror Law in 2012-2013. Under the scrutiny of the international 
community and in the face of growing domestic opposition against these draconian 
measures, the government felt impelled to once again amend the counter-terrorism 
legislation, aimed to address some of the highly controversial clauses that set the legal 
grounds for the imprisonment of hundreds of journalists, as well as politicians and 
academics for expressing their opinions. Most importantly, the new judicial reform foresees 
that ‘direct incitement to violence’ will be penalized as a terrorist crime, as the definition of 
‘propaganda’ becomes more nuanced and differentiated from being a member of an 
organization. (İnsan Hakları ve İfade Özgürlüğü Bağlamında Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik 
Yapılmasına Dair Kanun, 2013) It has been suggested that these amendments are superficial 
modifications in order to impress the European Commission and the Council of Europe, 
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since the new provisions are still too broad and vague, therefore, insufficient to engender 
changes in implementation. For instance, the newly added condition of praising, legitimizing 
or encouraging methods that involve the use of coercion, violence, or threat can still be 
interpreted to involve simple expressions of opinion, such opting to term PKK ‘guerillas’ 
instead of ‘terrorists’. (Karaca, 2013)  
On the whole, in the face of perceived security threats, governments endeavor to 
securitize areas of social life, to exempt themselves from the requirements of international 
norms. Once an issue-area is deemed as a security issue per se, state officials evoking a 
sense of emergency can legitimately employ the right to use extraordinary measures (Buzan 
et. al. 1998). The practices that are tantamount to the suspension of law, where individuals 
are deprived from due process are poignant manifestations of this phenomenon. Agamben 
claims that the modern state of exception is a product of democratic governments, not 
absolutist states, wherein “the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of 
entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political 
system [takes place].” (2003: 2) Hence, what took place in the aftermath of September 11 is 
a legal limbo in which the individual is deprived of any legal status and therefore 
fundamental rights. In both the British and the Turkish case there is a proclivity of utilizing 
counter-terrorism measures to target those forms of opposition that are deemed as posing an 
‘existential threat’ to the political community (Schmitt, [1922] 1985). In the former case, the 
focus after 9/11 has not only been the Muslim minority living in the UK, but also other 
ethnic minorities as potential criminals as well as protestors voicing their discontent with the 
government, exemplified in the securitization of student protests. In the latter case, one of 
the targets has been ironically the pro-secular establishment under the purview of the 
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military vanguards, which had brought down a number of religious oriented parties that 
were the predecessors of AKP either through legal means or military threat, and also those 
pro-Kurdish groups who chose not to abide by the government initiated peace process. 
Participation in the public sphere gets more and more securitized with the new provisions 
that are formulated in such a way as to render rights and freedoms amenable to be subsumed 
under the security apparatus. Although the UK is a long-established liberal democracy, it has 
nonetheless resorted to draconian practices comparable to those of a democratizing country. 
The international counter-terrorism trends incurred by the ‘War on Terror’ have provided 
conducive grounds for these controversial practices and the reversal of earlier established 
norms. 
While pursuing security policies, governments are under the obligation of balancing 
such concerns with rights and liberties, in order to present their conduct as legitimate to their 
constituents and the international community. As indicated by Risse and Sikkink (1999), 
human rights norms have become a yardstick in determining ‘civilized nations’ by shaping 
actors’ identities and interests. The inclination of purportedly changing contentious 
practices, while trying to hold on to most of the content under a different banner is an 
example of this trade-off both the British and the Turkish governments have been engaging 
in. Therefore, in line with Reus-Smith’s argument that respect for human rights norms has 
come to constitute one of the pillars of legitimizing ‘sovereignty’ (Reus-Smit, 2001), these 
cases demonstrates how even in the area of national security, state conduct is circumscribed 
by the such norms. Nonetheless, as state officials pay lip service to human rights norms and 
repackage controversial laws, the problematic provisions are being passed on, thereby 
institutionalized in the extant legal framework. Hence, whilst actors feel the urge to portray 
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their conduct as upholding such norms, a watered down version of exceptional measures are 
being normalized is the legislation.  
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Part III. Securitization and the Language of Rights in the Making of Counter-
terrorism Policies 
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Introduction: 
Policy Frames and the Analysis of Parliamentary Debates 
 
 The previous section presented a comparative analysis of policy development in the 
context of Turkey and the UK, elaborating on key political events and trends that have 
shaped the trade-off between human rights and security concerns. Moving on from a 
comparative policy analysis, this section presents the main findings of the frame analysis of 
parliamentary debates in each respective setting. As mentioned earlier, the study argues that 
the relationship between the discourse and policy of counter-terrorism is a mutually 
constitutive process: while the language on terrorism is shaped by perceptions of ‘threats to 
national security’, these perceptions are in turn translated into concrete policy outcomes. 
Therefore, the legitimization and institutionalization of contentious security policies are two 
different processes that work to reinforce one another. In the making of counter-terrorism 
policies, the security discourse is often challenged by a discourse on rights that 
problematizes the grounds of exceptionalism the former is premised upon, instead evoking 
international norms and democratic principles. The confrontation, bargaining, and 
negotiation among these two prevalent policy frames offer interesting insights not only 
pertaining to the political culture and repertoire of meaning in each context, but also with 
respect to the commonalities across different settings in the language of security and rights. 
Therefore, the second part of the study consists of a discursive investigation of the 
legislative process through the employment of frame analysis of parliamentary debates with 
the help of the programme ATLAS.ti.  
In order to examine the most frequently used concepts, themes and arguments with 
respect to counter-terrorism policies and their relationship to human rights principles, this 
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study analyzes parliamentary debates with a focus on the House of Commons
61
 as the 
chamber of democratically elected representatives in the UK and the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly in Turkey. Although the legislature is often dominated by the executive 
in the decision-making of national security matters particularly during times of emergency, 
the parliament nonetheless encompasses all the argumentation, justifications, concerns and 
assurances articulated by different parties including government officials. The role of the 
parliament for political contestation is taken up by Neal: “…Parliament plays a central role 
in legitimating the symbolic and repressive legislation that is invariably enacted in the eve of 
spectacular terrorist attacks, but on the other hand, Parliament frequently expresses concerns 
about how the law may exceed its intentions, scrutiny, and oversight.” (Neal, 2012: 265) As 
such, the parliament is not only a problem-solving body, but also a performative arena for 
the members of the parliament to stand for and justify certain positions. A point that needs to 
be made is the culture of debate and parliamentary scrutiny in these two settings. The 
analysis has shown that on the issue-area of security, the UK legislative process has 
exhibited a much detailed and rigorous debate on the proposed provisions; whereas, the 
Turkish case presented less deliberation and argumentation. Although this dimension of the 
legislative process is not part of the analysis, it is a noteworthy observation demonstrating 
the difference in the culture of debate and the functioning of the legislative organ. 
Amidst the overwhelming extent of counter-terrorism legislation and an even larger 
volume of parliamentary discussions, the study has opted to focus on those pieces of 
legislation that have generated extensive debates and brought about a new aspect to counter-
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 Due to time constraint the House of Lords debates have been left out. The focus on House of Commons 
allows one to investigate democratically elected politicians’ points of views and captures a larger proportion 
of the spectrum of political ideas.   
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terrorism legislation through relevance sampling. In the UK context the debates on three key 
legislations have been analyzed, namely Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 
Terrorism Act 2006, and finally Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, 
retrieved from Hansard parliamentary records which offer comprehensive access to 
parliamentary debates and different committee reports. Firstly, ATCSA 2001 came in the 
aftermath of 9/11 attacks and signified the general zeitgeist of the ‘War on Terror’. With the 
introduction of the practice of indefinite detention, this piece of legislation which has 
triggered waves of debate both nation-wide but also with an international reach, rendering 
the UK as the only EU country to derogate from the ECHR. Some of the highlights of the 
parliamentary debates about this Act included issues pertaining to immigration and 
deportation, due process and the lack thereof, as well as freedom of expression in relation to 
a clause criminalizing religious hatred which was later dropped.  
 The second source of data is comprised of the parliamentary debates on Terrorism 
Act 2006, which was introduced following the 7/7 London bombings in 2005. At this critical 
juncture, with the shocking insight that the perpetrators were UK nationals this legislation 
has for the first time approached the issue of terrorism from an ideological vantage point and 
sought to criminalize the glorification of terrorism. Other controversial provisions included 
the extension of pre-charge detention period to 90 days and the monitoring of religious 
institutions against preaching extremism. The debates that surrounded the Bill included the 
danger of extremism, state of multiculturalism and community relations, and definition of 
‘glorification’. Lastly, the analysis included parliamentary debates and Public Bill 
 177 
 
Committee debates on Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011
62
, which 
are novel in their purported objective of restoring rights and liberties in security policies. 
According to Theresa May, this legislation has sought to “…correct the imbalance that has 
developed between the State's security powers and civil liberties, restoring those liberties 
wherever possible and focusing those powers where necessary.” (HM Government, 2011)63 
As such, the legislation vowed to ‘re-balance’ counter-terrorism policy in favor of liberties 
with the introduction of new measures and the annulment Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, 
along with control orders. The highlighted issues in the parliamentary sittings have been the 
burden of extending rights to security measures, problems pertaining to due process, and the 
issue of exceptionalism.  
 On the other hand, in the Turkish case the data on parliamentary debates have been 
retrieved from the Turkish Grand National Assembly website that offers access to 
parliamentary debates as well as relevant parliamentary committee reports. All the data 
acquired from this primary source has been analyzed in the original language and translated 
to English by the author in the reporting of the findings. Three essential legislative periods 
that aim to amend Anti-terror Law as well as those articles in the Penal Code dealing with 
terror-related crimes have been chosen for the analysis: the EU harmonization packages 
during 2002-2003, reverse amendments in the Law amending Law on Fight Against 
Terrorism in 2006, and finally the most recent reform packages during 2012-2013 as a 
response to the increasing number of cases brought to the ECtHR. Since the enactment of 
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 Due to the fact that unlike the other two legislation, the debate on TPIMs 2011 have taken place both at 
the House od Commons and also through a Public Bill Committee with select members, the records of both 
sittings have been included in the analysis. 
63
 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97972/review-findings-
and-rec.pdf 
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the notorious 1991 Anti-terror Law, the most groundbreaking development came about with 
the dynamism of the EU-accession process, as the legal bastion of the military tutelage as 
well as the national security apparatus underwent a meticulous transformation in favor of a 
rights-based understanding. During the discussion of these inclusive reforms some of the 
most salient themes were the conceptualization of democratization as a requirement of 
modernity and a break with the past regime overshadowed by the military involvement in 
politics.  
 The second set of legislative debates involve a reverse wave in the Anti-terror Law 
in line with the international zeitgeist following the 7/7 London bombings as well as the end 
of cease-fire with the PKK, that have resuscitated security concerns once again. During the 
formulation of the new amendments that extend the definition of propaganda and being a 
member of a terrorist organization, one of the most frequently voiced arguments was that the 
government has been going soft on terrorists groups and that there should be necessary 
limitations to rights and liberties to prevent them from being abused. The last legislative data 
analyzed in the Turkish case are the reform packages introduced in 2012-2013, with the aim 
of addressing those problematic articles that have culminated in mounting cases brought 
forth to the Strasbourg Court. The discussions during this period is underpinned by concerns 
over what is deemed as the undemocratic practices employed by the government with under 
the rubric of counter-terrorism, in particular its impact on freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press.  
In total, records of parliamentary debates and public bill committees amounting to 
8076 single-space pages have been analyzed through the qualitative research programme 
ATLAS.ti. The analysis was conducted through both concept-driven codes as well as data-
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driven codes that have arisen inductively throughout the investigation. The table below 
differentiates those codes that have been construed on the basis of theory and those on the 
basis of data. A more detailed explanation of all the codes and what they represent can be 
found at the codebook provided in the Appendix. These codes have been coded alongside 
the policy frame template that can be found in Table 8, illustrating the different frame 
elements constituting an overall frame structure. The dimensions that come together to form 
a cognitive frame involve a diagnosis, a prognosis, roles attributed to different actors, 
mechanisms involved, the location of the problem or the solution, and finally 
intersectionality signifying overlaps with other frames. As a result, codes that represent 
various themes, arguments, justifications, and other relevant concepts have been analyzed as 
part of the frame elements through a process of double coding. The co-occurrence function 
of ATLAS.ti has helped to analyze code frequencies in relation to each frame dimension, 
thereby allowing the researcher to observe which arguments and themes have been more 
saliently articulated in the framing of the problem or the solution. The intertwined 
composition of codes and the frame structure has set up the pillars of the two policy frames 
that are prevalent in discussions on controversial counter-terrorism policies and human 
rights. These analytical tools have been utilized in order to examine relevant parliamentary 
debates in each setting. In what follows, this section will explicate a comprehensive account 
of policy frames and their constituent elements in the making of counter-terrorism policies 
and their relation with human rights principles.  
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Table 7. Theory-driven and Data-driven Codes 
 
Theory-driven Codes Data-driven Codes 
Turkey United Kingdom 
Abuse of open society 
Balancing 
Burden 
Democratic values 
Dialogue/diplomacy redundant 
Duty to protect 
Enemy 
Ethnic terrorism vs. international terrorism 
Exceptionalism 
Executive powers 
International community 
International institutions 
International norms 
Legal obligation 
Lessons from the past  
Necessity 
Operational effectiveness 
Police powers 
Prevention 
Right to security 
Rule of law/due process 
Threat to our way of life 
Threatening rights and liberties 
Threat/urgency/emergency 
Trivialization 
Universal morality 
Vague definition 
Victim 
 
Abuse of rights and 
liberties 
Civil-military relations 
Democratization 
Demonstration/protest 
Example of civilized 
societies 
Foreign imposition 
Freedom of press 
Freedom of expression 
Going soft 
Infamous policy 
Nationalism 
National sensibilities 
Necessary limits to rights 
and liberties 
Organized Crime 
Othering support for 
human rights 
Pluralism 
Pressing reality of 
terrorism 
Propaganda 
Public Opinion  
Reaffirming commitment  
to human rights 
Real terrorists vs. falsely 
accused 
Religion 
Requirement of 
modernity 
Separatist vs. 
fundamentalist terrorism 
Socio-economic 
development 
 
Demonstration/protest 
Discrimination 
Extremism 
Freedom of association 
Freedom of expression 
Going soft 
Human rights for ‘us’ 
Immigration and asylum 
Infamous policy 
Minority vs. majority 
Multiculturalism  
Necessary sacrifice 
Organized crime  
Othering support for human 
rights 
Our lands 
Public demand security 
Public opinion 
Reaffirming commitment to 
human rights 
Religion 
The nation/society 
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Table 8. Policy Frame Structure 
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Chapter 5. Balancing under the State of Exception: Prevalent Policy Frames in the UK 
Legislative Process 
 
Unfortunately, there are times when people have to be outside the legal framework. 
                 Gerry Sutcliffe, 23 June 2011
64
 
 
Taking pride in a tradition of civil rights and liberties yet concomitantly enacting 
controversial counter-terrorism legislation since the last couple of decades yields interesting 
ramifications in the UK political landscape. The political culture and rhetoric accommodates 
two strong and often conflicting policy frames regarding counter-terrorism measures, 
namely the security frame and rights frame. Congruent to the theoretical premises of this 
study, the parliamentary discussions are undergird by the contestation and bargaining in the 
making of counter-terrorism legislation, manifested through various frame elements and 
framing techniques. The analysis reveals that contrary to conventional conceptualizations, 
these frame structures are not mutually exclusive, and owing to the political context in the 
UK, they tend to overlap at certain junctures by barrowing from one another’s stock of 
meaning. As such, this section offers a discursive analysis of the legislative process in the 
UK parliament in order to shed light on the commonly employed concepts and themes 
working up to the structure of two salient policy frames and their relationship.  
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 Hansard HC Public Bill Committee Deb, 23 June 2011, p. 57.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of Keywords in UK Parliamentary Debates 
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 Before moving on to a detailed account of frame structures, a general distribution of 
key words can help to acquire a better grasp of the wider picture in the making of counter-
terrorism policies. As can be observed in Graph 1, the highest frequency is shared between 
terrorism and government. Yet, considering all the bureaucratic language present in the 
parliamentary debates, this is not surprising. The following terms, nonetheless, start to give 
some hints about the content of the discussions, especially police, law, public, and security. 
From the frequencies of these terms, it is possible to derive that there is an emphasis on the 
powers of the police in providing security in terror-related matters. Moreover, the high 
frequency of law suggests the significance of the legality and dealing terrorism within a 
legal framework, a resonant theme that will be elaborated in the following section. Likewise, 
the high occurrence of public illustrates the object of security to be protected against 
terrorism.  
 This simple frequency table offers some other clues into the structure of the 
discussions on counter-terrorism policies. As one observes through the consecutive 
elements, it is possible to see the international dimension of terrorism/terrorists being 
highlighted, followed by the notions of emergency and community. While the phrase rights 
ranks much higher compared to liberties and freedom, acts of protecting and balancing seem 
to occupy a similar place within the debates. Furthermore, when the words Muslim and 
Islam are coined together their frequency is dramatically higher than the combination of 
Ireland and Irish. This picture is indicative of the fact that the issue-area of terrorism is more 
associated with religious extremism and the Muslim community, thereby superseding the 
historical focus on Irish separatism or what is defined as ethnic terrorism. Against this 
backdrop, a detailed account of the structure of the two policy frames in relation to their 
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respective dimensions and the frequencies of the codes that make up those components will 
be delineated.   
5.1. Structural Components of the Security Frame  
 5.1.1. Framing of the Problem: 
As explicated earlier, the structure of a policy frame is premised on the depiction of a 
diagnosis followed by a prognosis and supporting arguments or justifications. Two 
predominant policy frames materialize throughout the analysis of UK parliamentary debates 
as they confront and bargain with each other. This section will outline the multifaceted 
components of security framing and the various concepts and themes that constitute it. To 
begin with, the first frame element is problem roles which attribute the cause of the 
perceived problem to certain groups or bodies. The discussions of three separate counter-
terrorism legislation at different time periods have pointed out that the framing of problem 
roles mainly revolves around the reference to and description of an ‘enemy’, whose 
identified difference is conceptualized as a matter of public security. This depiction is posed 
vis-à-vis the victim, which is generally constructed as ‘innocent’ ‘law-abiding’ citizens, 
against those that are deemed as abusing the liberties granted by the democratic society. The 
formulation of the problem roles can be observed below.  
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Table 9. Security Frame Problem Roles
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Figure 2. Distribution of Security Frame Problem Roles 
 
 The articulation of the enemy is also associated with the differentiation of what is 
considered as ‘ethnic terrorism’ and ‘international’ or ‘global’ terrorism which usually 
comes to signify Islamic fundamentalist groups. While the former is construed as negotiable 
or as suggested by Zarakol (2011) ‘system-affirming’, the latter is portrayed as ‘system-
threatening’ and against the values of western democracies, rendering dialogue or diplomacy 
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 The nodes represent various codes pertaining to problem roles that are linked with different types of 
relationship. The groundedness of a code (i.e. number of quotations it is linked) increases it is closer to the 
color red, as its density (link to other codes) increases it gets closer to the color blue.  
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redundant. The quotation below from The Secretary of State of the time Charles Clarke is a 
lucid example incorporating all of these characteristics:  
       Those who attacked London in July and those who have been engaged in or 
committed the long list of previous terrorist atrocities were not the poor and the 
dispossessed…. [U]nlike the liberation movements of the post-world war two 
era, they are not in pursuit of political ideas such as national independence from 
colonial rule, equality for all citizens without regard for race or creed or freedom 
of expression without totalitarian repression. Such ambitions are, at least in 
principle, negotiable and, in many cases, have been negotiated. However, there 
can be no negotiation about the recreation of the caliphate in this country, the 
imposition of sharia law, the suppression of equality between the sexes or the 
ending of free speech. Those values are fundamental to our civilisation and are 
simply not up for negotiation.  
                                           (Hansard HC Deb, 26 October 2005, vol. 438 col. 325) 
A less verbalized yet overt tendency related to problem roles has been denouncing 
human rights advocacy. Notwithstanding its low occurrence it bears symbolic significance, 
most lucidly captured by Kevin Hughes’s comment during the ATCSA 2001 debate: “…that 
the yoghurt and muesli-eating, Guardian-reading fraternity are only too happy to protect the 
human rights of people engaged in terrorist acts, but never once do they talk about the 
human rights of those who are affected by them?” (Hansard HC Deb 19 November 2001, 
vol. 375 col. 30, emphasis added) As can be seen, within the security frame not only the 
perceptions of the enemy, but also those who are considered to be supporting the ‘rights of 
the enemy’ are referred to as part of those groups responsible for the problem at hand.  
The second frame element of problem location indicates those sites that are deemed 
to be the sources of the problem. Within the security frame, the nexus of problem locations 
interconnected to one another, can be found in Table 10 below.  
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Table 10. Security Frame Problem Locations 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Security Frame Problem Locations 
Two main pillars of the problem location within the security frame are namely the necessity 
of taking certain steps vis-à-vis an alarming situation, coupled by extremism constituting the 
ideological arm of terrorism. Together, these constitute the most frequently occurring codes 
from within the security frame, as exemplified by Conservative MP Tobias Ellwood’s 
following comments:  
         The threat of terrorism affects every aspect of our lives. Every time we step 
on a train, we are reminded to be vigilant and watch out for suspicious bags. 
Every time we enter a Government building, we are obliged to have our bags—
and, indeed, bodies—scanned. When we switch on the news, there will often be a 
report of another attack in one part of the world or another…We must tackle the 
ideology behind terrorism, as well as prevent the terrorist attack itself…Sadly, 
 189 
 
history has shown that Islamic radicalisation reached our shores a number of 
years ago…Terrorism has become part and parcel of our lives, therefore. 
            (Hansard, HC Deb 7 June 2011, vol. 529 col. 113, emphasis added) 
This quote illustrates how the threat of terrorism is depicted as ubiquitous, to be 
expected anywhere at any time, thereby necessitating certain measures. Moreover, it also 
captures the way in which emphasis is given to the ideology behind terrorism, namely 
‘Islamic radicalization’. Another clear example of the conceptualization of terrorism and 
extremism partaking in an intertwined relationship can be traced in MP Shahid Malik’s 
following comment: “I was proud to be elected as Dewsbury's MP, but that pride pales into 
insignificance compared with the pride I feel at the way in which we have responded, as a 
united community, against the twin evils of terrorism and extremism.” (Hansard HC Deb 26 
October 2005, vol. 438 col.397, emphasis added) The depiction of an evil worldview, 
predicated on the binary opposition of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ reinforces necessary measures 
which make their own laws (Jackson, 2005). This discursive formulation is congruently 
followed by rendering dialogue or diplomacy redundant, since the sort of nihilism upheld by 
terrorists “means that our societies would cease to be a target only if we were to renounce all 
the values of freedom and liberty…[o]ur only answer to this threat must be to contest and 
then to defeat it…” (Charles Clarke in Hansard HC Deb 26 October 2005, vol. 438, col. 
327) 
To a less visible extent, another problem location articulated within the security 
frame is public demonstrations and protests, as epitomized by Beverly Hughes’s 
explanation of the need to criminalize covering the face during demonstrations under the 
purview of ATCSA 2001, since such sites are conducive to violent behavior for “people 
whose motives were associated with terrorism or serious crime to use the camouflage of a 
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large public event to perpetrate certain acts.” (Hansard HC Deb 26 November 2001, vol. 375 
col. 726) As such, this example is suggestive of how the political act of taking part in 
protests as a democratic right is being securitized and subsumed by the environment of 
inflated insecurity and constant threat.  
 
Table 11. Security Frame Problem Mechanisms 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of Security Frame Problem Mechanisms 
A third frame element of the security frame is problem mechanisms, connoting the 
circumstances and dynamics that produce the problem. The nexus of threat-urgency-
emergency comes to the fore in tandem with exceptionalism, particularly during the ATCSA 
2001 discussions. In this context, exceptionalism connotes a deviation from normal levels of 
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risk, triggered by the perception of a constant threat of terrorism. The zeitgeist of 
exceptionalism and the conception of a new era in terrorism deemed to be antagonistic to 
western values are coherently coined with the earlier argument dialogue/diplomacy 
redundant in MP Piara S. Kabra’s following comment:  
       In an ideal world, we would not have to take these firmer measures—I can 
believe that—but 11 September indicated once again that we do not live in an 
ideal world. It provided yet more evidence—somehow, some people seem to 
need more evidence—of the impossibility of reasoning with these people. A 
passage in the manual that I have mentioned states: "The confrontation that we 
are calling for with the apostate regime does not know Socratic debates . . . 
Platonic ideals . . . nor Aristotelian diplomacy." If we do not act at this precise 
moment, there is no doubt that the terrorists will. 
                        (Hansard HC Deb, 19 November 2001, vol. 375 col. 98, emphasis added) 
A related theme is threat to ‘our’ way of life, where terrorist groups are perceived to 
target western values per se, due to their ideological disposition: “Does the Home Secretary 
accept that, in contrast to the society that he has just described, the terrorism that threatens 
this country is based on the fascist-type ideology of hatred and an obsessive wish to destroy 
the west and modernity?” (Louise Ellman in Hansard HC Deb 26 October 2005, vol. 438 
col. 325) This characterization invokes a sense of perpetual anxiety by construing this form 
of terrorism directly in opposition to western civilization, and thereby as an existential other 
in the Schmittean sense ([1922] 1985) that cannot be negotiated with. In a similar vein, the 
argument of terrorist groups seeking to abuse open society, by manipulating rights and 
freedoms has also been resonant in the debates, as epitomized in MP Ross Cranston’s 
remarks:  
I cannot accept that we should not act because that is somehow contrary to 
what are said to be our liberal, democratic traditions. We are vulnerable because a 
liberal democracy enables people to pursue individual interests, and we act as a 
refuge for those from other states. We will pay a high price if we ignore the 
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minority of fanatics who would abuse the liberties and rights of liberal democracy 
to destroy it. 
                                        (Hansard HC Deb 19 November 2001, vol.375 col. 67) 
 Two other recurrent themes under problem mechanism have been the codes burden 
and going soft. The first comes to signify an argument whereby human rights obligations are 
considered to burden the authorities in providing greater security. Interestingly, this 
argument has been presented predominantly during the TPIMs 2011 debates, which 
purported to ‘re-balance’ counter-terrorism legislation in favor of rights and liberties. As put 
by Lord Howard: “When that system [indefinite detention] was changed, as a result of the 
decisions of the courts in order to take into account the Human Rights Act and civil liberty 
considerations, we ended up with a control order system that… is less effective in protecting 
the security of the public…” (Hansard HC Public Bill Committee Deb, 21 June 2011, p.18) 
The situation is exacerbated when the authority of the security forces is framed as operating 
“…in metaphorical handcuffs because they are tied by laws that do not apply to terrorists.” 
(Bob Stewart in Hansard HC Deb, 7 June 2011, vol. 529, col. 123) 
The second and related notion is the judgment that the government is going soft on 
terrorism in relation to human rights concerns, or in other words “watering down measures 
proven to prevent terrorist activity.” (Yvette Cooper in Hansard HC Deb, 7 June 2011, vol. 
529 col. 74) Once again this argument is more salient during TPIMs debate that is aiming to 
modify earlier counter-terrorism measures to bring them more in line with human rights. 
Gerry Sutcliff has voiced his discontent regarding the proposed bill on the grounds that 
“…the new regime that the Government is introducing is a step too far, because it gives 
more freedoms to the controlees... The balance has changed from safety to a more libertarian 
outlook.” (Hansard HC Public Bill Committee Deb, 23 June 2011, p. 56-57) Hence, tilting 
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the balance towards liberties is dismissed as ‘libertarianism’ and such policies are rendered 
incompetent to provide security to the public.  
 Finally, the last element of the problem framing is problem intersectionality that 
presents those issue-areas that are interlinked with the problem posed by terrorism. One area 
that is referred to in discussing terrorism is organized crime and how the two problem areas 
are interdependent, particularly during ATCSA 2001 debate. Yet, in the UK context the 
most notable intersectionality occurs with the interconnected policies of religion and 
immigration/asylum. Throughout all parliamentary discussions these two issues are visible, 
particularly the debates pertaining to ATCSA 2001 and Terrorism Act 2006. The 
international environment following 9/11 produced the UN Security Council Resolution 
1373 which brought the issue of immigration and asylum under the remit of national 
security, thereby driven out of the borders of ‘normal politics’ into the state of exception. As 
such, this piece of legislation exemplified the trend of securitizing immigration and asylum 
policies with the onset of the ‘War on Terror’. Likewise, the term ‘glorification’ under 
Terrorism Act 2006 has generated an intense dispute, wherein religious outlooks deemed 
‘extreme’ or ‘radical’ have been framed as possible sources of terrorism. As a result, the 
problem of terrorism is directly associated with members of the Muslim minority: 
       The Bill needs to be understood in the context of the Prevent agenda that was 
mentioned earlier, the relationship between the Muslim community and the police, 
the work of the security forces and international events, interventions and identity. 
There must be a question about what incited young British Muslim men to blow 
themselves up in British streets.  
            (Kris Hopkins in Hansard HC Deb 7 June 2011, vol. 529 col. 80) 
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Table 12. Security Frame Problem Intersectionality 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of Security Frame Problem Intersectionality 
  5.1.2 Framing of the Solution  
 Against the backdrop of the formulation of the problem supported by varying and 
interconnected units, security frame also offers its conceptualization of a solution with 
identical components. The first element of solution roles defines the authorities and bodies 
reckoned to be responsible for overcoming the problem of terrorism. Within the security 
frame, solution roles are attributed to the government’s primary duty to protect on the one 
hand, and to the extension of police and executive powers on the other. A case for extending 
executive powers in order to make prompt decisions in times of emergency has been put 
forth by Paul Goggins: “There may be circumstances where the enhanced powers would be 
required…Time is crucial…and I would certainly want to give the Home Secretary those 
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powers, so that she can use them when she judges that to be appropriate.” (Hansard HC Deb 
5 September 2011, vol.532 col. 138) As suggested by Agamben (2003), once again the state 
of exception is invoked vis-à-vis a context of urgency that necessitates additional powers for 
the executive. 
Another interesting finding has been references to the international community, 
particularly during the discussions on ATCSA 2001 and Terrorism Act 2006 in defense of 
proposed controversial policies framed as commitment to international cooperation against 
‘global terrorism’. This narrative of a commitment to an international community with 
shared values and a fight against ‘evil’ is expressed by Jack Straw in 2001: “We have shown 
that the determined will of the international community can defeat the evil that seeks to 
destroy us and that destroyed the lives of so many people on 11 September. We have shown 
that action to enforce universal values is a powerful force for good. We have shown that we 
have not forgotten 11 September, and we will not rest until we have made sure that such an 
atrocity can never happen again.” (Hansard HC Deb, 12 December 2001, vol. 376 col. 850, 
emphasis added) Hence, loyalty to the international community predicated on shared values 
and a shared security outlook is being accentuated for embarking on the ‘War on Terror’. 
This tendency is in line with the Constructivist argument that a certain political environment 
can converge states’ expectations and behavior, in this case the perception of a common 
enemy to western civilization (Adler & Barnett, 1998; Jepperson et. al., 1996). 
 
 196 
 
 
Table 13. Security Frame Solution Roles 
 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Security Frame Solution Roles 
When it comes to the solution location, the data-driven code of our lands becomes 
visible, asserting the need for control over ‘our’ territories against ‘foreigners’ who take 
advantage of the open society. An example of this trend is provided by David Blunkett 
within the framework of immigration and asylum laws: “This is our home—it is our country. 
We have a right to say that if people seek to abuse rights of asylum to be able to hide in this 
country and organise terrorist acts, we must take steps to deal with them.” (Hansard HC 
Deb, 19 November 2001, vol. 375 col. 30) Other two sources for a solution have been the 
right to security based on Lazarus and Goold’s (2007) theoretical insights on the normative 
power of rights-talk, and the argument of public demands security which has materialized 
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through data analysis. The former borrows from a rights-based rhetoric in evoking greater 
security; whereas, the latter resorts to public opinion in justifying security policies. For 
instance, the argument of right to security can be traced in the words of Lord Howard, who 
refers to the right to life in promoting (in)security: “…what I regard as the greatest human 
right and civil liberty of all: the ability of a citizen to walk down the street and go about his 
business without being at risk of a terrorist bomb.” (Hansard HC Public Bill Committee 
Deb, 21 June 2011, p. 18-19) This comment is a striking manifestation of framing security 
as the most important human right, in other words, the utilization of the language of rights in 
order to invoke legitimacy and articulate it within the security frame. Likewise, a succinct 
illustration of the argument on public demanding security has been put forth by David 
Blunkett in 2001: “Circumstances and public opinion demanded urgent and appropriate 
action after the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.” 
(Hansard HC Deb, 19 November 2001, vol. 375 vol. 22) It is emphasized in this example 
that the parliament is responsible for fulfilling the will of the people who demand greater 
security. 
 
 
Table 14. Security Frame Solution Locations 
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 The last theme of solution location is necessary sacrifice, which differs from that of 
necessity: whilst the latter denotes a situation entailing necessary action, necessary sacrifice 
constitutes a situation where certain rights and liberties need to be sacrificed for the sake of 
greater security, therefore acknowledging their status. Significantly salient in the 
parliamentary debates, the interplay of this concept with exceptionalism can be traced in the 
following comment made by MP Sutcliffe: “Prosecution and putting people in prison for 
terrorist activities is where we want to be, but it is accepted that there are occasions when 
that cannot happen as a result of the sensitivity of the information from the security and 
intelligence services. Unfortunately, there are times when people have to be outside the 
legal framework.” (Hansard HC Public Bill Committee Deb, 23 June 2011, p. 57, emphasis 
added) Thus, while recognizing the value of due process and normal criminal prosecution, 
Sutcliffe invokes the state of exception entailing necessary sacrifices in normal legal 
processes, thereby carrying the solution to the terrain of exceptional measures.  
 
Figure 7. Distribution of Security Frame Solution Locations 
 The third frame element of solution mechanism is premised on the interplay of 
various concepts and themes which operate jointly to offer a solution scheme. A relatively 
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less visible code expressed during the debates is human rights for ‘us’ associated with the 
earlier theme of right to security, which adopts the language of rights in dichotomizing the 
public into innocent individuals that deserve human rights and those suspects who do not. 
Within this nexus another code that is juxtaposed with the previous one is minority versus 
majority, representing the argument that the rights of a ‘dangerous’ minority should not 
supersede security of the majority. The workings of these intertwined notions can be found 
in the cogently put argument by Vernon Coaker:  
         Individual human rights are important and must be protected, but so must 
collective human rights. A small minority must not dictate to the majority. If an 
individual seeks to bring terror to the lives of countless others through the bomb, 
the gun or other means, does society not have a right to protect the human rights 
of those countless threatened people through the denial of that individual's human 
rights? That is what causes many to deplore those who use the very freedoms 
treasured by all of us to undermine and threaten our democracy. It is ridiculous 
that the Government can do nothing while terrorists use our immigration and 
asylum laws, which offer genuine refugees a safe haven, as a means of staying 
here and openly pursuing their hostile opinions.  
             (Hansard HC Deb, 19 November 2001, vol. 375 col.107-108) 
This quotation interlinks several different nodes of the security frame and condenses them 
into a coherent reasoning. While acknowledging the status of human rights, Coaker utilizes 
this normative narrative from a security perspective and argues for the rights of the majority 
against those of a dangerous minority. From this perspective, the rights of the ‘threatened 
people’ must logically supersede the rights of those who are perceived as seeking to exploit 
open borders and bring about havoc. In this way, while those democratic values of rights and 
liberties are upheld, they are done so as symmetrically opposed to the conceptualization of 
an enemy rendered undeserving of the virtues of modernity.  
 200 
 
 As can be observed, there is a general rhetorical acceptance of the normative weight 
of the human rights norms and obligations. This trend is also manifested in the prevalent 
codes of balancing and the data-driven code on reaffirming commitment to human rights, 
which have proved to be among the most frequent codes in general. This finding is 
important on several levels: firstly it illustrates that even from within the security framework 
it is not possible to blatantly dismiss human rights obligations; and secondly, it points out to 
a stronger hold of human rights rhetoric within the security discourse as a source of 
legitimacy. In other words, there is an evident tendency to declare commitment to human 
rights ‘under normal conditions’, yet pointing out to the necessity of suspending them due to 
exceptional circumstances. This phenomenon can be read in Paul Murphy’s statement: 
“None of us wants more counter-terrorism legislation and none of us wants freedom and 
security constantly balanced, as they must be, but all of us must acknowledge that the world 
has changed. To protect our freedoms we have always to protect our people.” (Hansard HC 
Deb 26 October 2005- vol. 438 col. 356) Hence, the well-being of human rights is 
conditioned upon security, thereby legitimizing their ‘temporary’ suspension in due course. 
Another case in point is presented during the Terrorism Act 2006 debates as the Minister for 
Policing, Security, and Public Safety of the time Hazel Blears declared that:  
         We are all struggling to reconcile the issues of security and liberty. How, 
in our free democracy, do we protect our citizens from harm while at the same 
time protecting the fundamental values that are so precious to every Member of 
Parliament? How, in particular, do we protect our freedom to speak, and to 
debate serious ideas on which we have deeply opposing views, while 
maintaining a sense of respect and upholding the right of decent people to go 
about their business in peace and safety? I ask Members to remember what 
happened on 7 July. More than 50 innocent people were murdered by terrorists 
who did not care how many innocent people they killed. More than 700 people 
were injured, many of them seriously, and their whole lives will be affected. I 
say that not in order to make my arguments easier to present, but because it is 
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always in my mind as we struggle to get the balance right. We are not talking 
about a theoretical situation. This is not an academic debate. The threat is real. 
We have been attacked, and we must now find the best way in which to protect 
the people of this country, while upholding and strengthening our values. 
   (Hansard HC Deb, 26 October 2005, vol. 438 col. 410-411, emphasis added) 
 In a similar vein, this excerpt highlights how exceptionalism is sought after the 
principled commitment to human rights. In this sense, striking the right balance is depicted 
as the ultimate aim of a counter-terrorism policy, while being cognizant of the pressing 
conditions that demand the suspension of norms. Moving on from these grounds, the picture 
gets even more interesting as exceptionality is being institutionalized in counter-terrorism 
policies and promoted to a permanent status. As put by John Denham during the Terrorism 
Act 2006 debates:  
        This is a long-term fight. Once terrorism is established, it takes years to get 
rid of. In my view, we will be extremely lucky if we are not facing attacks such as 
those that we have seen in London for the next 30 years. These are not, therefore, 
short-term, emergency measures. To all intents and purposes, they are permanent. 
The fight against terrorism does not lend itself to short-term initiatives. The 
public need to be reassured that things are being done, but they want to be safer. 
           (Hansard HC Deb, 26 October 2005, vol. 438 col. 369, emphasis added) 
 
 
Table 15. Security Frame Solution Mechanisms 
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Figure 8. Distribution of Security Frame Solution Mechanisms 
Lastly, solution intersectionality with other issue-areas shows relationship to public 
opinion as an important reference point in the formulation of counter-terrorism legislation. 
This code is also associated with the abovementioned argument of public demands security. 
Clearly more visible during the ATCSA 2001 debate following the 9/11 attacks, the 
significance of public opinion in the formulation of counter-terrorism policies can be 
observed in the following comment by Blunkett: “It seems to me that although the nation of 
course has a right to scrutinise what we are doing and to question us—to ask why on earth 
we are taking additional measures—we must also face up to things and be prepared to 
understand that people out there really want us to get a grip on any danger that threatens 
their or our lives, or the operation of this country—its economy, working and lifeblood.” 
(Hansard HC Deb, 19 November 2001, vol. 375 col. 30) Thus, public opinion is put forth as 
a necessary reference point in shaping security policies, whilst the will of the people is 
depicted as demanding greater security. 
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Table 16. Security Frame Solution Intersectionality 
 
Figure 9. Distribution of Security Frame Solution Intersectionality 
 In short, the structure of the security frame is the product of these knotted layers 
which come together to materialize this policy frame. While the identification of the enemy 
vis-à-vis the victim is ensued by a perceived sense of exceptionality, international terrorism 
is rendered existentially different and hostile to the values of a modern democracy. 
Extremism is portrayed as the source of terrorism, and ‘suspect’ groups are presented as 
exploiting the liberal values and open borders. The safest option is seen to be preventing 
such extremism from being dispersed, through tightening immigration laws and fighting 
certain ideologies and worldviews in the public sphere. Although ‘under normal 
circumstances’ the commitment to the principles of human rights and due process are 
unquestioned, it is suggested that because of exceptional circumstances the duty to protect 
overrides such norms. Especially the road taken since 9/11 with the fight against the ‘evils’ 
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of terrorism, it is maintained that strict security measures are also demanded by international 
community of countries who share an interest in protecting ‘western civilization’ from 
attacks. Hence, security framing proposes that we must suspend those civil rights of a 
dangerous few in order to protect the right to security of the innocent law-abiding majority. 
These are the general contours of the security framework that the analysis has presented, 
constituting different components of the same structure that work in tandem. Yet, there is 
another equally prevalent policy frame in the UK political context that has been essential in 
countering acts of securitization.  
5.2. Structural Components of the Rights Frame 
 5.2.1. Framing the Problem  
 Similar to the security policy frame, the rights framework is also composed of 
identical frame elements that come together to form the composite structure of the whole. 
Throughout all three legislative debates, rights frame is highly visible and exerts 
considerable pressure to the security narrative. It is suggested by the content of the 
discussions that this is partly due to the tradition of civil rights and liberties in the United 
Kingdom, and equally owing to the legal obligations entailed by international institutions. 
The framing of counter-terrorism policies from the vantage point of a rights-based 
framework exhibits interesting insights into the parliamentary debates, built on and 
supported by various interconnected themes, concepts, and arguments. In order to acquire a 
comprehensive understanding of these discursive formulations, we need to look into the 
construction of the diagnosis and prognosis.  
 The first element of the problem frame is the associated roles. Within the rights 
frame two positions are problematized, namely the extension of executive powers and that of 
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police powers. Enlarging the scope of these powers under the auspices of counter-terrorism 
is conceived to jeopardize the normal functioning of due process, leading to the 
infringement of a number of civil rights, as well as creating a culture of fear. Bringing forth 
the example of section 44 of Terrorism Act 2000 which has conferred substantial powers to 
the police, Alan Simpson warns about the ramifications of their misuse:   
 Will he [the Home Secretary] confirm that of the 900 or so people who 
have been arrested and detained under the Terrorism Act 2000, there has not 
been a single successful prosecution made for membership of any organisation 
on the burgeoning proscribed list, which we are told must be banned 
internationally. What we have done is to create a culture of fear, and a sense of 
division and vulnerability, that has nothing whatever to do with successful action 
against terrorism. 
                                (Hansard HC Deb, 26 October 2005, vol. 438 col. 329, emphasis added) 
This remark exemplifies the discontent about extensive police powers, which are not only 
deemed as failing to bring about the desired outcome, but also criticized for triggering an 
environment of constant anxiety. Further criticism has been expressed regarding the 
executive powers and the underlying logic behind counter-terrorism policy-making in 
general, deemed more as a performance than well-evaluated set of solutions: 
         There is a feeling in Government—it is the same in all Governments—that 
when something awful happens, they have to be seen to be doing something. 
The only thing Governments can do, apart from making statements and 
providing resources for the forces of law and order, is to pass new legislation. 
So that is what they do, and I suspect, to some extent, that is what we are doing 
here today. 
                               (Jeremy Corbyn in Hansard HC Deb, 16 March 2006, vol.443 col. 1678) 
 
 206 
 
 
Table 17. Rights Frame Problem Roles 
 
Figure 10. Distribution of Rights Frame Problem Roles 
 When it comes to the second frame element of problem location, two main strands 
make an appearance, those related to the highly recurring codes infamous policy and 
discrimination. The former either portends that the proposed piece of legislation risks 
culminating in infamous and contentious measures, or that it reflects earlier controversial 
practices. In this respect, it is associated with the code on lessons from the past which 
denotes critical historical experiences. Concerns and warnings have been raised regarding 
provisions found to be unjust and discriminatory, with respect to their impact on community 
relations and more importantly the potential of leading to sympathy for terrorist activity:  
       Does my right hon. Friend agree that before 7 July the worst mass-murder 
terrorist attack on civilians was the Birmingham pub bombing? Immediate anti-
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terror legislation followed, and then the wrong people were arrested, although 
they were given a full jury trial. There is no doubt that in my city, the alienation 
of the Irish community that resulted from all that created a breeding ground for 
sympathy for terrorist activity in Northern Ireland. Does my right hon. Friend 
believe that we are remembering the lessons of those events? 
         (Clare Short in Hansard HC Deb, 26 October 2005, vol. 438 col. 411, emphasis added) 
Parallel warnings have been made with respect to the relations with the Muslim 
community and how the perception of disproportionate punishments can instigate 
radicalization, generating more ‘martyrs’ rather than security:  
….[W]ill the Bill prevent anybody from being drawn into terrorism? I believe 
not, because I think it will create martyrs. However, we must consider the 
proportionality of the response. If a catch-all provision of the kind contemplated 
in clause 1 and in particular in subsection (2) also renders unlawful many acts 
that in all conscience should never be treated as unlawful, even if it did prevent 
one person from being drawn into terrorism, it would be wrong. 
   (Douglas Hogg in Hansard HC Deb, 2 November 2005, vol. 438 col.869, emphasis added) 
Interestingly, the justification for greater adherence to human rights norms against draconian 
measures borrows from the security narrative. A similar sense of elevated threat and 
emergency is in play, undergird by warnings about the possible outcome of unjust policies. 
Hence, this form of faming demonstrates how the rights language can also appropriate 
certain themes from the security narrative in order to make a strong case.  
 A related problem location is the code on discrimination that reckons prospective 
provisions either as discriminatory or conveying the possibility of engendering 
discriminatory practices. This problem location is also associated with the situation of 
religious minorities as well as immigrants and asylum seekers, indicating those groups that 
are subsumed by the process of securitization and ultimately labeled as ‘suspects’. Thus, the 
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risk of creating suspect communities through counter-terrorism has been expressed by Helen 
Jackson during the debates on ATCSA 2001: 
I should be grateful if my right hon. Friend would clarify this query: to 
what extent can he be sure that the people who are part of the international 
network about which we are concerned at the moment are not nationals of the 
various countries in which they live? Is there not a danger that we are labeling 
those individuals who are stateless, and directing this Bill at them…? 
       (Hansard 19 November 2001, vol. 375 col. 31-32) 
Similar problems that underscore proposed counter-terrorism legislation that risk inflicting 
hate towards a religious minority group has been frequently expressed: 
The events of 2001, the invasion of Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, the 
Bush-led war on terror, the axis of evil speech and similar things have had an 
enormous effect on community relations. They have also generated a degree of 
Islamophobia within our society and continue to do so, which is a very serious 
matter. The anti-terrorism legislation and the arguments surrounding the Prevent 
strategy, like so many other things, play into that agenda. My borough suffered 
on 7/7: more people from my borough died than from any other borough—it was 
a dreadful, awful, terrible day. I do not believe, however, that counter-terrorism 
legislation that goes around the principle of the use of the criminal law or goes 
around the norms of parliamentary democracy and open justice will stop those 
things happening again. That whole process does not make us more safe; 
ultimately, it puts our society at greater risk and makes it more vulnerable. 
          (Jeremy Corbyn in Hansard HC Deb 7 June 2011, vol. col. 109-110, emphasis added) 
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Table 18. Rights Frame Problem Locations 
 
Figure 11. Distribution of Rights Frame Problem Locations 
 Moving on from these premises, the problem mechanism is predicated on three main 
dynamics, namely exceptionalism, threatening rights and liberties, and vague definition. 
The theme of exceptionalism is also present in the security framework, yet as a perceived 
reality of emergency entailing exceptional measures. In this context it signifies the 
problematization of exactly those exceptional policies which override the normal 
functioning of due process, albeit being voiced to a lesser extent. This position is 
exemplified by Kenneth Clarke’s comment regarding the control orders regime introduced 
in 2005: 
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         The argument was whether the best way to protect ourselves against 
terrorism was to leave aside the normal principles of the rule of law and to give 
rise to the possibility, sooner or later, of cases of gross injustice by giving the 
Secretary of State the right to deprive someone of their liberty, and by denying 
them the chance of defense or of proper judicial review. That remains an issue, to 
which the Government promised they would one day return. 
                    (Hansard HC Deb, 15 February 2006, vol. 442 col. 1506) 
On the other hand, the problems predicated on utilizing vague definition has been 
voiced in all three parliamentary debates in relation to myriad different topics; nonetheless, 
it has been more frequently articulated during the discussion surrounding the clause on 
‘glorification’ in Terrorism Act 2006. Similar concerns have been raised with respect 
freedom of expression and the right to protest as corollaries of the more generic code on 
threatening rights and liberties. The particular manifestations of their interaction have 
ranged from discussions on the interpretation of minority religions to the distinction between 
‘freedom fighters’ and ‘terrorists’. An example of the problematization of the term 
glorification regarding how it can give way to the criminalization of certain religious beliefs 
has been articulated by William Cash in 2006:  
The Oxford English Dictionary definition is that the word "glorification" 
means the praise and worship of God. Does my right hon. Friend agree that there 
will be a grave danger that the courts will try and construe those words in the 
context of terrorism, which is what the debate hinges on? If terrorism and religion 
are conflated, would not the courts have to make a decision based on how 
praising and worshipping God are interpreted?  
                     (Hansard HC Deb, 15 February 2006, vol. 442 col. 1458, emphasis added) 
 A related topic of discussion that has taken up a substantial space during the 
Terrorism Act 2006 debates has been the differentiating between ‘freedom fighters’ and 
‘terrorists’, and how the term ‘glorification’ can muddle their distinction:  
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      If, for example, I had said in a public speech to a community of Bosnians 
in this country at the   time of the first Yugoslav war that the acts of those in 
Bosnia who resisted the Serb forces of the Yugoslav Government were worthy, 
and that they were conducting themselves honourably and laudably in protecting 
their community from state aggression, and the speech was a clear 
encouragement to people to go out and join them—or people inferred that from 
the   words—should that be criminalised? As the clause stands, it is likely to 
cover the glorification of Robin Hood. 
(Dominic Grieve in Hansard HC Deb, 2 November 2005, vol. 438 col. 839, emphasis 
added) 
Hence, these two instances convey how the rights frame operates to construe problems 
prevalent in broad counter-terrorism measures predicated on exceptionality. Those problems 
of marginalizing dissent and labeling minority groups as pointed out by Jackson (2005) have 
been taken up by the rights narrative and frames as problem mechanisms. In a similar vein, 
the possible impact of vague clauses such as ‘indirect incitement’ or ‘glorification’ that can 
ultimately securitize and restrain the right to protest and demonstration, leading to the 
labeling of peaceful protestors is forewarned by Jeremy Corbyn:  
          Are we advancing anything by designating as terrorists people who, by their 
very nature, are opposed to violence, terror and the existence of nuclear weapons, 
and who in many cases are equally opposed to nuclear power? I honestly do not 
see the point of the clause standing part other than gratuitously to criminalise a 
large body of people who act for entirely peaceful purposes and who have brought 
about significant political changes. That is simply not a sensible way to proceed.  
       (Hansard HC Deb, 3 November 2005, vol. 438 col. 1033) 
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Table 19. Rights Frame Problem Mechanisms 
 
Figure 12. Distribution of Rights Frame Problem Mechanisms 
 The final frame element of problem intersectionality is parallel to that of the security 
frame, associated with issues of immigration and asylum as well as religion. Nonetheless, 
unlike the security frame, they are problematized in tandem with the code on discrimination, 
thereby connoting the possible side-effect of counter-terrorism legislation for discriminating 
these social groups. This theme is also present in problem locations and voices a concern 
over the ramifications of counter-terrorism measures on community relations, in particular 
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the disadvantages faced by the Muslim minority, who are being labeled as a suspect 
community:  
 …the Muslim community was beginning to feel persecuted by the nature of the 
Government's terrorism legislation. When one sees conditions framed in such 
terms, one can certainly understand why. Why are not more neutral phrases used, 
such as "place of worship", instead of "mosque"? Do not the documents lend 
credence to those in the community who argue that the Government's anti-
terrorism powers are used disproportionately against Muslims? Will such an 
approach build the inter-community harmony on which the Government put so 
much stress? 
(Alistair Carmichael in Hansard HC Deb, 15 February 2006, vol. 442 col. 1513, emphasis 
added) 
 
Table 20. Rights Frame Problem Intersectionality 
 
Figure 13. Distribution of Rights Frame Problem Intersectionality 
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 5.2.2. Framing the Solution 
 Against the construction of the problem, the prognosis offered by the rights policy 
frame once again rests on the same fundamental elements as elaborated above. The first 
frame element is solution roles, indicating those entities and authorities that can bring about 
the desired outcome. Within the rights frame two main bodies come to the fore, namely the 
international community and the international institutions. As mentioned earlier, the 
visibility of the international community representing internationally shared values and 
identities within the rights framework has been much less evident than the latter; as a matter 
of fact, it has been referred to more often within the security frame. An interesting finding 
has been the emphasis made on concrete legal obligations and commitments to certain 
norms under international institutions. This tendency is visible across all three legislative 
debates, particularly with references to the obligations under the ECHR. One notable 
example appears during the ATCSA 2001 debates regarding the decision to derogate from 
the ECHR: “We would be wrong to derogate from the European Convention on Human 
Rights and from the Human Rights Act 1998. Nothing that the Home Secretary has said 
about the issues on which we agree—for example, that there remains an international threat, 
which I accept without qualification—persuades me that that takes us into the criteria for 
qualifying for derogation.” (Simon Hughes in Hansard HC Deb, 12 December 2001, vol. 
376 col. 924) 
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Table 21. Rights Frame Solution Roles 
 
Figure 14. Distribution of Rights Frame Solution Roles 
 When it comes to solution location, a similar picture comes into view, whereby a 
sense of legality is being highlighted under international norms. This tendency has been 
vindicated by the significantly low occurrence of the code universal morality, particularly in 
comparison to legal obligations, thereby failing to constitute one of the pillars of solution 
location. The importance of carrying out requirements of international norms can be traced 
in the following comments made by Edward Garnier: 
….[I]if [the Home Secretary] wants us willingly, rather than grudgingly, to 
accept the need to disapply certain provisions of the European Convention on 
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Human Rights barely a year after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force 
and to accept in a spirit of co-operation that what were so recently thought to be 
essential freedoms should be curtailed, he needs to be more open with us and, if I 
may say so, to avoid insulting the very people whom he needs to apply and carry 
through his new restrictive provisions. 
         (Hansard HC Deb, 19 November 2001, vol. 375 col. 64) 
On the other hand, one notable observation has been the characterization of the 
‘nation’ and ‘society’ as a source of rights and liberties. Although the code of the nation has 
been generated as a generic recurring theme within the data, its expression in accordance 
with democratic values has produced a commonly employed argument that the nation is 
characterized by democratic values upholding rights and liberties, which cannot be 
overridden at any circumstance. During an intense debate on a clause granting the police to 
ask individuals to remove face covering and its possible implications on the Muslim 
community, Caroline Flint has justified the measure on the grounds that even in a country 
such as Qatar such measures are implemented. In response to this argument, Normal Baker 
has stated that: 
With respect, if we are taking lessons in human rights and civil liberties 
from states in the Middle East, we need to be rather careful. We should base our 
system on what we believe correct—a tradition of civil liberties established over 
many hundreds of years. With due respect to Qatar—a country with which I am 
not familiar—the importation of its powers on human rights and civil liberties 
should be considered with some trepidation.   
      (Hansard HC Deb, 26 November 2001, vol. 375 col. 757, emphasis added) 
 As such, the rights narrative frames commitment to rights and liberties as part of the 
national identity, depicting the UK as one of the pioneering countries to assume those 
‘scripts of modernity’ (Krasner, 1999). This framing is also utilized against measures that 
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are deemed to culminate in discriminatory implementations, in which the tradition of 
multiculturalism that defines the nation is being exhorted:  
We need to take great care over the way in which we foster the wonderful 
race relations that we have in Britain's multicultural society. I came to this 
country at the age of nine as a first-generation immigrant. I have seen race 
relations develop to such an extent that we have a proud record to show not just in 
this country but to Europe and the rest of the world. That is why what happened in 
France did not happen here. We should take great care of that legacy, however, 
and when we pass laws that will disproportionately affect a section of our 
community, we should do so with the utmost care. 
           (Keith Vaz in Hansard HC Deb, 15 February 2006, vol. 442 col. 1451) 
 
 
Table 22. Rights Frame Solution Locations 
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Figure 15. Distribution of Rights Frame Solution Locations 
 Parallel to the makeup of solution location, the components of solution mechanism 
incorporate the workings of the rule of law and due process along with the functioning of 
democratic values. All of these codes are highly frequent throughout the parliamentary 
debates. While the notion of due process is enforced concurrently with legal obligations to 
counter exceptional measures, democratic values are underlined against those provisions 
seen to infringe fundamental rights and liberties. An instance of this discursive formulation 
can be found in the ATCSA 2001 debate on indefinite detention, as exceptionalism is 
contested with principles of the rule of law:  
We are supposed to be acting against terrorism and reassuring young people, 
whether they are Muslim or Catholic, about the fairness of British society and the 
things that we stand for, but the notion of internment without trial runs clean 
contrary to the idea of an effective war against terrorism. Even if it were possible 
to persuade some of us that in certain limited circumstances—much more 
prescribed than those in the Bill—internment was the only practical option, the 
notion of internment without judicial review would be completely unacceptable. 
        (Diane Abbott in Hansard HC Deb, 21 November 2001, vol. col.395, emphasis added) 
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 On the whole, the most frequently voiced mechanism has been striking a balance 
between rights and liberties on the one hand, security of the public on the other. Congruent 
to that of the security frame, the act of balancing has been by and large the most salient 
solution conveyed across all three parliamentary debates. The need to balance has also been 
reiterated by Mark Oaten during the Terrorism Act 2006 debates:  
We accept that there is a terrorist threat. The issue has always been about 
the level and balance of the response to the threat….I was very taken with the 
Prime Minister's remarks, at press conference after press conference, about civil 
liberty and the principle of freedom that we should be able to walk freely 
without fear of attack. Of course we support that. However, as politicians we 
also need to argue for other freedoms and civil liberties and for the important 
principle that we do not hand the terrorists a backhanded victory by doing away 
with our strong principles of justice. 
                      (Hansard HC Deb, 26 October 2005, vol. 438 col. 356) 
Oaten’s remarks are undergirded by a call for recognition of rights and liberties as national 
principles, even within the counter-terrorism context. As noted previously, this call for 
human rights echo the language of the security frame, with its depiction of terrorists as the 
enemy seeking to destroy those strong principles of ‘our’ civilization. The notion of 
balancing has also been pronounced in the parliamentary debates on the introduction of the 
TPIMs, where the Act has been promoted as a correction to the imbalance present in earlier 
provisions: 
It [the legislation] has very much at its heart our responsibility to protect the 
public, but it also recognises that there is a balance to be struck. We believe that 
the balance has previously been wrong and that it needs to be adjusted, as 
contemplated by the Bill, to ensure that our counter-terrorism measures are 
appropriate, necessary and focused on delivering safety and security in a way 
that is judged appropriate on the basis of the evidence. 
          (James Brokenshire Hansard HC Deb, 7 June 2011, vol. 529 col. 69, emphasis added) 
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Table 23. Rights Frame Solution Mechanisms 
 
Figure 16. Distribution of Rights Frame Solution Mechanisms 
Hence, solution mechanism is attributed to a successful balancing of security and 
human rights issues, based on democratic values and the proper functioning of due process. 
The final frame element of the rights policy frame is comprised of solution intersectionality. 
Congruent to problem intersectionality, this area is premised on multiculturalism as a 
response to concern over discrimination, which is once again interrelated to the issue-areas 
of immigration and religion. Within the rights framework, preference is given to enhancing 
good community relations and legislations that treats all individuals regardless of their 
religion as equal under counter-terrorism policies:  
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I have talked in detail to people from those faiths and asked them what 
they want and need most to give them the maximum protection. The maximum 
protection will come from legislation that treats all faiths equally, that does not 
give protection to a denomination of one faith and that ensures that the law is 
clear and does not restrict the freedom of speech, as some people fear might 
happen.  
(Simon Hughes in Hansard HC Deb, 26 November 2001, vol. 375 col. 683, emphasis 
added) 
 
Table 24. Rights Frame Solution Intersectionality 
 
Figure 17. Distribution of Rights Frame Solution Intersectionality 
 All in all, the rights policy frame is premised on an understanding of legal 
obligations under extant laws and international institutions, as well as to the tradition of civil 
liberties attributed to the conceptualization of national identity and national values. The UK 
is considered to be a leading country in the ‘civilized world’, in line with Risse and 
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Sikkink’s (1999) arguments, due to the historical status of fundamental rights. This policy 
frame problematizes exceptional measures and the extension of powers it bestows to both 
the executive and the police forces, pointing out how the logic of exceptionalism can 
culminate in the securitization of certain areas of political life, such as participation in 
demonstrations and the freedom of expression. One striking finding is the formulation of 
such arguments at a given conjunction, which resonate the security language of depicting 
‘the enemy’ as an existential other, seeking to destroy those values of modern democracies. 
In so doing, there is an evident thread within the rights framing of the problem along the 
lines of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ logic. In a similar vein, criticism of draconian and 
discriminatory measures on the grounds that they risk instigating more radicalization and 
even lead to creating ‘martyrs’ once again reflects the symbolism of the security discourse.  
5.3. Conclusion 
 In sum, the analysis of the UK parliamentary debates has illustrated the interplay 
between the two policy frames and their respective elements that are composed by various 
concepts, themes and arguments. These discursive cues are translated as codes in the 
analysis process in order to track the pattern of which cluster of codes work together to 
constitute the frame structure. The section has tried to elaborate on both the frequencies of 
these codes and what part of the greater network they partake in attributing meaning to 
events. The rights frame and the security frame confront, bargain, and negotiate with each 
other in the policy-making process by offering different vantage points to the problem at 
hand as well as how it is to be resolved. The security framework is imbued with notions of 
the enemy versus the victim, alarm of constant threat and emergency, and extremism as the 
ideological manifestation of terrorism that imperils the democratic values of the nation; 
whereas the rights framework is underscored by caution towards an environment of inflated 
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(in)security and the extension of powers it foresees, since these can not only suffocate rights 
and liberties but also induce discrimination against minority communities. As a result, where 
the security framework proposes greater exceptional powers and the necessary sacrifice of 
the normal functioning of due process, the rights narrative emphasizes legal obligations 
under the rule of law and international norms.  
However, this dichotomous positioning is only one part of the picture. Contrary to a 
mutually exclusive depiction of these policy frames, there are significant overlaps between 
the two as they borrow from the semiotic vocabulary of the other. One of the most salient 
tendencies is the acknowledgement and articulation of balancing as the most desirable 
solution mechanism in both policy frames. In all three legislative debates, the need to strike 
a right balance is uttered frequently, at times giving way to the criticism of earlier 
imbalances. Secondly, another area of overlap is the recognition of the moral legitimacy of 
human rights principles in both policy frames. This is not surprising in the rights framework, 
yet the security frame also frequently employs a reaffirmation of the commitment to these 
fundamental principles under ‘normal’ circumstances and borrows from the language of 
rights when arguing for greater security measures, as in the case of rights to security. This 
tendency is in line with Risse and Sikkink’s (1999) insights on how paying lip service to 
human rights is significant in international politics, as these norms have come to constitute a 
symbol of membership to the ‘civilized nations’. Such acknowledgement is usually followed 
by framing of an environment of emergency and exceptionalism, thereby justifying the 
suspension of these norms. At certain instances, the relationship between freedom and 
security is portrayed in such a way as to suggest that the only way to protect rights and 
liberties is to suspend them in fighting terrorism. Likewise, security is also conceptualized as 
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a ‘right’, by resorting to what Lazarus and Goold (2007) define as the normative power of 
rights talk.  
A final area of overlap takes place within the rights frame, as the security narrative is 
mimicked in order to argue against draconian measures that are deemed as instigating more 
insecurity. This tendency is not only traced in the representation of the enemy from a similar 
perspective as existentially different and therefore seeking to destroy western values, but 
also in cautioning against ramifications of policies rendered unjust by the public since they 
can trigger more threat to the nation rather than eliminating it. Thus, notwithstanding the 
fact that the allocation of a diagnosis and a prognosis among both frames are in opposition 
to one another in the parliamentary debates, through strategic framing they borrow the 
themes and arguments of the other in an attempt to persuade and evoke legitimacy. As these 
two narratives contest each other in the political arena, they tend to transform one another as 
well as transforming the notion of sovereignty as the ultimate authority to declare the state 
of exception in security matters, yet also one that is increasingly bound by the legitimacy 
that human rights convey.  
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Chapter 6. Democratization and National Sensibilities: Prevalent Policy Frames in the 
Turkish Legislative Process 
 
Try to eschew defining terror. Every definition is a limitation. Limitations bring about 
inadequacies. 
Orhan Eraslan, 29 June 2006
66
 
 The Turkish case offers interesting insights into the trade-off between security and 
human rights, as an EU candidate undergoing comprehensive transformations against a 
history of military tutelage and tradition of exceptional measures. While the post-9/11 world 
order resuscitated realist security concerns over human rights principles as leading 
democracies started resorting to illiberal measures, Turkey was heading towards a different 
direction with the impetus instigated by the EU accession process. Yet, the democratization 
that has fundamentally altered civil-military relations and endeavored to ingrain a rights-
based understanding to key legal texts came to a standstill in 2006 with the reverse 
amendments in the Anti-terror Law. The new extensive provisions have culminated in 
thousands of individuals imprisoned on ideological grounds, with new files abounding at the 
ECtHR. As a result of widespread national and international pressure, these problematic 
provisions have been brought to the parliamentary agenda once again during the reform 
packages in 2012-2013. During this period of oscillating security policies, a pattern of 
themes and salient concepts come to the fore in the making of key policies. Parallel to the 
British case, the Turkish parliamentary debates are predicated on the confrontation, 
bargaining, and negotiations between the security frame and rights frame in the making of 
security policies. The former is primarily embedded in a pervasive discourse of national 
identity, while the latter advocate further democratization and institutionalization of human 
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 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 Haziran 2006, Cilt: 126, 122. Birleşim, p. 32.  
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rights in the Turkish legal framework. In what follows, the relationships and frequencies of 
different discursive cues that come to form the two policy frames will be explicated in 
detail.  
 
Figure 18. Distribution of Key Words in Turkish Parliamentary Debates
67
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 Translation of key words in ascending order: çıkarlar, uygar, ahlak, denge, masum, propaganda, bölücü, din, 
vatan, haklar, bölünmez, terörist, irade, ilke, savaş, Kürt, olağanüstü, asker, jandarma, özgürlük, şehit, tehdit, 
polis, istisna, milli, terör, hükümet, güvenlik, görev, uluslararası, hukuk, millet.   
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 Before going into the multifarious structure of individual policy frames, an overall 
distribution of key words offers some hints on the content of discussions in the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly. As can be seen the term nation ranks the highest in the 
discussions, followed by law, international, duty, and security. From the high frequencies of 
these terms, one can extrapolate that security and duty to serve the nation is prioritized 
alongside legality and international standing. These terms are followed by security signifiers 
such as terror, threat, police, gendarme, soldier and martyr. These terms illustrate the 
pervasiveness of the security discourse underpinned by a perception of threat, and the role 
attributed to the police and the military officials. Unlike the British case, the military 
occupies a significant role in tackling terrorism within the borders of the country, especially 
in the south east region where clashes with PKK militants take place. As a result, the 
concept of martyrdom has acquired a central position within the debates on terrorism and 
counter-terrorism under the category of victim, often invoked for pursuing aggressive 
policies and extending the purview of security measures.  
 References to the Kurdish population is more recurrent than references to religion as 
such in relation to threat perception, although as will be explicated below, the distinction 
between what is deemed as separatist versus religious reactionary forms of terrorism has 
been a visible theme in the debates. The rights discourse is less vocal in the Turkish context, 
and tend to be mostly associated with international standing and legal obligations. Within 
the rights discourse, reference to liberties rank higher than reference to rights. Contrary to 
the UK parliamentary debates, the articulation of balance is less visible in the Turkish case, 
as can be seen from the low occurrence of the term. This has been one of the most important 
distinctions between the two cases, as will be elaborated in the frame structures. The 
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following section will delineate in detail the commonly employed themes, concepts and 
arguments that work to constitute the structure of policy frames. 
6.1. Structural Components of the Security Frame 
6.1.1. Framing the Problem 
 Congruent to the policy frames in the previous chapter, the Turkish parliamentary 
debates on counter-terrorism measures are also premised on the confrontation and 
bargaining among two predominant policy frames, namely the security frame and the rights 
frame. Within the security narrative the first component of the frame structure is problem 
roles. Similar to the UK parliamentary debates, the articulation of the enemy vis-à-vis the 
victim is a common theme in the Turkish debates. The conceptualization of the enemy in this 
context is once again an existential other and a threat to the nation, who defies the principles 
of the Republic and the indivisible unity of the nation. Parallel to the distinction between 
ethnic versus international terrorism in the British context, there is a differentiation being 
made with respect to separatist (bölücü) versus religious reactionary (irtica) terrorism, as a 
characteristic for defining the enemy. This distinction can be traced from MP Orhan 
Eraslan’s remark: “…[R]egulations regarding terror are conjunctural. Depending on the 
conjuncture religious reactionary terror might come to the fore, or separatist terror, or any 
other form of political terror.” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 June 2006, Cilt. 126, 122. 
Birleşim, p.57) Hence, it is suggested that the political conjuncture determines the 
classification of the enemy, to be designated by the sovereign (Schmitt, [1922] 1985). The 
major difference with the UK case is that terrorism associated with religious groups is 
considered to be an international phenomenon instigated primarily by ‘foreigners’ or those 
who have migrated from another country; whereas, in the Turkish case both forms are 
perceived as ‘enemies within’, yet often backed up by ‘foreign powers’. The argument that 
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terrorists are supported by foreign powers is implied in the comment made by Süleyman 
Sarıbaş on how the US deals with El Qaida as opposed to how it deals with Kurdish 
militants in Northern Iraq:  
   We all know the places that feed separatist terror are either those that lack 
any political authority or the authority in Northern Iraq that harbors evil plans for 
Turkey. Its support is there, the logistic supports and the camps are there… It has 
been three years since the US presence in Iraq, they haven’t made any move. 
Why haven’t they? Because they are doing everything in their power, with all 
their weapons and all their soldiers to eliminate El Qaida, what they call as ‘their 
terrorist’. They have every right to do so, but they should not allow the terrorist 
group of another nation to make camps…We ought to denounce an international 
understanding which states my terrorist is bad so I should kill them, but your 
terrorist is different, your terrorist should live.  
      (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 June 2006, Cilt. 126, 122. Birleşim, p. 35, emphasis added) 
 
 
Table 25. Security Frame Problem Roles 
 Another palpable difference with to the British case has been the recurrent concept of 
the victim, mostly manifested as a praising of martyrs who sacrificed their lives to protect 
the country from terrorist, instead of referring to ‘innocent law-abiding citizens’ as in the 
UK context. “I wish mercy upon those that have sacrificed their lives, running to the status 
of martyrdom without hesitation for the unity and health of our nation.” (Bekir Bozdağ in 
TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 June 2006, Cilt. 126, 122. Birleşim, p.45) Moreover, those 
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supporting rights and liberties are also framed as parties responsible for the problem, 
exemplified in İbrahim Özdoğan’s claim that “[a]ll they do is to take refuge in a tawdry 
arabesque rhetoric of liberties, and continue as such.” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 June 
2006, Cilt. 126. 122. Birleşim, p. 65) This position goes further to the extremes of 
suggesting that human rights organizations are directly supporting terrorist organizations:  
…[I]n Turkey, a significant number of organizations that operate in the field of 
human rights are found to be associated with illegal organizations by the 
intelligence service of the Republic of Turkey…[U]nfortunately, the concept of 
human rights in Turkey have been abandoned to the alleged representations by 
illegal organizations and marginal groups, failing to acquire sufficient interest 
from subsequent governments or an overwhelming majority of the population 
that form the public opinion.  
 (İbrahim Özdoğan in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 June 2006, Cilt.126, 122. Birleşim, p. 64)  
 A novel finding in the Turkish context has been the theme of foreign imposition, 
whereby certain policies particularly those that aim to extend the purview of rights and 
freedoms are framed as being imposed by ‘foreign powers’, usually against national interest. 
This perception is expressed through denouncing ECtHR decisions as a façade for 
conceding to the demands of the PKK, or negotiating with Abdullah Öcalan as the 
imprisoned leader of the organization. (Faruk Bal in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 4 April 2013, 
Cilt. 48, 90. Birleşim, p.586) One such example is questioning the intentions of European 
officials that point out to the role of the Turkish military in politics and the rights of the 
minorities:  
My friends, as you can see behind the position of the government there are some 
expectations of European states, of European officials. We must consider why 
they are so bothered by the status of the military. Why does this bother them? 
We are conducting various meetings with European officials. They tell us two 
things: firstly, the role of the military, and secondly the claim that minorities 
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cannot enjoy their religious rights in Turkey. Does the government accept such 
accusations? 
         (Onur Öymen in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 30 July 2003, Cilt. 25, 113. Birleşim, p.481) 
 
Figure 19. Distribution of Security Frame Problem Roles 
 The second component of the frame structure is constituted by assigning the problem 
locations. Congruent to the theoretical framework and parallel to parliamentary debates in 
the UK, the argument of necessity (or a situation entailing certain actions) is also present in 
the Turkish context, yet to a much lesser extent. An associated theme to that of necessity has 
been the pressing reality of terrorism, which signifies the depiction of a ‘reality’ 
necessitating further security measures. The presence of these two interconnected concepts 
reflect Agamben’s (2003) proposition that necessity creates its own laws. Nonetheless, the 
most frequently expressed problem location within the security frame has been propaganda, 
as embodying the ideological goals of terrorist groups. While in the UK context, emphasis is 
being made on extremism and the dissemination of extremist ideologies as a serious threat to 
security, in the Turkish context it is defined as the ideological propaganda of terrorist 
groups: “Last week you [the government] have abolished any barriers against propaganda, 
and enabled the terrorist organization to make its own propaganda. You have legalized 
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terror and speeches made by the terrorist organization; you have put an end to the 
organization being associated with blood, death, and trouble, but instead promoted its 
internalization by the society.” (Enver Erdem in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 17 April 2013, 
Cilt: 49, 93. Birleşim, p. 95, emphasis added) This quote is an instance of securitization of 
freedom of expression, where the circulation of dissident ideas are construed as possible 
sites to be abused by terrorist groups, and therefore to be firmly restricted under the auspices 
of the security apparatus. A similar remark has been made by MP Mehmet Şandır, who 
argues that freedom of expression is being manipulated by terrorist for making propaganda: 
 …[T]he main aim of the separatist terrorist organization is propaganda. It can 
pursue this through guns, it can pursue this through publications, or other 
means. It aims to impose its own views to the state it confronts, with the weapon, 
threat, violence, or other means it chooses. That is the primary aim of 
propaganda. For this reason, international laws also foresee restrictions on 
freedom of expression on the grounds of unity of the nation, unity of the 
territory, and public order.  
(Mehmet Şandır in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 11 April 2013, Cilt.48, 91. Birleşim, p. 747, 
emphasis added) 
 A parallel problem location designated within the security frame is the sphere of 
demonstrations and protests. Epitomized in the problematic amendments in 2006, attending 
demonstrations have become evidence for being treated as a member of a terrorist 
organization, regardless of actual involvement within the organizational structure. The 
securitization of the right to protest has materialized throughout the parliamentary debates, 
and still finds expression in the recent debates. As exemplified by Hakkı Köylü’s stance, it is 
asserted that an individual might ‘become’ a terrorist by simply attending a demonstration. 
(Adalet Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi, 14 February 2012, p.43) Likewise, the act of 
protesting has been framed as a site of turmoil and vandalism during the debates, in favor of 
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the notorious clause on charging demonstrators as members of a terrorist organization. Such 
objection was voiced by MP Faruk Bal, who has pointed out that protestors who resist 
security forces and invoke violence will get away with the damage they have caused if the 
Anti-terror Law is to be amended. (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 30 June 2012, Cilt. 26, 128. 
Birleşim, p.41) As put by Jackson (2005), these instances of framing issues pertaining to 
opposition and protest as national security matters are indicative of disciplining domestic 
society through marginalizing dissent.  
 
Table 26. Security Frame Problem Locations 
 
 
Figure 20. Distribution of Security Frame Problem Locations 
 The third pillar of the frame structure is comprised by problem mechanisms, 
referring to those processes that are taken to generate or reproduce the source of the 
problem. The composition of this element is quite similar to that of the security frame in the 
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UK parliamentary debates, yet with different frequencies. The most visible argument that 
underpins the problem mechanism is that the government has been going soft on security 
measures. Given the historical stronghold of the military and the ingrained security culture 
within the political life in Turkey, the prevalence of this argument within the security 
discourse is anticipated vis-à-vis ongoing thorough reforms that aim to mitigate military 
tutelage. An example of this stance can be found in the discussion of the recent reform 
packages in 2013:  
In a period of negotiating with terror, ceasefire with Kandil, ceasefire with İmralı, 
you are using these [human rights] as a pretext for freedom of expression, for 
humane values, for the rulings of the ECtHR; and thereby conceding to terror and 
terrorists. You are conceding to the terrorist organization that threatens the life 
and property of the people of Turkey, that threatens our most valuable possession, 
our life, with force and violence; and we do not know how far this will go.  
 (Faruk Bal in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 4 April 2013, Cilt. 48, 90. Birleşim, p. 586)68 
This tendency is coupled with the argument that terrorist groups are abusing rights and 
liberties. Similar to the argument in the UK context that terrorists are abusing the open 
society their country is built upon, it is suggested that the reforms and the extension of rights 
in Turkey are being taken advantage of by terrorists groups. One instance of this reasoning 
can be observed in the following excerpt:  
…Therefore, if there is a phenomenon of terrorism haunting Turkey, a 
phenomenon that finds it easier to maneuver, that finds it easier to conduct 
terrorist acts and terrorists crimes by using the shield of democratization, of 
freedom of expression, of fundamental rights and liberties within the purview of 
EU harmonization laws, then we will stand up and say: Turkey’s indivisible 
unity, protection of the public order, Turkey’s interests and unity cannot be 
sacrificed for any fundamental rights and liberties.  
                                                          
68
 İmralı is the island where the leader of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan is being held imprisoned for life, while 
Kandil is the name of a mountain area that is believed to accomodate camps of PKK fighters.  
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(Mehmet Eraslan in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 June 2006, Cilt. 126, Birleşim 122, p.94, 
emphasis added) 
  Hence, the security frame is premised on an understanding of problem mechanism 
whereby granting rights are considered as concessions to terrorist organization (generally 
connoting the PKK), who in turn utilize such freedoms for pursuing their own criminal 
conduct. The other two themes that constitute this frame element are firstly the generic code 
threat/urgency/emergency signifying the perception of an elevated sense of threat, and the 
conceptualization of rights as a burden to security policies. What is striking about the latter 
is the remarkably low occurrence in the Turkish context as opposed to the UK legislative 
process. While in the British case human rights principles are construed as a burden to 
tackling with terrorism effectively in operational terms, the Turkish context is more imbued 
in a nationalist discourse rather than efficiency concerns.  
 
Table 27. Security Frame Problem Mechanisms 
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Figure 21. Distribution of Security Frame Problem Mechanisms 
 Finally, the element of problem intersectionality is premised on two separate issues 
that are perceived as being interwoven with terrorism, namely religion and organized crime. 
These issue-areas are identical with the UK case, yet once again with much lower 
frequencies. Particularly the notion of religion has been much more salient as a problem in 
the British political rhetoric and still an ongoing issue. Although, the overlap of religion and 
terror is less discernable in the political discussion in Turkey, it usually manifests itself with 
respect to the practices of fundamentalist groups and how they threaten the principle of 
secularism as well as public order and security. For instance, the warning of Fatma Nur 
Serter that the government is giving way to the corruption of Islam by seizing power from 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs and conferring it to dervish lodges “operating in shady 
corners and fostering hatred,” is indicative of this tendency. (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 17 
April 2013, Cilt. 49, 93. Birleşim, p.112) 
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Figure 22. Distribution of Security Frame Problem Intersectionality 
6.1.2. Framing the Solution: 
 Against this backdrop of the diagnosis, the security frame sets on to formulate a 
consonant prognosis. Once again, the first element of the solution structure is composed by 
the roles attributed to bringing about a solution. Within this element, there is an emphasis 
made on the government’s primary duty to protect the state and provide security. The 
interesting dimension in this argument has been the articulation of the state and its 
indivisible unity as the main object of security, where public security comes second or as a 
byproduct of protecting the state. This is evident in Ahmet İyimaya’s claim that “one ought 
to balance the state, democracy, and human rights” when making reforms within the 
purview of the EU-accession process. (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt. 85, 
61. Birleşim, p. 272) In a similar vein, extending the scope of rights vis-à-vis counter-
terrorism policies is perceived as a threat to the unity of the state, as put by Faruk Bal who 
accuses the government of “…using the parliament as an instrument for dismantling the 
state.” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 4 April 2013, Cilt. 48, 90. Birleşim, p. 663)  
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Furthermore, the second most frequent code is the role expected from the police and 
the military. Unlike the UK context, counter-terrorism measures in Turkey are not only 
expected to be undertaken by the security force, but also the military due to the ongoing 
clashes in the South East region, with the objective of ensuring the unity of the state. This 
tendency is observable in the comment made by Süleyman Sarıbaş: “Dear friends, the 
motivation of our armed forces fighting terror must be ensured… the desire and enthusiasm 
of those that struggle for the indivisible unity of this country should not be disheartened.” 
(TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 June 2006, Cilt. 126, 122. Birleşim, p. 34)  On the contrary, 
attributing roles to the executive power in solving terror-related problems has not been 
expressed contrary to the British case, which might be explained by the continuing primacy 
of the military in terrorism, understood within the logic of war.  
On the other hand, the notion of international community once again appears within 
the security frame connoting shared identities and interests among different states, 
underlining the importance of international cooperation in fighting terrorism: “A need for 
establishing a system among states that share a similar understanding towards terror acts 
has arisen… [T]he prospective cooperation among states on counter-terrorism must be 
hastened.” (Haluk İpek in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 June 2006, Cilt. 126, 122. Birleşim, 
p. 26, emphasis added) The notion of international community reflects Constructivist 
conceptualization of security communities sharing similar security outlook and interests 
(Adler & Barnett, 1998; Jepperson et. al., 1996). This tendency is also associated with 
referring to security practices in western states as a model for proposed provisions in 
Turkey, as represented by the code example of civilized societies. During a period of reverse 
amendments in 2006, the overbroad terrorism definition has been justified by referring to the 
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national legislations in other European countries, in particular the United Kingdom: “I know 
that individuals arrested as a terrorist suspect can be held up to 28 days in the United 
Kingdom, with more in-depth investigations getting to the bottom of the cases; but it’s 24 
hours for us. You arrest a terrorist suspect or a criminal and you have to release him in 24 
hours without being able to even verify his identity…” (Mehmet Eraslan in TBMM Tutanak 
Dergisi, 29 June 2006, Cilt. 126, 122. Birleşim, p.58) A similar manifestation of this 
tendency is present in the following plea for greater security measures:  
In counter-terrorism Europe have adopted such a fierce language, they are 
…using the term of ‘combating’ terrorism…which means clash. When there is 
an attack on their own people, their own citizens, the European mentality 
combats, it clashes; whereas, you welcome them and make peace. Then you 
associate this position with the Convention on Human Rights…In America, let 
alone making terrorist propaganda, with the mere mention of Al Qaida on a 
phone call, in a message, you will find yourself directly in Guantanamo.  
      (Faruk Bal in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 4 April 2013, Cilt. 48, 90. Birleşim, p. 663) 
 
Table 28. Security Frame Solution Roles 
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Figure 23. Distribution of Security Frame Solution Roles 
The second solution component is solution location, comprised by the interrelated 
codes of national sensibilities, right to security, and necessary limits to rights and liberties. 
Similar to the British conjuncture, the argument of right to security also appears in Turkish 
legislative debates, adopting the language of rights in promoting security policies. This 
strategy can be traced in the following comment: “We know that all liberties are tied to the 
right to life, they are for people who are alive, but terror obliterates the right to life…What 
freedom does a dead person need?” (Cemil Çiçek in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 June 2006, 
Cilt. 126, 122. Birleşim, p. 44, emphasis added) Once again, the rights language is adopted 
within the security narrative in order to invoke normative power (Lazarus & Goold, 2007). 
On the other hand, a strong concern over national sensibilities comes to the fore in 
discussions of counter-terrorism policies conveying notions such as the principles of the 
Republic, religious values, the indivisible unity of the nation, not merely in terms of land but 
also national belonging. The concept of national sensibilities as it materializes in the Turkish 
parliamentary debates is imbued in nationalist motifs that are placed above rights and 
liberties: “We claim to re-invoke death penalty and hang those that insult our flag, those that 
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accuse our nation for murder, and those that want to destroy our state…What is wrong with 
that? Isn’t this a right in every democratic country?” (Adnan Şefik Çirkin in TBMM 
Tutanak Dergisi, 11 April 2013, Cilt. 48, 91. Birleşim, p.812) Hence, as noted by Buzan 
(1983), those symbols pertaining to national identity and the official ideology of the state 
constitute important elements in the understanding of national security. While the state is 
depicted as the main object of security, its ideology predicated on national values 
circumscribes sensitive issues to be protected at all cost. 
 
Table 29. Security Frame Solution Locations 
 A congruent theme is necessary limits to rights and liberties, which differs from 
necessary sacrifice that has been visible in the UK parliamentary debates connoting the 
necessity of sacrificing rights and liberties whose status have already been established and 
acknowledged by political actors. Necessary limits entail restricting the purview of those 
newly introduced rights and liberties which do not enjoy such an established position in the 
Turkish context, but are rather perceived as possible impediments to the primacy of national 
interest. This position has been taken up by MP İsmail Köse, who contends that a necessary 
limit should be placed upon human rights principles as a bulwark for national sensibilities. 
His comments echo Buzan (1983) is illustrating how national identity is a critical element of 
the security problematique:   
 242 
 
Now in Turkey, we have faced with a horrible demand to have the right to 
insult state institutions, the state’s view of its establishments, and feelings of 
hatred towards the state. We perceive freedom of expression to be our people’s 
rights to express their own opinions and beliefs, without insulting….[W]e say, 
yes to freedom of opinion and freedom of expression, but if your freedom of 
expression voices ideas of separatism, or ideas that provoke hatred in a period 
where our Turkey carries certain sensibilities… While expressing an opinion, 
you should not abuse religious sensibilities shared by 99 percent of the 
population, or issues of social class, through separatist ideas… In other words, 
you should express your opinions in a befitting way for a human being.  
    (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt. 85, 61. Birleşim, p.258, emphasis added) 
 
Figure 24. Distribution of Security Frame Solution Locations 
 A third pillar of the solution frame is solution mechanisms, which are parallel to 
those found in the UK case, namely reaffirming commitment to rights and liberties, 
balancing, and prevention. One major difference is that balancing human rights and security 
measures is not as pronounced as the primary solution mechanism, as was the case in the 
previous context. An instance of this theme is elaborated by Hüseyin Güler: “Without 
conceding from human rights, tolerance and traditions, we should fight terror in the best 
possible way. This is a matter of equilibrium…” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 June 2006, 
Cilt. 126, 122. Birleşim, p. 55) The frequency of balancing lags behind the theme of 
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reaffirming commitment to rights and liberties which is once again conditioned upon 
nationalist sentiments:  
        As a sign of state’s respect for human rights and for its own citizens, all of 
us wish to see progress made in the rule of law and commitment to human rights 
principles. Fundamental rights and freedoms should take place in the law 
extensively, revoking limitations of the freedom of expression and opinion. 
However,….[e]very state takes into consideration its own sensitivities and 
special conditions…. The reason Article 8 has remained on the agenda is 
because supporters of terrorism seek refuge in the excuse of freedom of 
expression.  
(Ali Günay in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt.85, 61. Birleşim, p. 276-278, 
emphasis added)  
 
 
Table 30. Security Frame Solution Mechanisms 
 
Figure 25. Distribution of Security Frame Solution Mechanisms 
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Lastly, solution intersectionality comes into play as the final frame element in the 
security frame, signifying those terrains that are associated with solving the issue of 
terrorism.  A common theme with the British security frame has been the resort to public 
opinion, as a sphere that is interconnected to the formulation of counter-terrorism policies. 
On the other hand, a novel site of solution intersectionality has been socio-economic 
development, indicating the need for investing in the south east region as a counter-terrorism 
strategy, to drain the financial support of the terrorist organization: “The problem is to make 
our children the citizens of our own nation. One of the most important causes of the problem 
is the unresolved issue of unemployment. By overcoming this issue, the source of terrorism 
will also wither.” (Commission Report of the Ministry of Interior, 27 Nisan 2006, Esas 
no:1/1194, Karar no: 40, p. 10)  
Cross-cutting other themes and concepts in the security frame, the most pronounced 
intersectionality with counter-terrorism has been the realm of nationalism. In the Turkish 
context, nationalist narrative has permeated the security discourse intensely, also palpable in 
the aforementioned concepts of necessary limits and national sensibilities. Therefore, such a 
framework reflects Buzan’s (1983) conceptualization of state ideology and national identity 
as inextricable elements in the security sector, representing the idea of a nation and shared 
values as the objects of security. The juxtaposition of these two terrains is demonstrated by 
claims such as “…there is no problem of terrorism in Turkey, there is a problem of 
separatism, and terror is a product of it,” which opts to frame the issue along the lines of 
national identity and unity of the nation. (İbrahim Özdoğan in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 
June 2006, Cilt. 126, 122. Birleşim, p.48) Another lucid instance of this tendency is 
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presented by MP Metin Lütfi Baydar’s following comments that construe the issue of 
terrorism along the contours of denouncing nationalist values:  
…[W]e have two roads ahead of us since the letter by the person imprisoned to 
life in İmralı has been read. First one is the road that will be pursued by those 
who belong to the Turkish nation,… who are on the side of the Great Leader 
Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,… those who are committed to the Republic 
wholeheartedly and those who have no problems with the Turkish flag or the 
Turkish language. The second one is the road for those who do not want to 
belong to the Turkish nation, who feel proud of going back to their genetic code, 
… who do not like the Great Leader Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and want to 
get rid of him,… who do not want the Turkish flag nor the Turkish language. 
        (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 11 April 2013, Cilt. 48, 91. Birleşim, p.832, emphasis added)  
 
 
Table 31. Security Frame Solution Intersectionality 
 
Figure 26. Distribution of Security Frame Solution Intersectionality 
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 On the whole, the security frame in the Turkish context conveys certain similarities 
as well as differences from the UK security frame. In constructing the enemy as the 
existential other posing a threat to national security and national values, a distinction is 
being made between separatist versus religious reactionary terrorism. One significant aspect 
in the problem roles is an understanding of rights and liberties being a form of foreign 
imposition that jeopardize national interests.  Moreover, propaganda comes to the fore as a 
predominant location for the problem of terrorism, signifying primarily the ideology of the 
Kurdish movement, as opposed to the concept of extremism in the British case involving 
extremist religious views of minority groups. While the government is perceived as going 
soft on the issue of terrorism with the reform process initiated by the EU-accession, such 
rights and liberties are in turn found to be susceptible to abuses by terrorist groups. Building 
on this formulation of the problem, the security frame attributes substantial responsibility to 
the police as well as the military in tackling the issue of terrorism, which highlights the 
continuing prevalence of the role of the military and the logic of war, owing to the ongoing 
clashes in the south east region. One of the most visible tendencies has been the intertwined 
relationship of counter-terrorism and nationalist discourse, also manifesting itself in notions 
such as national sensibilities, which are construed as grounds for limiting the scope of rights. 
The security practices within the international community are also invoked as justifications 
for limiting the purview of rights, with reference to the example of ‘civilized’ societies. On 
the whole, it can be argued that within the security narrative fighting terror has been framed 
as guarding the state as the main object of security, with the notion of the indivisibility of its 
land and unity of the nation. 
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6.2. Structural Components of the Rights Frame 
6.2.1. Framing the Problem: 
 Notwithstanding the predominance of the security discourse within the Turkish 
political culture, it does not stand without a challenge in the legislative process. Especially 
with the impetus provided by the EU candidacy and the prospect of membership, a language 
of rights has become significantly vocal, pushing for further democratization initiatives. At 
this juncture, the structure and positioning of the rights policy frame becomes critical in the 
analysis of the language of law-making, in order to illustrate its building blocks and how 
such composition endeavors to challenge the security narrative.  
Hence, the first element that makes up the problem framing is problem roles, 
associated with the extended powers granted to the police and military, as well as boundaries 
of executive discretion. An illustration of how powers granted to the police are 
problematized as being misused on an arbitrary and illegitimate basis can be found in the 
following excerpt: “Now, new policemen will be assigned. We have seen how they have 
been assigned…And they will ensure public order, ensure our safety! We have seen in the 
last few days, for instance how they have battered a citizen in Istanbul. What was his crime? 
He has been lynched in front of his family for speaking Kurdish…” (Sırrı Sakık in TBMM 
Tutanak Dergisi, 3 July 2012, Cilt. 27, 131. Birleşim, p.51) Similar concerns have been 
raised with regards to the executive powers during the recent debates in 2012: “Although the 
parliament is open, although the relevant commissions are holding meetings, owing to 
utilization of rule by decree granted by the Generals during September 12, there is enough 
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exceptional powers to legislate despite the parliament being open.” 69 (Özgür Özel in 1 July 
2012, Tutanak Dergisi, Cilt. 26, 129. Birleşim, p.255)  
 
Table 32. Rights Frame Problem Roles 
 
Figure 27. Distribution of Rights Frame Problem Roles 
 One interesting finding that materialized from the data has been the distinction 
between actual terrorists as opposed to those innocent individuals that have been falsely 
accused, as represented by the code real terrorists vs. falsely accused. Although low in 
frequency, this line of reasoning has been expressed strongly on several accounts during the 
2012-2013 parliamentary debates. This historical conjuncture is significant because it is 
marked by the previously mentioned Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, targeting figures thought 
to be affiliated with the ancien régime of the Kemalist ideology, on the grounds of plotting 
to overthrow the government by force. The irony lies in the fact that these individuals used 
                                                          
69
 September 12 refers to the notorious military coup staged in 1980.  
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to be closely involved with the Republican state apparatus, some belonging to the higher 
ranks of the armed forces, finding themselves suddenly in the same category with the PKK 
fighters as enemies of the polity. Hence, this concept represents how the security discourse 
has also permeated the rights narrative through the articulation of the enemy as the 
existential other, in this case referring to the ‘real terrorists’ who do not conform to the 
principles of the Republic and the unity of the nation and therefore deserve to be subject to 
draconian measures. This stance has given way to an eccentric political discourse, whereby 
contentious counter-terrorism laws are criticized not because they infringe freedoms by 
silencing opposition, but because they falsely accuse some part of the population:  
 We hereby declare: Abolish the Law on Fight Against Terrorism (no. 3713). 
The irony is here: Since there is no fight against terrorism anymore in this 
country, since there is negotiation instead of fighting with the PKK terrorist 
organization that has inflicted so much harm upon this country, caused thousands 
of deaths, and taken on violence as their primary aim; therefore, there is no need 
for the Anti-terror Law that was primarily enacted to counter the PKK. Now the 
Anti-terror Law is not utilized to fight terrorism, but instead to attack those 
supporters of the Republic, supporters of Atatürk, those in favor of the modernity 
of this country, of its progressiveness and future…[H]ence the Anti-terror Law is 
now futile. It does not fight terror, it negotiates with it. It fights the people, the 
people have suffered more from these articles…On the other hand, the Anti-
terror Law does carry many antidemocratic provisions.  
(Dilek Akagün Yılmaz in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 10 April 2013, Cilt. 48, 90. Birleşim p. 
658, emphasis added) 
 Moving on from these designated problem roles, the second component that makes up 
the problem is the solution location, constituted by the concordant codes lessons from the 
past and infamous policy. Equivalent to the themes found in the UK parliamentary debates, 
lessons from the past and infamous policy tend to work together to underscore those 
practices in the past that have engendered grave human rights violations. Such narrative of 
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invoking examples from history is demonstrated by an account of emergency measures and 
the executive powers it has bestowed during the 1990s: “…in 1993, with the extant Anti-
terror Laws the governor of Batman has assembled a private army. They have imported 
weapons without the military, from Bulgaria from China; and with the private security force 
he has established he fought terrorism. But of course later, this governor has been tried, and 
nobody stood up for him.” (Ersönmez Yarbay, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 29 June 2006, Cilt. 
126, 122. Birleşim, p.92) In a similar vein, an instance of recalling contentious experiences 
as lessons from the past in order to demonstrate their underlying problem is also expressed 
with respect to consecutive military coups and the concurrent emergency measures: 
 …[S]ince the transitioning to the multi-party system, the parliament has been 
closed down, the governments overthrown and emergency rule established by 
military coups and memorandums every eight to ten years.  During this period, 
there have been decisions to ban and collect a great number of publications, 
whether they are books, journals, or other published documents…We would like 
to start off with a clean slate and regulate such decisions in a healthy manner. 
            (Sadullah Ergin in Adalet Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi, 30 May 2012, p.31-32) 
Interestingly, the theme of infamous policy has also been utilized with reference to practices 
in the post-9/11 era, referring to the reverse processes in liberal democracies: “Now they are 
also resorting to the excuse of September 11; in the West and in the United States certain 
restrictions are being enacted following September 11. These are bad examples my dear 
friends.” (Mehmet Bekaroğlu in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt.85, 61. 
Birleşim, p. 287) 
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Table 33. Rights Frame Problem Locations 
 
 
Figure 28. Distribution of Rights Frame Problem Locations  
 The third pillar of the problem configuration is once again constituted by problem 
mechanisms, as those dynamics that generate or reproduce the problem. The most 
pronounced concept within this category belongs to the generic code on threatening rights 
and liberties, which work in tandem with specific fields of human rights such as freedom of 
expression, demonstration/protest, and freedom of the press. Especially the latter has been a 
repeatedly voiced concern in the Turkish context, as counter-terrorism legislation has tended 
to impose heavy restrictions to journalists and publications in general: “…[T]he extant Anti-
terror Law in Turkey is at a point of seriously undermining freedoms, limiting freedom of 
the press…On April 22nd there is the KCK trial, the press trial. More than 40 press workers 
are being tried, not for being press workers but for being ‘units of the KCK’. However, if 
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you take a look at the accusations, they are being tried for the news they have made…When 
you see the proceedings there, you can observe what has become of the situation for press 
freedoms; this is a serious problem.” (Sebahat Tuncal in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 17 April 
2013, Cilt. 49, 93. Birleşim, p.44) Similar remarks have been made with respect to freedom 
of expression, and its indispensable position in a democratic society:  
Dear friends, if we want democracy, if we talk about democracy, the 
inextricable element of this democracy is freedom of expression. Why freedom 
of expression my dear friends? Because democracy is the will of the people. 
There needs to be discussion in order to figure out what people think, what is the 
will of the people, in other words, what is public interest according to the 
people? They say ‘There are threats against this country, we have special 
conditions.’ It’s true, there are threats against every country, we have our own 
particular threats…but protecting democracy is only possible through democratic 
means. 
(Mehmet Bekaroğlu in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt. 85, 61. Birleşim, 
p.286-287) 
 Congruent to the UK parliamentary debates, two other concepts come to the fore 
within the contours of the rights frame, namely vague definition and exceptionalism. The 
problem associated with vague definition of terrorism has been uttered by MP Sırrı Sakık, 
who argues that, “[e]very individual who goes on the streets to demand democratic rights are 
treated as ‘terrorists’, you accuse everyone for being ‘terrorist’ and try to silence people by 
arresting them.” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 3 July 2012, Cilt. 27, 131. Birleşim, p.51) This 
comment not only conveys a concern over the vague definition of terrorism that risks 
extending beyond its borders, but also how the term has been adopted by the government in 
order to silence dissident views. This tendency has been reiterated by MP Salih Fırat, who 
maintains that:  
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…[f]or some reason there are two magic words in Turkey: ‘terror’ and 
‘organization’. Whoever we dislike, whatever group we dislike, we put the words 
‘terror’ and ‘organization’ before it to imprison them in jail; in groups, not 
individually. What are their crimes it is not known, people do not know what 
they are being charged by from the accusations. There are ten thousands of 
people arrested in this way, there are politicians, members of organizations.  
                  (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1 July 2012, Cilt. 26, 129. Birleşim, p. 264) 
The voicing of such concerns vindicate the perturbing implementation of counter-terrorism 
strategies, which securitize the democratic sphere of deliberation and oppositional politics, 
moving them beyond the functioning of normal politics (Buzan, 1998). Hence, these 
criticisms point out to the workings of the state of exception and how those groups deemed 
as the enemy are to be eliminated from the political arena in Schmittean terms. 
 
Table 34. Rights Frame Problem Mechanisms 
The final component of the problem mechanism is once again the salient concept of 
exceptionalism. The enduring problem of exceptionalism in the Turkish political scene, 
premised on extraordinary measures is problematized in the following way: 
State of emergency has been obliterating open society. Prohibitions and 
limitations are further restricting the already limited scope of democracy, rights 
and liberties we have in this country. Of course also democratic countries resort 
to states of emergency and martial laws; however, for a state of 
emergency…there needs to be an actual emergency, one that can end in a 
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reasonable period of time. Now, we are sustaining the state of emergency, but we 
don’t ask why we have not been able to tackle this problem for twenty five years. 
The mentality, the team that has prepared this draft has placed this notion 
acknowledging the fact that emergency situation will last for another twenty five, 
fifty years; instead of being revoked, it is being preserved.  
(Mehmet Bekaroğlu in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 26 March 2002, Cilt. 90, 78. Birleşim, p.88, 
emphasis added) 
Therefore, the institutionalization of the state of exception has been addressed by the 
rights frame, as one of the primary causes for violating human rights as well as democratic 
principles. Moreover, in relation to the recent waves of mass trials involving terrorist 
charges, such as the Ergenekon trial, the Balyoz trial, or the KCK cases, the unreasonably 
long pre-trial detention periods have been criticized as it takes place in the Criminal 
Procedure Law: “Pre-trial detention in Turkey is for ten years. Leaving aside other crimes, 
but for heavy crimes and terror-related crimes, we can say that the upper limit is ten years. 
Where else in the world do they have a detention period of ten years, can you or our 
bureaucrat friends please explain?” (Turgut Dibek in Adalet Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi, 23 
May 2012, p.18) This question seeks to draw attention to how principles of rule of law are 
being corroded by a culture of exceptionalism. 
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Figure 29. Distribution of Rights Problem Mechanisms 
 Finally, the last strand of problem framing is taken up by problem intersectionality, 
primarily represented by matters regarding civil-military relations, which have had a 
tremendous bearing upon the Turkish political scene for decades due to the role attributed to 
Turkish armed forces as the vanguards of the Republic. The presence of the military has 
manifested itself in different institutions of the state, one such important site being State 
Security Courts as the quintessence of the state of exception. These judicial authorities that 
included military officers within its cadres have addressed cases involving national security 
matters. While the issue of civil-military relations has been an oft-cited concern for the 
rights frame in the Turkish context, States Security Courts have been one area to voice these 
concerns: “State Security Courts are the product of emergency situations. Turkey needs to 
normalize. We feel the need to abolish State Security Courts, we have made the necessary 
Constitutional reforms to remove the military members of these courts.” (Mehmet Ali Şahin 
in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt. 85, 61. Birleşim, p.333) 
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Figure 30. Frequency of Rights Frame Problem Intersectionality 
6.2.2. Framing the Solution: 
The rights frame constructs the problem upon the entrenched culture of 
exceptionalism in Turkey as a relic of the military presence in the politics, while pointing 
out the systemically carried out rights violations as a byproduct of counter-terrorism, most 
profoundly affecting freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and principles of rule of 
law. Against this backdrop, formulation of a solution is being offered by the rights frame 
grounded in international norms and prospects of democracy. Parallel to the UK policy 
frames, the solution roles involve international institutions as the promoters of international 
norms. This theme reverberates throughout the parliamentary debates with reference to the 
European Union and the European Court of Human Rights. An example of the former can 
be found in the following comment: “…[f]or us what is important is the right of our people 
to express their free opinion. That is the priority and European Union [accession process] is 
a result of this.  (Feridun Fikret Baloğlu in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 15 July 2003, Cilt. 22, 
106. Birleşim, p.67) 
             An interesting finding within the human rights narrative has been recurrent 
references being made to the example of ‘civilized societies’ as a role model for Turkey. 
Thus, as suggested by Risse and Sikkink (1999)the value in upholding human rights is 
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framed in terms of the legitimacy bestowed by being part of the ‘civilized world’, owing to 
the normative power of the concept. One example is the endorsement of freedom of 
expression, because it is “the general acknowledgement in the civilized world.” (İ. Sühan 
Özkan in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt. 85, 61. Birleşim, p. 266) 
Likewise, the principle of pluralism is evaluated in terms of its connotations with a 
perception of ‘civilization’: “Modern civilized societies are pluralist. Societies are 
composed of people that convey different religions, sects, races, social classes, regional 
differences, political views, and different mentalities. In a society with such a disposition, 
the aim is to ensure that people live in peace, in a way that brings together their differences.” 
(Aydın Tümen in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt. 85, 61. Birleşim, p. 253, 
emphasis added)  
 
Table 35. Rights Frame Solution Roles 
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Figure 31. Distribution of Rights Frame Solution Roles 
In the solution locations, the legal dimension of international norms comes to the 
fore once again, echoing the British rights frame. In other words, the issue of human rights 
has been framed in terms of legal obligations entailed by a body of international law and 
international institutions: “Turkey has accepted the European Convention on Human Rights 
with its own free will and has undertaken its requirements. This means that Turkey has 
undertaken to regulate its national legislation in line with the ECtHR rulings.” (Cemil Çiçek 
in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 23 December 2003, Cilt. 3, 26. Birleşim, p. 363) Although much 
less visible than an understanding of legal obligation, the concept of universal morality does 
make an appearance in the Turkish parliamentary debates especially during the discussions 
on the harmonization packages. This position is typified in denouncing torture and inhuman 
treatment, with an emphasis made on the inalienable rights of individuals qua human beings: 
“The practice of torture which does not concur with human honour, is a crime against 
humanity. It is unacceptable for human beings as the most honorable creature to be exposed 
to emotional torment…or physical torment, even if they have committed a crime.” (Fahrettin 
Kukaracı in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 26 March 2002, Cilt. 90, 78. Birleşim, p. 46) A notion 
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of democratic values accompanies the utterance of commitment to international norms, 
albeit considerably less pronounced than the British context. The reason for this discrepancy 
is due to the long-established status of democratic principles in the UK, also as a source of 
national pride, contrary to the nascent state of democracy in Turkey. The rhetoric of 
democratic values is evident in the following remark: “…[i]t is not possible to conceive of a 
public order outside of democratic traditions.” (Mehmet Bekaroğlu in TBMM Tutanak 
Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt. 85, 61. Birleşim, p.286) 
 
Table 36. Rights Frame Solution Locations 
 
Figure 32. Distribution of Rights Frame Solution Locations 
 In the structure of the solution mechanisms, the concept of democratization appears 
as the most frequently designated code for solving the problem of human rights violations. 
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This notion finds expression first in the earlier parliamentary debates on EU harmonization 
laws, which are considered as “important new steps in the path to democratization.” (Aydın 
Tümen in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt. 85, 61. Birleşim, p.252) As an 
ongoing process yet to be achieved, plea for greater democratization has been voiced in the 
context of the peace process with the Kurdish population: “Let’s get involved together for 
the democratization of this country, for this process of silencing guns, ending the conflict 
and shedding of blood, not as the field of the Justice and Development Party but as the 
desires of seventy six million citizens… and fight for freedom and democracy together.” 
(Abdullah Levent Tüzel in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 4 April 2013, Cilt.48, 90. Birleşim, p. 
626) An associated theme has been the conceptualization of democracy and commitment to 
human rights as the requirements of modernity. This line of reasoning can be found in the 
following remark that emphasizes the principles of the rule of law:  
         Every step that is to be taken in the direction of civilization is a 
requirement for this parliament and involves Turkey, because this parliament is 
Turkey’s parliament. Therefore, I hope we will not face serious problems in our 
work, but I would like to repeat again that, law is not anything, law is not 
everything every time. The important thing is the implementation of law, the 
judiciary that will implement the law, the members of the judiciary should 
absolutely execute the law in line with the requirements of our age and the 
realities of our country. Law can only develop in this way. Civilization can only 
develop in this way.  
(İ. Sühan Özkan in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt. 85, 61. Birleşim, p. 
268, emphasis added) 
A similar instance of invoking modernity as an impetus for institutionalizing human 
rights and pushing for further democratization is expressed by MP Aydın Tümen, who 
maintains that “[f]or our country to achieve a modern and democratic structure, for a 
democratization in the standards of the European Union to be instituted, the opposition 
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parties have as much duties as the ruling party.” (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 
2002, Cilt. 85, 61. Birleşim, p. 253, emphasis added) Once again, human rights and 
democratic values are promoted as ‘scripts of modernity’ as put by Krasner (1999), 
thereby shaping actors’ identities and interests.  
The theme of balancing conveys a lower visibility compared to the British context, 
both in the security frame and the rights frame. The need to balance security concerns with 
fundamental rights and freedoms has been expressed with respect to the problematic clauses 
in the Anti-terror Law that has been corroding freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press:  
…[W]hen we are compared to other countries, it is plain that we are lagging 
behind in many fields pertaining to freedom of expression. It is desired that the 
balance between national security and freedom of expression is sustained 
continually. There is a concern to keep security in the forefront while protecting 
freedoms. Now, if we empathize on a concrete event we might ask for the 
gravest punishment, yet on the other hand there is freedom of the press, freedom 
of expression, the right of the people to have access to information. If we find a 
solution on the basis of such balance, we might not have to go back. 
 (Yüksel Hız in Adalet Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi, 31 May 2012, p.7, emphasis added) 
 
 
Table 37. Rights Frame Solution Mechanisms 
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Figure 33. Distribution of Rights Frame Solution Mechanisms 
 The final component of the solution framing belongs to solution intersectionality, 
denoting those areas that overlap with the solution of upholding rights and promoting 
democratization. The main area of intersection in the Turkish context is occupied by the 
principle of pluralism. Distinct from the notion of multiculturalism prevalent in the UK 
context which primarily encourages the flourishing of minority cultures, pluralism invokes a 
political space where conflicting worldviews, political standpoints, as well as cultures and 
religions can co-exist:  
There are two types of understanding dear friends: One is based on a monist 
notion of a single truth, it is single-minded and ideological states embrace this 
philosophy…other people’s rights are considered correct to the extent that they 
overlap with their rights. People whose rights that do not overlap with theirs are 
considered as a herd of sheep that have gone astray away from the right path, 
while they regard themselves as shepherds responsible of bringing them to reason, 
usually in a despotic way. The second understanding, my dear friends, is the 
pluralist understanding. According to the pluralist understanding, truth has many 
dimensions, yours is not the only right. 
(Hüseyin Çelik in TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 6 February 2002, Cilt. 85, 61. Birleşim, p.346, 
emphasis added) 
 263 
 
 
Figure 34. Frequency of Rights Frame Solution Intersectionality 
 With the interplay of all these framing cues, the rights framework acquires a fully-
fledged body that operates in the political arena. Parallel to the UK legislative context, 
problem roles are attributed to the extended power of the police and armed forces, as well as 
the executive under the mentality of state of emergency. One interesting distinction has been 
that of real terrorists as opposed to those falsely being accused, conveying the argument that 
counter-terrorism legislation is problematic as a weapon in the hands of the government for 
labeling the innocent as terrorists, on par with what is deemed as the ‘real’ enemy. This 
position illustrates how the security discourse has permeated the rights narrative in 
articulating a language of the ‘enemy’ as the existential other, in this case the ‘real’ terrorists 
being those that do not respect the Republican principles and the unity of the nation, as 
opposed to the falsely accused innocent citizens that espouse such national values. While 
invoking notorious experiences from the past to guide future conduct, the rights policy 
frame points out in what ways security policies are damaging democratic rights and liberties, 
most prominently felt in the spheres of freedom of expression, freedom of press, and due 
process. Two crucial mechanisms that contribute to this situation are firstly the 
institutionalized status of exceptionalism in Turkish political life, and secondly the vague 
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definition of terrorism which makes it susceptible to label any political dissident voices. The 
uneasy course of the civil-military relations is also mentioned as an important factor in 
entrenching the state of exception in the Turkish context.  
 On the other hand, international institutions promoting international norms and 
standards of democratic practices have been delineated as the main sites for bringing about a 
solution. Once again as in the UK context, the emphasis is given to the legal dimension of 
human rights, underscoring obligations under international norms as entailed by membership 
to international bodies, such as the EU and ECtHR. Nonetheless, an understanding of 
universal morality does make an appearance during the early debates on harmonization 
packages, positing rights as entitlements to human honour. An important theme that 
reverberates in all three discussions is the practices of ‘civilized’ societies as a model for 
Turkey, usually with reference to European nations, whereby adopting a rights-based 
understanding is presented as a means for becoming a member of the ‘civilized’ world as 
suggested by Risse and Sikkink (1999). Hence, whilst the institutionalization of rights and 
the impetus for democratization is construed as ‘scripts of modernity’ (Krasner, 1999), 
upholding such norms are promoted for the international status they confer.  
6.3. Conclusion:  
 The Turkish parliamentary debates are marked by the predominance of the security 
discourse, owing to the long-established position of the military as the vanguards of the 
Republic, coupled by the prolonged conflict in the south east region with the PKK forces 
that has culminated in the institutionalization of the state of exception. The security 
discourse is imbued in a pervasive nationalist narrative that cross-cuts different frame 
elements. One such manifestation is the concept of national sensibilities connoting national 
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values such as principles of the Republic, the indivisible unity of the nation, not solely in 
terms of land but also the nation, as well as sensibilities regarding the majority religion. 
Thus, from this framework it is possible to infer that the state and its official ideology are 
the main objects of security in the Turkish context. The state in its material and ideological 
manifestations is placed before any conception of freedom or rights, demarcating the 
grounds in which the latter are subject to necessary limitations. 
While reforms that aim to limit security policies in favor of greater respect for 
human rights are denounced as foreign impositions that weaken the state, a related matter of 
concern is the possible abuse of these rights by terrorists groups. Two key areas that come to 
the fore are namely demonstrations and propaganda, whereby the right to protest along with 
the freedom of expression is being securitized as sites harboring the ideology and activities 
of the terrorist organization. The conception of the enemy is categorized as either 
‘separatist’ organizations or religious reactionary groups that refute the principles of the 
Republic and unity of the nation. Once again, a rhetorical commitment to democratic values 
and human rights is visible as policy-makers reaffirm their dedication to such values in order 
to invoke legitimacy as suggested by Risse and Sikkink (1999). These claims tend to be 
followed by elaboration of the necessity of limiting such rights and liberties. Thus, by 
paying lip service to the status of human rights one is able to legitimize restrictive policies. 
In order to justify such limitations, examples of practices from the ‘civilized’ nations are put 
forth, in addition to stressing the priority of national sensibilities.  
 Notwithstanding the preponderance of the security narrative in the Turkish 
parliamentary debates, it has been challenged by the growing salience of a rights rhetoric 
finding momentum with the EU-accession process. In the last decade, a rights-based 
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language has started to establish itself in the Turkish political scene, putting freedoms and 
individuals’ entitlements before an étatist understanding. Pointing out the undemocratic 
environment precipitated by the historical normalization of the state of exception and the 
role bestowed to the armed forces, the rights policy frame seeks to draw attention to grave 
human rights violations in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and the 
basic principles of due process. Particularly in the most recent debates on the reform 
packages, it has been asserted that the label of ‘terrorist’ is being misused by government 
officials in silencing dissident political voices. A noteworthy manifestation of this theme 
resonates in the distinction being made between real terrorist versus those that are falsely 
accused, whereby overbroad and draconian counter-terrorism provisions are not denounced 
on the grounds of being illiberal, but rather for failing to target the real ‘enemies’ and 
instead being used as a pretext for imprisoning political opponents. In so doing, the rights 
frame borrows from the repertoire of the security narrative, adopting similar construction of 
the ‘enemy’ as the existential other in Schmittean terms ([1922] 1985), and in this particular 
case those who renounce Republican principles and the unity of the nation in favor of an 
alternative political ideal.  
In order to establish a rights framework in the political culture the process of 
democratization is upheld and promoted within the rights narrative. One of the most 
interesting findings that have presented itself throughout the data is the endorsement of 
human rights and democratization as the requirements of modernity. Echoing Krasner’s 
account (1999), such normative concepts are espoused as ‘scripts of modernity’ that confer 
international standing and legitimacy to a political regime. This framework is also 
substantiated by references given to what are considered as ‘civilized countries’, an 
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argument that also finds expression in the security frame that usually comes to connote the 
model of European countries or the United States. Hence, commitment to human rights and 
the process of democratization are embellished and endorsed as indicators of being part of 
the ‘civilized world’, rather than emphasizing their inherent worth for a free and fair society. 
As can be seen, once again the Turkish case illustrates how the interplay of the two policy 
frames work to transform one another and the understanding of sovereignty as an entity that 
is incumbent upon protecting the nation state and thus endowed with the authority to invoke 
the state of exception, yet whose legitimacy is conditioned upon international standards of 
democracy and rights.  
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Conclusion: 
Talking Security and Rights: The Interplay of Policy Frames in Turkey and the UK 
 
 This section has offered a systematic frame analysis of the parliamentary debates 
surrounding key counter-terrorism legislation in the contexts of Turkey and the UK. 
Building on a standardized frame structure, this part of the analysis has examined the 
panoply of different themes, arguments, and concepts that constitute and give meaning to 
frame elements. The interplay between the security frame and rights frame displays itself in 
some interesting discursive formations/formulations that not only provide insights regarding 
the content of the parliamentary debates, but more importantly on the different 
manifestations of sovereignty in the political discourse. As a result, the analysis presents 
important patterns that reverberate across both cases with respect to the language of security 
and rights, in addition to points of departure owing to the distinctiveness of each setting. The 
fact that similar representational structures are evident in both contexts regarding counter-
terrorism and human rights provides significant insights into the making of security policies.  
While the UK is one of the most established democracies in the world, it exhibits similar 
narratives and discursive constructs to those found in country like Turkey which is still 
going through a process of democratization with an ill-famed record of human rights 
violations. This section will highlight the important findings that have come to the fore in 
the analysis of the parliamentary debates in these two different settings.  
1. The plea to balance 
 The single most recurrent theme in the UK context has been the code on balancing, 
connoting the need to strike a balance between security measures and human rights 
principles. Despite being relatively more pronounced in the UK case, this argument is 
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articulated by actors in both settings who perceive the issue of counter-terrorism as a matter 
of maintaining the right balance of liberties vis-à-vis security. What is more interesting is 
that this argument has proved to be visible in both policy frames, eliciting the legitimacy 
conferred by human rights norms being acknowledged also within the security discourse. 
This tendency demonstrates how sovereignty is premised on a dual conceptualization where 
it comes to be understood not only in terms of providing security to the public, but also as an 
entity that is expected to protect fundamental human rights norms. As the security narrative 
cannot easily replace human rights obligations, or vice versa, state actors articulate 
balancing as a primary solution mechanism.  
2. Reaffirming commitment to rights and liberties 
 Another pervasive theme that resonates across both contexts is the code on 
reaffirming commitment to rights and liberties, which tend to operate in tandem with the 
argument of balancing in the security frame. Salient in both settings, this argument denotes 
the confirmation of a rhetorical commitment to human rights within the security discourse, 
once again signaling the recognition of the status of human rights in the political arena with 
tremendous bearings in both national and international legitimacy. The occurrence of this 
code usually unfolds in a pattern of declaring allegiance to human rights and democratic 
values, followed by the depiction of exceptionalism or pressing reality of terrorism that 
necessitate their suspension. Similarly, the high frequency of this code suggests that even 
with respect to security issues pertaining to the sacrosanct terrain of realism, state actors 
cannot dismiss the status of human rights norm; therefore, they tend to pay lip service to 
these principles and circumscribe their boundaries through the state of exception.  
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3. Human rights as legal obligations 
The conceptualization and endorsement of human right in the parliamentary debates 
is grounded in its legal weight more than its moral weight, defined and supported primarily 
as international norms stipulated by membership to international institutions. This framing is 
persistent throughout both contexts, with the exception of a few instances of underlining the 
universal morality human rights during the discussion of EU harmonization packages in 
Turkey. Thus, a notion of an agreed upon set of normative standards premised on a 
conception of universal morality was largely absent in both contexts. Overall, legal 
obligation is one of the strongest themes that reverberate in both settings, accentuating 
international norms as foreseen by membership to certain international institutions, primarily 
the EU (candidacy in the case of Turkey) and ECtHR. Moreover, the legal dimension was 
accompanied with an understanding of membership to international institutions and the 
standards of human rights they enforce as signaling a belonging to the ‘civilized nations’.  
4. International Institutions versus international community 
 Likewise, within the rights frame commitments and obligations under formal 
institutional bodies have been significantly more visible in the parliamentary debates, 
compared to a notion of international community premised on a certain identity with shared 
values and ideas. Once again, this tendency vindicates the legal dimension of human rights 
norms enshrined in international covenants as blueprints for appropriate state behavior 
towards its citizens, rather than an agreed upon universal morality by an international 
community of states. Interestingly, the notion of an international community has been 
reiterated more frequently within the security frame by state actors that express being part of 
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an community with shared values that works together against a perceived common threat 
that is seen to target a civilizational construct; thereby, demonstrating how the constructivist 
categories of ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ are translated into national security agendas. (Jepperson 
et. al, 1996)  
5. State of exception and the prospects of due process 
 Once again, in both contexts the leitmotif of exceptionalism has been ubiquitous in 
the debates on terrorism and counter-terrorism measures. In the British context the state of 
exception is invoked within the security frame in relation to the post-9/11 world order, 
depicting the problem as an unprecedented experienced and a modern nemesis that threatens 
‘western civilization’, contrary to earlier experiences with the IRA. Thus, it is suggested that 
these exceptional circumstances demand exceptional measures. On the other hand, the state 
of exception has already been entrenched in the political culture of Turkey, through 
consecutive military interventions in the functioning of civil democracy and wide-spread 
execution of emergency laws. The normalization of civil-military relations had been 
initiated in the aftermath of the last military coup in 1980s, yet exceptionalism continues to 
haunt political and social life due to the clashes with the PKK and the unresolved tension 
with the Kurdish movement. Hence, in Turkey the security frame does not purport the onset 
of exceptional situations as a novel phenomenon, but rather it is extensively articulated 
within the rights frame as a key source of problem. In both contexts, rights frame address the 
problems engendered by the state of exception, particularly its corrosive impact on the due 
process whereby suspects are barred from their basic rights to seek justice and are instead 
‘contained’ as possible threats to national security. Consequently, practices such as 
 272 
 
indefinite detention or excessively long periods of pre-trial detention become common 
implementations with the institutionalization of the exception.  
6. Defining the enemy 
 The depiction of the enemy as the existential other threatening national values and a 
given way of life has been another persistent pattern, demonstrating the Schmittean 
understanding of an enemy (whether internal or external) that needs to be eliminated and 
silenced in the public sphere. In the UK case, a distinction has been made between ethnic 
terrorism and international terrorism, the former affiliated with the activities of the IRA and 
the latter with Islamic fundamentalist groups. Yet, in this context the deliberation of the 
target tends to focus on the Muslim minority, the immigrants, and asylum seekers as those 
potential groups who can abuse the open society and expose certain segments of the 
population to extremist teachings. In line with Zarakol’s (2011) account, ethnic form of 
terrorism is framed as ‘system-affirming’ in the sense of demanding self-rule within the 
Westphalian order; however, international terrorism correlated with Islamic groups are 
portrayed as vicious violent assaults to tenets of western civilization and democracy. On the 
other hand, the Turkish case presents a different picture, with a distinction being made to 
what is referred to as separatist terrorism (bölücü) versus religious reactionary terrorism 
(irtica). The former associated with the activities of the PKK continues to be the main focus 
in the parliamentary debates due to the on and off nature of the ongoing clashes in the south 
east region; whereas, religious reactionary terrorism is verbalized to a much lesser extent. 
Both forms of terrorism are perceived to be ‘enemies within’ who are supported by foreign 
powers in their upheaval to national values, whilst international form of terrorism is 
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understood in the British contexts as being associated with ‘foreigners’ or immigrants who 
seek to destroy western civilization. 
7. Defining terror 
 As mentioned in the previous section on policy analysis, the adoption of overbroad 
definitions of terrorism and terrorist acts is present in both contexts, giving way to dubious 
measures as well as opening the way for various aspect of political life to be subsumed by 
the security apparatus. As the contours of terrorism are held wide and amorphous, it is easier 
to categorize myriad types of acts under such heading, including forms of democratic 
participation that might be deemed ‘dangerous’ by the officials. This tendency is addressed 
by the rights frame in both settings, pointing out how dissident voices are easily silenced by 
the terrorist label as encouraging or propagating terrorist ideologies, as a result of the vague 
and extensive definition of the concept. Such provisions are not only against principles of 
legality, but also marginalize political opposition and protest.  
8. Securitization of dissent 
 An upshot of employing vague definition of terrorism is the securitization of 
dissenting views in the public sphere. In the UK, the notion of extremism is invoked quite 
frequently as a major source of fostering terrorist ideologies and inculcating the society with 
ideas of violence against western civilization, generally referring to Islamic organizations 
that operate within the country, including mosques and other places of worship. On the other 
hand, in the Turkish context, the focus is on propaganda, usually referring to the ideology of 
the Kurdish political movement which is framed as defying national values such as the unity 
of the nation and irrefutable authority of the Turkish state. As a result, freedom of 
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expression and the workings of deliberative democracy are being subjected to the act of 
securitizing, where ideas considered extreme or radical are categorized as threats to national 
security.  
 A corollary finding has been the securitization of demonstrations and protests that 
are primary sites for the expression of discontent in participatory democracies. In both 
contexts, public demonstrations have been equated with sites harboring potential threat to 
public order and security, thereby transforming this democratic space into a security concern 
where the enjoyment of rights need to be restricted. The arguments for the necessity of 
preventive measures taken by the police in the UK are premised on this understanding, 
which have culminated in the extensive stop and search powers. In a similar vein, in the 
Turkish case it has even been suggested that an individual might ‘become’ a terrorist by 
merely attending a public demonstration. In fact, the notorious reverse amendments enacted 
in 2006 convey this theme by allowing individuals to be tried as members of terrorist 
organizations if they attend public demonstrations believed to be organized by the PKK. The 
securitization of freedom of expression and the right to protest illustrates the Schmittean 
([1922] 1985) notion of eliminating radical political groups from the public sphere under the 
state of exception.  
9. Democracy as national pride versus democratization as a requirement of modernity 
 In both contexts, the theme of democracy permeates the rights frame, emphasizing 
the indispensable position of democratic principles and processes in establishing a rights-
based institutional framework. In the UK the concept of democratic values is more salient 
due to the long-established democratic tradition of the country. This concepts is also 
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articulated in tandem with the generic code of the nation, signifying democratic values as 
part of the political culture of the country as a national pride. On the other hand, in the case 
of Turkey the process of democratization is advocated, as an ongoing mission yet to be 
achieved. Due to a history tainted by consecutive military coups and the normalization of the 
state of exception, consolidation of democracy is still an oscillating process. A noteworthy 
finding in the Turkish parliamentary debates has been the endorsement of greater 
democratization and the institutionalization of human rights, especially with the onset of the 
EU-accession process, imbued in a narrative of being part of the modern nations as required 
by modernity. Thus, within the rights frame, such concepts are promoted with references to 
example of ‘civilized’ societies conferring international standing and prestige as suggested 
by Risse and Sikkink (1999), emphasized more than the inherent value of rights and 
freedoms.  
10. Object of security 
 One palpable difference in the two cases has been the designated objects of security. 
In the UK case, the object of security is posited a referring to the public order and safety, in 
protecting the law-abiding innocent citizens from the ubiquitous threat of terrorist attacks. 
This conceptualization is predicated on a binary opposition of ‘us’ versus ‘them, whereby an 
understanding of our way of life (Wolfendale, 2006) representing western values is being 
targeted by evil terrorist groups who lack any understanding of civilization. On the other 
hand, in the Turkish case the object of security is cogently elucidated as the state, with its 
indivisible unity not merely in terms of land but also the nation, coupled with other national 
values that underpin its ideological foundations such as the principles of the Republic. This 
conceptualization reflects Buzan’s (1983) dual account of the nation state premised on a 
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physical and an ideological base, where the latter conveys the ‘idea’ of the nation and 
national identity as critical elements in the security problematique.   
11. Abusing rights 
 A common argument that finds expression in both contexts within the security frame 
is that terrorist groups tend to abuse rights and freedoms in a given society to their own 
advantage, thus framing rights as amenable to manipulation for terrorist plans. This finding 
is concurrent to Jackson’s (2007a) analysis of the security discourse in EU counter-terrorism 
policies. Firstly, in the UK case there is a stress made on abuse of open society, which 
suggests that terrorist networks find it easier to operate without impediments in an open 
society premised on rights and democratic values. Particularly, the issue-areas of 
immigration and asylum are being framed as national security matters that risk opening the 
door to infiltration by terrorists. In the case of Turkey, however, the emphasis is being made 
to the possible abuse of newly adopted rights and freedoms, particularly as part of the EU-
accession process, and how they are used as pretexts for the terrorist organization to promote 
its own ideology ‘under the rubric of’ freedom of expression.  
12. ‘Necessary’ restrictions to human rights 
 Interrelated with (yet not equivalent to) the code on necessity, the theme of 
restricting human rights lends itself to ample articulations in both contexts. In the UK case, 
this theme is represented by the code of necessary sacrifice, which stands for the idea that 
some human rights norms ought to be bypassed in a given situation of turmoil. The 
overtones of ‘sacrificing’ hint at the established status of human rights, which need to be 
suspended under exceptional circumstances. In the case of Turkey, a similar line of 
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reasoning is expressed through necessary limits to rights and liberties, which conveys a 
suspicious stance towards the concept of human rights unlike the UK context. In tandem 
with the aforementioned theme on abusing rights and liberties, once again this concept 
indicates a skeptical stance towards human rights, as possible pretexts to be utilized by 
terrorist groups. This argument is intensified when coined with the code on ‘foreign 
imposition’, where human rights are perceived to be imposed by western states in order to 
provide concessions to terrorists.   
13. Areas of intersectionality: nationalism, religion, and immigration 
 In the case of UK, two pivotal areas that tend to intersect with discussions on 
terrorism and how to formulate counter-terrorism measures have been the issue of religion 
and immigration. As mentioned earlier, religious activities of minority groups, primarily the 
Muslim minority, are construed as an issue that is interlinked with terrorism. Likewise, the 
issue areas of immigration and asylum are also juxtaposed to countering terrorism, as 
potential risks to national security that might give way to infiltration of terrorists. Hence, 
minority religion under the banner of extremism along and immigration policies are the two 
sites that have been securitized in the UK context. On the other hand, the most solidified 
area of intersectionality that cross-cuts all parliamentary debates in Turkey is the issue of 
nationalism. National values, national sensibilities, national identity, and the unity of the 
nation are reiterated on myriad accounts, connecting the fight against terror with nationalist 
ideals. As a result, counter-terrorism becomes more than assuring the security of the public 
and signifies upholding the nationalist ideology. This theme is important in illustrating how 
difference is being perceived as a threat to the idea of the homogenous ‘nation’, to be 
contained (Blaney & Inayatullah, 2000).  
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14. A call for co-existence 
 Against this backdrop, the rights frame has made a call for co-existence against the 
discriminatory and corrosive repercussions of counter-terrorism policies in community 
relations and tolerance. In the British case, multiculturalism is promoted as a policy against 
discriminatory practices of counter-terrorism that marginalize minority groups rendering 
them as ‘suspect’ communities (Silvestri, 2011); whereas, in the Turkish context principle of 
pluralism is advocated as an alternative to security policies that segregate the society. The 
distinction lies in the former addressing issues of minority culture and religion, whilst the 
latter adopts a wider scope supporting the co-existence of different political stances, 
oppositional views, as well as religious and ethnic identities. Hence, the rights frame in both 
contexts warns about the discriminatory effects of counter-terrorism measures, instead 
promoting tolerance and democratic dialogue.  
15. Borrowing from each other’s repertoire of meaning 
 On the whole, one of the most interesting findings throughout the frame analysis has 
been the inclination of each frame to borrow from the symbolic vocabulary of the other, as 
the language of security penetrates that of human rights and vice versa. In order to make an 
appeal for their cause both frames adopt arguments that can make a persuasive case, 
culminating in the convergence of the two frames at certain junctures. This phenomenon is 
evident in the plea of reaffirming commitment to human rights or the framing of security as 
a ‘right’ whereby the security discourse adopts the language of rights for invoking 
legitimacy. On the other hand, the rhetoric of creating martyrs with unjust counter-terrorism 
practices in the case of the UK, and the distinction between real terrorists and those that are 
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falsely accused exemplify how the language of rights borrows from the security narrative in 
the conceptualization of the enemy as the existential others. 
 In short, the deliberations, bargaining, and confrontations of the two policy frames 
manifest themselves in a nexus of common themes, concepts, and arguments that produce 
key counter-terrorism legislation yielding an immense impact on the political life of each 
setting. The security discourse operates in stimulating an environment of constant threat and 
insecurity, thereby justifying draconian measures that mar the status of human rights through 
acts of securitization. Concomitantly, the discourse of rights and liberties challenge the 
security logic by problematizing the stronghold of exceptionalism, instead advocating 
obligations under international norms. While the security frame pays lip service to human 
rights principles owing to the legitimacy and international standing they bequeath, the rights 
framework mimics the security language by adopting similar construction of the enemy as 
the existential other. As such, in the context of fighting terrorism, the two aspect of 
sovereignty are grounded in the political discourse, not replacing but transforming each 
other in the policy making process: as the provider of security and thereby the ultimate 
authority to declare the state of exception, yet concomitantly, whose legitimacy is bound by 
the protection of human rights norms. In the end, the interplay between the two policy 
frames produces concrete laws with real and significant outcomes.  
 
  
 
 280 
 
Conclusion. Reconciling Policy and Discourse 
 
 The breadth of security is a pressing matter in modern societies not only from a 
realist perspective of mitigating possible threats, but also with respect to the ramifications of 
such threat perception and concurrent emergency situations on the enjoyment of rights. 
Security policies do not solely influence the well-being of the state and the safety of the 
public; they also yield tremendous bearings on the functioning of democracy and 
participation in the polity. Conceptions of the ‘enemy’ or ‘threats to national security’ are 
translated into the legislation and become institutionalized over time. As wider areas of 
political life are subsumed under the logic of (in)security, they move beyond the normal 
political process into the state of exception marked by a legal limbo. The inflated sense of 
threat and urgency has produced counter-terrorism policies that aim to introduce preventive 
measures for sustaining public safety at the expense of individual rights and democratic 
principles. While state officials cannot simply condone the human rights obligations they are 
subject to, they tend to by-pass such requirements with the mantle of exceptionalism 
necessitating exceptional measures.  
 This study set out to illustrate how states try to balance security concerns with 
human rights obligations in the context of counter-terrorism. It has been argued throughout 
the analysis that the normative weight of human rights norms and democratic principles is 
indispensable for a legitimate basis of sovereignty in contemporary politics. Therefore, even 
in the most sacrosanct realist terrain of national security, attempts to sidestep these norms 
entail sound justifications. The multi-method analysis of policy development and policy 
frames has verified the argument that in an attempt to by-pass human rights obligations state 
actors securitize areas of political life replacing them beyond the boundaries of normal 
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politics by invoking a sense of exceptionalism. At this conjuncture, language and policy are 
mutually constitutive in determining how certain concepts, policies, or causes are defined 
and framed, shaping political outcomes. Congruently, counter-terrorism policies are also 
formulated as a product of the conflicts, bargaining, and negotiation between a language of 
security and a language of rights. The analyses in the previous sections have mapped out the 
general tendencies in each setting as well as similar patterns that cross-cut both contexts in 
the making of counter-terrorism legislation and their relationship to human rights norms. 
This last section will elicit those discernable linkages between policy outcomes and framing 
trends that have been visible throughout the analysis. It will finish off by elaborating the 
main contributions of the study, followed by future direction for academic research and 
policy implications.  
 To begin with, an evident trend in the legislative debates has been defining and 
categorizing critical concepts and how such definitions ultimately shape what is to be 
considered as a matter of security. The definition of ‘terrorism’ per se has proved to be a 
contentious matter in world politics in the absence of an internationally recognized 
definition of the term. Consequently, national legislations in different contexts adopt varying 
definitions that reflect the understanding of the object of security as well as the 
conceptualization of the ‘enemy’. The definitions of terrorism in relevant laws on counter-
terrorism reflect the underlying themes and interpretive cues that are prevalent in the 
parliamentary debates. In the British case both the political rhetoric and the provisions are 
predicated on a conceptualization of the public order as the main object of security, wherein 
‘innocent law-abiding citizens’ are threatened by terrorist who are against western culture. 
Whereas, in the Turkish case, definition of terrorism in the extant law designates the nation 
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state as the primary object of security with its physical and material basis (Buzan, 1983), 
reflecting the étatism that underscores parliamentary debates.  
Notwithstanding this difference, both settings have adopted vague and overbroad 
definitions of terrorism and terrorist acts, which have resulted in the criminalization of 
democratic rights and the labeling of certain segments of the population as ‘suspects’ 
(Silvestri, 2011). The various problems associated with employing such a vague definition 
have been frequently voiced in both settings. In the Turkish case the primary target of 
counter-terrorism continues to be the Kurdish political movement and its ideological tenets 
as jeopardizing the unity of the nation and the authority of the state. This standpoint is also 
palpable in the predominant presence of the nationalist discourse not only in the law-making 
process but also the subsequent laws that emphasize the indivisible unity of the nation with 
its land and nation. Nonetheless, the changing political context has brought about the 
designation of new suspect groups that are considered to threaten the political authority. On 
the other hand, in the British political scene two overlapping groups come to the fore as the 
possible risk groups, namely immigrants and asylum seekers, as well as the Muslim 
minority. As repeatedly voiced in the parliamentary debates these two groups are identified 
with abusing the opportunities of open society, coming from other countries to preach 
extremism and hatred. This perception is markedly manifest in policies such as the indefinite 
detention of non-nationals and the Special Immigration Appeals Committee. Concurrently, 
regulations introduced in 2006 on the direct or indirect encouragement of terrorism that 
addresses extremism, that is generally associated with the Muslim community, is another 
clear manifestation. Hence, against the perception of a national identity, difference and 
diversity is being construed as elements of threat (Blaney & Inayatullah, 2000; Schmitt, 
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([1922] 1985). Against this backdrop, there is a call to overcome the inherent discriminatory 
framework in counter-terrorism policies that hinder inter-community relations and principles 
of pluralism. This call is traced in the discourse of rights that aims to challenge the 
damaging effects of the security logic, in this case the marginalization of certain segments of 
the population. 
 A related trend that interconnects the framing of terrorism with counter-terrorism 
policies pertains to the securitization of dissent. Particularly those political activities in 
relation to freedom of expression and the right to protest are being subsumed under the 
security apparatus, which severely corrodes democratic forms of participation. The framing 
of ‘extremism’ or ‘propaganda’ in ways that necessitate the limitation on freedom of 
expression have been directly translated into policies that tend to suffocate political 
opposition. Likewise, public demonstrations and protests have been framed as possible sites 
harboring threat to the public order or terrorist motives and thereby been subject to 
securitization. In the Turkish context in addition to the Kurdish political movement, such 
laws have recently been targeting other forms of vocal political opposition deemed as the 
existential others of the polity, including prominent figures associated with the Kemalist 
ideology of the ancién regime (Schmitt, [1922] 1985). Similarly in the British case, in 
addition to political organizations and activism undertaken by the Muslim minority, other 
forms of political dissent such as protests against the Labor government or the student 
movement in 2010 have been dealt within the scope of counter-terrorism. As exceptionalism 
becomes ingrained in the political structure, these security policies go on to paralyze the 
functioning of democracy and the legitimacy of the political opposition.  
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 In tandem with these proclivities, an upshot of the security logic is the enhancement 
of powers granted to the security forces. While perceptions of threat permeate into different 
issue-areas, so does the purview of security requiring the monitoring and controlling of the 
society, thereby ‘disciplining the domestic society’ (Jackson, 2005). In both contexts, there 
has been an emphasis on extending police powers, while in the Turkish context additional 
stress has been made to the role of the military in fighting terrorism due to the ongoing 
armed struggle in the south east region. The continuing role of the military that has 
historically entrenched the state of exception in the political culture is a serious obstacle to 
the bourgeoning peace process the country has been undergoing. Recently in Turkey, 
provisions similar to those of the stop and search powers in the UK have been granted to the 
police on the basis of ‘reasonable suspicion’, including the authority to arrest and detain in 
the absence of a court order. Such policies not only discourage political opposition 
particularly public demonstrations, but also bypass the normal judicial processes.  
 A notable tendency observable in both contexts is the suspension of due process 
under the state of exception and the creation of a legal void in dealing with terrorist suspects 
who are to be ‘contained’. The grounds for suspending indispensable principles of justice 
can be traced in the parliamentary debates where the duty to uphold rights are depicted as a 
burden to security initiatives. Such discursive cues include the necessity of limiting or 
‘sacrificing’ rights for the greater good of security and also the threat that rights might be 
abused for terrorist intents. As mentioned earlier, in the UK context exceptionalism has been 
articulated with the September 11 attacks continuing with London bombings, conceptualized 
as an unprecedented situation that is different from experiences with the IRA since the 
attacks have been framed as targeting ‘western civilization’ at large. This outlook has been 
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translated into subsequent policies first initiated by the controversial provision on indefinite 
detention of non-nationals, continuing with control orders and TPIMs, which operate outside 
of criminal law rendering individuals susceptible to the “de facto rule” of the sovereign 
(Agamben, 2003: 3) In the Turkish case exceptionalism has been part and parcel of the 
political culture with consecutive military interventions and the wide-spread execution of 
emergency laws. Although this characteristic has been undergoing a thorough 
transformation since the EU accession process, the vestiges can still be felt in different 
forms. One such example is the pre-trial detention period that can go up to ten years for 
crimes against national security or the Constitutional order, as stipulated by the Criminal 
Procedure Law (Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu, 2004). These counter-terrorism measures have 
been subject to both international and domestic criticisms for justifying the infringement of 
established rights and the normal legal process. Such criticisms are also represented in the 
parliamentary debates in both contexts for impeding the rule of law and due process.  
 Despite the corrosive effects of securitization on human rights principles, these 
norms retain their normative power in conferring legitimacy and international standing 
(Risse et. al., 1999; Krasner, 1999; Reus-Smith, 2001). This aspect can be observed in the 
highly visible rhetorical trend to reaffirm commitment to human rights and democratic 
values in both contexts. The introduction of a draconian measure is usually preceded by 
reiterating the recognition of the status of rights and liberties. At certain instances, the 
security narrative mimics rights-talk by framing security as a right, thereby drawing on the 
legitimacy conveyed by the concept. Moreover, the objective of striking the right balance 
between human rights and security concerns is another repeatedly asserted theme in counter-
terrorism legislation. These positions are not only rhetorical strategies but are also converted 
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into policy outcomes, such as the tendency to repackage contentious provisions under a 
different banner. As controversial provisions become subject to both domestic and 
international criticism, they threaten the legitimacy of the government due to the negation of 
established rights and freedoms, and are therefore replaced by newer, ostensibly less 
controversial ones. An example from the UK case is the evolution of policies that seek to 
contain terrorist suspects, from indefinite detention of non-nationals, to the TPIMs that 
claim to remedy the imbalance present in previous measures. Similar inclinations are evident 
in the Turkish case where officials seek to amend controversial clauses in the face of 
growing national and international discontent with files piling at the Strasbourg Court.  
 Being part of the international human rights machinery endows nation states with an 
international standing as members of the ‘civilized nations’. Throughout this study, an 
evident concern over legitimacy has been empirically traced in both policy development and 
the political rhetoric. In the UK, the issue of deportation has proven to be a litmus test for 
balancing rights and security, where the government refrained from violating international 
laws against deportation, instead opting for indefinite detention of non-citizens. The latter 
contentious provision was also later dropped in line with ECtHR rulings against it. The 
incentives of Turkey are more pronounced due the requirements for fulfilling the 
Copenhagen criteria, in addition to the authority of the ECtHR. Notwithstanding the fact that 
a rights-based understanding is yet to be developed and established, obligations under such 
international institutions have been essential in promoting human rights priorities in the 
political agenda.  
 The parliamentary debates reflect a similar stance in both contexts, as the rights 
frame endorse international norms entailed by membership to international institutions. 
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Within this nexus, a clear emphasis is made on the legal obligations entailed by human 
rights norms, rather than on their inherent universal morality. While in the UK context, 
human rights principles and democratic values have been praised as part of the national 
identity, defining the character of the polity; in the Turkish case the goal of democratization 
and the institutionalization of rights have been encouraged as ‘scripts of modernity’ 
(Krasner, 1999), that signal being part of the ‘civilized world’. As such, the normative 
weight of human rights is mostly constituted by the understanding of legal obligations and 
international standing it provides, instead of a shared understanding of morality. Thus, the 
rhetoric of rights resonates throughout the policy-making process and challenges acts of 
securitization. 
 On the whole, this study contributes to the literature on theoretical, methodological, 
and empirical grounds. Firstly, the research is novel by bringing together securitization 
theory and the concept of ‘state of exception’ in order to critically approach the issue of 
counter-terrorism. The complementary nature of these two theories has proven to be quite 
fruitful in addressing the research questions at hand. How the act of securitization relies on 
invoking exceptionalism, and how the product of this narrative results in a “space devoid of 
law” (Agamben, 2003) where fundamental principles of justice are suspended, have 
constituted the backbone of the theoretical framework. Moreover, the incorporation of 
human rights norms and the language of rights into the analysis has allowed the researcher 
to trace the interplay of the security discourse with the latter. Studies that focus on 
securitization and its effects on human rights principles have often failed to include the 
rights discourse in their analysis, rendering it a passive position (Heller et. al., 2012; Pisoiu, 
2013). As these two narratives interact in the discursive plane, they tend to transform one 
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another as well as transforming the understanding of sovereignty. Therefore, the study sheds 
light on the contesting conceptualizations of sovereignty that manifest themselves in the 
context of counter-terrorism, not only connoting the authority to invoke the state of 
exception against a perceived threat and enemy, but also whose legitimacy is ever more 
conditioned upon the observance of international human rights. 
 Secondly, on a methodological level, the study offers a rigorous research design that 
seeks to unpack how security policies rest on cognitive frames and dominant discourses. As 
mentioned earlier, there has been an apparent lacuna in the IR literature on the issue of 
balancing human rights with fighting terror, as the issue is taken up either from a solely legal 
perspective or as part of a normative philosophical inquiry. In this regard, the study is novel 
in offering a contextual analysis of the matter at hand, by linking policy output to the 
political discourses in two different settings. In particular, the merging of frame analysis and 
the analytical tools offered by ATLAS.ti has produced a systematic examination of the 
parliamentary debates, by offering a structured form of discourse analysis that can be 
applied in different settings for comparative investigations. The process of double coding of 
the frame elements and those recurrent themes, arguments, and concepts has allowed 
ATLAS.ti to analyze these codes through its co-occurrence function both with respect to 
their relation to each other and also regarding their frequencies in the texts.  
Lastly, the empirical findings of the study contributes to the literature in 
demonstrating how counter-terrorism policies have come to culminate in unforeseen 
protracted forms of injustice that jeopardize the functioning of democracy that have an 
impact on the society at large. While governments undertake counter-terrorism policies and 
act in line with national security interests, they tend to overlook the consequences of such 
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policies for the functioning of democracy and principles of human rights. This is not only 
the case for a yet democratizing country like Turkey, but is also evident in long-established 
liberal democracies as clearly illustrated by the UK case, where the state of exception can 
bring about a reverse process for the status of rights. This tendency is particularly critical 
amidst a political environment marked by worldwide protests in many different social 
settings as individuals are becoming increasingly vocal in expressing their discontent against 
authoritarian or repressive regimes. At this juncture, democratic manifestations of dissent 
risk being subsumed by the logic of security as elements of threat to be silenced and 
eliminated from political life. A vibrant civil society underpinned by freedom of expression, 
the legitimacy of political opposition, and the rights of minority groups are bastions of 
liberal democracy and therefore too precious to be sacrificed for security concerns.  
Having said that, an important limitation of the study has been the absence of the 
dimension of resonance with respect to the security narrative. The resonance of 
securitization in the larger society points out to how such official representations find 
expression in the public opinion, whether or not they are accepted and reproduced in media 
outlets or by civil society actors. Also suggested by Buzan et. al. (1998), the act of 
securitization fulfills itself only when it finds resonance through its audience, which accepts 
the arguments that legitimizes the necessity of emergency measures. The extent to which 
framing of exceptionalism that necessitates extension of powers and the suspension of rights 
reverberates in public opinion is a significant phenomenon revealing the impact of political 
discourse. This issue is also pertinent with respect to the public representations of ‘suspect 
communities’ that come to be associated with terrorism and thereby identified as a potential 
source of threat, reinforcing their marginalization from the society at large. Due to given 
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time constraints, these important questions could not be addressed in this study, yet lend 
themselves to future work that deserve academic attention.  
In conclusion, the main findings of the study point to essential policy implications in 
the making of security policies in general, and counter-terrorism policies in particular. 
Striking the right balance between security and human rights is not an easy task, and 
officials are often expected to take a stern stance, especially in the face of tragic incidents. 
Yet, rash and miscalculated policies premised on a language of emergency, necessity, and 
exceptionalism lead to unforeseen long-term repercussions on the functioning of democracy 
that affect the society as a whole. Hence, policy-makers need to be wary of the wider 
implications of counter-terrorism policies beyond the field of national security, extending to 
other areas of social and political life that face the risk of being subsumed by the logic of 
security. Fundamental rights and freedoms are what make a political regime democratic by 
protecting citizens from the arbitrary power of the sovereign. Without rights and freedoms 
there can be no security. 
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Appendix 1. Code Book 
abuse of open society  how free movement of ideas, people, technology and 
resources offer a conducive setting for terrorist objectives 
abuse of rights and liberties  Rights and liberties are abused by terrorist groups 
balancing  the need to balance between rights and liberties on one 
hand and security on the other 
burden  rights and freedoms burdening protection of individuals 
civil-military relations  Issues pertaining to civil-military relations 
democratic values  sine qua non for democracy 
democratization  The process of democratization 
demonstration/protest  right to demonstration or protest being securitized 
dialogue/diplomacy redundant  Due to the characters attributed to other parties 
discrimination  policy is deemed discriminatory or believed to possible 
cause discriminatory implementation 
duty to protect  the government's duty to protect citizens 
enemy  depiction of the enemy as existentially different, evil, 
dangerous, radical. 
ethnic terrorism vs. 
international terrorism  
differentiating between ethnic and global terrorism as 
different phenomena 
example of 'civilized societies'  Certain policies deemed desirable by referring to the 
example of 'civilized societies' 
exceptionalism  exceptional situations entailing exceptional measures  
executive powers  the extension of executive powers 
extremism  extremism as a underlying problem of terrorism and a 
danger for the society 
foreign imposition  Certain reforms or new policies deemed as a foreign 
imposition 
freedom of association  freedom of association 
freedom of expression  freedom of expression 
freedom of press  freedom of the press 
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going soft  going soft on terrorism 
human rights 'for us'  demand for rights of the victim 
immigration and asylum  immigration and asylum  
infamous policy  policy deemed or risks being deemed infamous due to 
breach of rights and liberties 
international community  logic of appropriateness 
international institutions  obligations imposed by institutions 
international norms  established standards 
legal obligation  the government has international/domestic legal 
obligations to uphold rights and liberties 
lesson from the past  lessons from history to consider at the current 
conjuncture 
minority vs. majority  framing the issue in terms of the majority verses the 
minority 
multiculturalism  the importance of the values of multiculturalism and 
tolerance towards different cultures  
national sensibilities  National sensibilities that need to be taken into account, 
such as unity of the nation, the tutelary role of the army, 
principles of the Republic...etc. 
nationalism  Such as unity of the nation, security, international 
standing, becoming a regional power...etc.  
necessary limits to rights and 
liberties  
Rights and liberties should be restricted for the greater 
cause of security 
necessary sacrifice  the necessary sacrifice of certain rights in a given situation 
necessity  deeming certain measures inevitable  
operational effectiveness  technical need for the relevant policy 
organized crime  organized crime as an important topic 
othering support for human 
rights  
disregard or disrespect for the human rights community 
our lands  the rhetoric of 'our lands' belong to us, we must own it 
pluralism  emphasis on pluralist democracy 
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police and military  extending the role of the police and military forces in 
fighting terrorism 
police powers  extensive police powers for fighting terrorism 
pressing reality of terrorism  pressing reality of terrorism must be taken into account 
prevention  preventing possible future attacks 
problem intersectionality  other frames involved in the assessment 
problem location  where is the problem located? 
problem mechanism  what mechanism produces the problem? 
problem roles  who is responsible for the problem? 
propaganda  making propaganda of a terrorist organization or their 
ideology 
public demands security  the argument that public demands more security 
measures 
public opinion  the importance of public opinion emphasized 
reaffirming commitment to 
human rights  
the argument of reaffirming commitment to human rights 
when introducing security measures  
reaffirming commitment to 
human rights/democratization  
the argument of reaffirming commitment to human rights 
when introducing security measures  
real terrorists vs. falsely 
accused  
A distinction between those deemed to be 'real' terrorists 
that defy national principles versus falsely accused 
innocent individuals who espouse such values 
religion  religion as an important topic in the discussion 
requirement of modernity  Certain policies endorsed as requirements of modernity 
right to security  security not curtailing rights, but necessary to protect 
them 
rule of law/due process  rule of law and due process 
separatist vs. religious 
reactionary terrorism  
Differentiation between separatist versus fundamentalist 
forms of terrorism 
socio-economic development  Promoting socio-economic development as a solution to 
terrorism in the South East region 
solution intersectionality  other frames involved in the solution 
 322 
 
solution location  where is the solution located? 
solution mechanism  what are the mechanisms that should be addressed? 
solution roles  who is responsible for the solution? 
the nation/society  depiction of the nation or the society 
threat to our way of life  terrorism threatening a given preconception of 'our way 
of life' or 'our values' 
threat/urgency/emergency  perception of a threat to the nation, a matter entailing 
certain measures to be taken for security reasons 
threatening rights and liberties  policy deemed as threatening rights and liberties 
trivialization  downplaying rights curtailments, condoning the 
infringement of certain rights while reaffirming others. 
universal morality  humanistic values 
vague definition  problem of vague definition and wording  
victim  those that are violated and to be protected 
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Appendix 2. Total Distribution of Problem and Solution Codes 
 
 
Figure 35. Frequency of Codes Associated with a Problem Frame in UK Parliamentary Debates 
 
 
Figure 36. Frequency of Codes Associated with a Solution Frame in UK Parliamentary Debates 
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Figure 37. Frequency of Codes Associated with a Problem Frame in Turkish Parliamentary Debates 
 
 
Figure 38. Frequency of Codes Associated with a Solution Frame in Turkish Parliamentary Debates 
 
 
